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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study is concentrated on the question relating the 
future relations of two great regional actors of the area we 
prefer to call South West Asia. These countries, Turkey and 
Iran, have their own respective national identities and great 
histories. 
It is important to evaluate both countries and their 
foreign policies which face many challenges after the post 
cold war era to understand possible future relationships 
between both countries. It is hoped to find some clues to 
determine the future of their relations. This thesis will be 
helpful in finding mutual agreement between two countries 
which is essential for peace in this very sensitive region. 
This thesis will focus on the relations of Turkey and 
Iran and their view point on different issues that affect 
their relations. The first priority will be given to their 
security prerequisites and their current foreign policies. 
Domestic problems and the stability of their regimes will be 
another focal point used to estimate the future of their 
relations. 
This thesis will follow the systematic approach of using 
different tools to find a solution to the research question 
outlined in the contents table. The longititudional approach 
will be used to understand the development of relations 
between two countries. The method of agreement will be used to 
find common points on their relations. To understand what may 
cause a problem or cooperation between two countries, this 
thesis will examine the current issues of the two countries. 
The two countries will be compared by making the analysis of 
political,  economical,  social  and  security  factors  to 
understand their decision-making process. 
Both countries have long histories, their first 
interactions were recorded as early as third century B.C. 
However, there are some turning points in the relations of 
both countries. 
The thesis will look for the periods in which they 
established good relations and cooperated as well as periods 
which caused struggle between these countries. The historical 
relations of the two countries will be studied beginning from 
their early history. The history of Shiism also requires 
attention. 
It is crucial to know that although nations behave 
according to the flow of events in their era, their history 
shows an interpretive system or paradigm to analyze and 
respond to these events. So, it is important to give adequate 
attention to the study of history to understand basic 
characteristics of their relations. 
There are several severe problems between the two 
countries that may destroy peace in the region. The policy of 
Iran to influence Central Asia and the Turkish response to 
this challenge must be studied. The Iranian policy on the 
Kurdish problem in the region is tremendously important for 
Turkey. The chaos in Iraq after the Gulf War is another 
problem between the two countries. The security of the Gulf 
region has an impact on the Turkish economy. An aggressive 
alliance of Iran and Syria may endanger the security of 
Turkey. 
The ongoing attempts to export Islamic fundamentalism by 
Iran is a threat to the secular regime of Turkey. The attempts 
of Iran to influence Shiite populations in the region are 
another problem between Turkey and Iran. The increasing 
nationalism in the Azerbaijan may also be seen as a threat to 
Iran. Armenia's expansionist policies and Iran's close ties 
with Armenia may be another dispute between two countries. The 
extensive military build-up and nuclear proliferation of Iran 
may seem as a threat to Turkey. 
If the geopolitics of the region is studied, the 
influence of the two countries over region and current events 
will be understood. Developments in the 1990s have revealed 
the potential conflict between Turkey and Iran. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union and establishment of independent countries 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus have become an area of 
challenge for Turkey and Iran. 
To understand how Turkey and Iran will determine their 
policies on these problems, their cultural biases that affect 
their policy making process will be evaluated.The analysis of 
their economic, political, social structures and national 
security policies will give us their capabilities and 
limitatitions on their decision-making process. 
The research and analysis involved in this thesis will 
contribute to an understanding of Turkish-Iran relations and 
may give tools to the reader to speculate about the future 
relations of both countries. It will be important for 
institutions and readers to be familiar with the historical 
background, present situation and future of Turkish-Iran 
relations in creating their own policies toward these 
countries. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. EARLY HISTORY 
Iran's history as a nation of people speaking an Indo- 
European language did not begin until the middle of the second 
millennium B.C. In the beginning, three major groups were 
identifiable-the Scythians, the Medes, and the Persians. The 
Scythians established themselves in the northern Zagros 
mountains. The Medes settled over a huge area reaching as far 
as modern Tabriz in the north and Esfehan in the south. The 
Persians were established in three areas: to the south of Lake 
Urmia, on the northern border of the Kingdom of the Elamites; 
and in the environs of modern Shiraz, which would be their 
eventual settling place and to which they would give the name 
Parsa.x 
During the seventh century B.C., the Persians were led by 
Hakamanish, ancestor of Achaemenid dynasty. A descendant, 
Cyrus II led the combined forces of the Medes and the Persians 
to establish the most extensive empire known in the ancient 
world. Alexander the Great of Macedon came to power in his 
early age and his vision forced him to conquer unknown lands 
and create an empire. 
After establishing his rule over the Greek cities in 336 
B.C., he conquered Asia Minor, and quickly advanced to 
Mesopotamia. In quick succession he captured Egypt, Babylonia, 
and in two years he demolished the Achaemenid Empire. 
Alexander established his empire but could not live long 
enough to conquer India and died in 323 B.C. 
When Alexander the Great died without any heir, his 
empire divided among his four generals. Seleceus, one of his 
generals, gained power in Iran and established his dynasty. 
However, Parthians-another nomadic tribe, under the leadership 
of Mithradates overthrew the Selecuid rule and created a 
unified rule from India to Asia Minor. The Parthians were a 
polyglot people adopting Greco-Persian culture.2 However, they 
accepted Zoroastrianism3 as their religion. 
The Sassanids, a revived Persian dynasty, held power 
between 224-642 A.D. During this era, Rome became a major 
threat for the Sassanids. The Sassanids and Byzantium wars 
lasted many years and eventually the Sassanid's power 
declined. 
"Zoroastrianism or Mazdaism is a religion based on the struggle between the forces of 
Good led by Ahura Mazda and the forces of Evil. It was first preached by Zarathustra in the sixth 
century B.C. REFERENCE 2: pg 6 
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The world was introduced to a new religion- Islam in 612 
A.D., and it became powerful in Arabia. The Prophet Mohammed 
proclaimed his mission and finally won a great acceptance from 
his people. Before Islam became a religion, Arabs were nomadic 
and pagan people. The new religion transformed these people 
from a segmented cabal to a unified, devoted, and disciplined 
army of believers ready to deliver the message of God 
everywhere. Arab forces defeated the enemies of the faith all 
over the region including the Byzantine armies and the 
Sassanidian armies. 
The conquest of Iran by Islamic  armies begun with the 
defeat of the Byzantine army in 635 and the capture of the 
capital of the Sassanid Empire in 637. The corruption and 
mismanagement  of  the  country  by  the  Sassanids  were 
contributing for the people's readiness to accept a new 
religion. They did not heavily resist Arab forces and adapted 
themselves to the new style of life. By 652, Arab forces 
captured all of Iran and Khwarazm, a city on the Oxus river. 
This advance of Arab forces opened a new world to Islam: 
Central Asia, homeland of the Turks. Turkish people were 
nomadic  and they created several confederations of tribes. 
Each of these confederations established their rule in the 
vast lands of Central Asia, from the borders of prehistoric 
China to Persia and Transoxania to the Carpathians. The 
Turkish people were strong and brave warriors. The migrations 
of Turkish clans were always directed to the West. 
Although Turkish clans existed long before, the first 
historical references to the Turks appear in Chinese records 
of about 200 B.C.3 These records are related to the Hun 
Empire, who established their rule in an area bounded by the 
Altai Mountains, Lake Baikal, and the northern edge of Gobi 
Desert. Later, the Hun Empire divided into several states as 
North and South Hun Empires. 
Turco-Iranian relations began with the early contacts of 
the tribes. Both sides attacked each other frequently and 
created alliances against their common enemies. Iranian poems 
known as Sehnamesb mention Turkish people and their land as 
Turan, and address the struggle between Turks and Persians 
from the beginning of the third century B.C.4 The contacts 
between of the two nations continued during the Sassanids 
period, additionally the Sassanid kings used Turkish warriors 
in their armies. 
Turkish clans used the Sassanids in their internal power 
conflicts too.  In 552 A.D.,  another Turkish Empire was 
bThese poems were collected in the 'Shahnama' by the Persian poet Ferdousi and presented 
to the Turkish Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna in the early eleventh century A.D. 
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established, known as Gokturk Empire, by Bumin Hakan and his 
brother Istemi Yabgu. In a few years they created a strong 
structure and began their power struggle with another Turkish 
Empire, the Ak-Huns (White-Huns). Bumin Hakan and Anushirvan- 
the Sassanid ruler, established an alliance against the Ak-Hun 
Empire.5 
This alliance did not last long and the Gokturks 
eventually dominated the silk trade after the collapse of the 
Ak-Hun Empire. This provided a good reason for the Sassanids 
to attack the Gokturks. As a result of the attempts of the 
Sassanids to take over the control of the silk trade, the 
Turks created an alliance with the Byzantines against the 
Sassanids for the first time in the history.6-7 
The introduction of Islam to Turkish tribes began with 
the Conquest of Persia by Arab armies. In this period some of 
the Turkish tribes served as warriors in the Arab armies. 
These groups became a catalyst for the transformation process. 
Another event that effected this process was the Talas War 
between the Chinese and Islamic armies in 751 A.D. 
The main threat for China came from its western borders 
in the form of Turkish clans. So, China, in addition to 
building the Great Wall with its chain of castles along its 
western border, always interfered in the power struggles of 
different Turkish clans and tried to prevent the establishment 
of a powerful federation or empire. When the Uygur Turks 
became powerful, the Chinese armies concentrated their attacks 
on them. 
Meantime, the Islamic armies entered Central Asia from 
the west by capturing Khawarzm. The Chinese armies changed 
their target and both armies met in Talas. The Turkish clans 
sided with the Islamic armies and this changed the balance of 
power. The victory of the Islamic armies accelerated the 
process of conversion to Islam. Acceptance of Islam as a 
religion by Turks is a major event in history because Turks 
became a dominant figure or leader of the faith and carried 
the flag of Islam to three continents.8,9 
After this victory, the Sultanate of Ghazna established 
in present Afghanistan in 969 A.D. The Sultanete of Ghazna was 
the first Islamic state that was established by Turks. Mahmud, 
the Sultan of Ghazna, conquered India and northern Iran. He 
put an end to the Samanid rule in 999 which was established in 
819 in Iran.10 
However, the Ghaznavid power did not last long. Another 
Turkic clan ended their rule and gained control over their 
territories. This new clan was a branch of the Oghuz Turks, 
named the Seljuks. In 1055, their leader, Tugrul occupied 
Baghdad and established his rule in Persia and Mesopotamia. 
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The Great Seljuk Empire was a federation of different 
tribes under the banner of Seljuks. The Selcuks used Persian 
people as administrators and civil servants while Turkish 
tribes concentrated on the expansion of the Empire. These 
tribes devoted themselves to conquering new lands and 
delivering their faith to new people. 
Their attention was concentrated on the West, and they 
launched attacks to Anatolia, against the Byzantine Empire. In 
1071, Alp Arslan confronted the Byzantine army in Malazgirt.11 
The defeat of the Byzantine army opened the doors of Anatolia 
to Turks permanently. Many tribes entered Anatolia and 
established settlements. 
The Mongol invasion ended Turkish domination of Iran in 
1258.12 The Great Seljuk Empire divided into several states 
under the Mongol influence. Although the Mongol rule became 
useful for Persian people, Turkish tribes suffered many loss. 
The Mongols also used Persian people in their administration 
and protected Persian culture.13 
The influence of the Mongols lasted until the 1330s and 
they were eventually obliged to adopt the Islamic faith. On 
the other hand, their loss of control caused a power vacuum in 
the region and this vacuum was filled by several petty 
dynasties in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Persia. The Salghurid, 
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Muzaffarid, Inju, and Jalayirid were the ones that were 
established in Iran by Mongol commanders, old Seljuk 
retainers, and regional chiefs. The Ottomans became powerful 
in western Anatolia by the 1330s, and some other Turkish 
emirates divided the remainder of the Seljuk Empire amongst 
themselves .14 
Although Mongol influence disappeared in the 1330s, 
another wave of Turkic-Mongol tribes, led by Tamerlane, became 
powerful in the region. He established his rule in Transoxiana 
in 1381, and conquered Iran within a few years. The rivalry 
between Tamerlane and the Sultan Bayazid, the leader of the 
Ottomans, caused a confrontation at Ankara. Tamerlane defeated 
the Ottomans and captured Bayazid in 1402. This caused a pause 
in the rise of the Ottomans, and the four sons of Bayazid 
struggled for the throne for a decade. 
B. THE HISTORY OF SHHSM 
It is important to mention Shiism before continue with 
the Ottoman period. The reason is that, being a Sunni leader 
of the Islamic world, the Ottomans felt themselves in the 
position to protect the faith against the enemies of the faith 
including the Shia elements. On the other hand, being a Shia 
nation, Iranian leaders felt themselves in a position to 
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overthrow the munafiqeen(hypocrites) and non-Tawhidl ulemas 
and create the rule of lmamiyatc. This rivalry has affected 
the relations of both countries since the acceptance of Shiism 
by Iran. 
Although there are differences between Shia and Sunni 
thoughts, they are all the same in the common ground. They 
believe in the same Prophet, Mohammed, and the same faith, 
Islam. The differences are mainly political and partially 
religious. 
The Prophet Mohammed was selected as a messenger from God 
to deliver his new Book, the Holy Quran. In the early stage of 
Islam, the Prophet was a spiritual and temporal leader of his 
people. 
When he died in 632 A.D., the leaders of the Muslim 
community divided in the election process of the new leader. 
One school of thought believed that the leader should be 
elected. Another one believed that the descendants of the 
Prophet should assume the leadership. Meantime, one school of 
thought proposed the leadership of the Umayyad dynasty. 
cIn the Shia doctrine, munafiqeens were the Caliphs of Umayyad and Abbasi dynasties 
because they surpassed the power of Imams. Ulema means clergy that can interpret the meaning 
of the book. Tawhidi means accepting the dominance of God only, and Non-Tawhidi means 
accepting human dominance in the Shia doctrine. 
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Finally,  the Muslim community accepted the election 
process and chose his father-in-law and one of the first 
followers of the Prophet, Abu Bakr as a caliph (the political 
leader of Muslims) by a consensus. Some people continued to 
accept the descendants of the Prophet their leader. They 
favored Ali, who was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. 
They called themselves as Shi-ah-i  Ali   (the partisans of Ali) 
and refused Abu Bakr's caliphate. Besides, they believed that 
Ali also resumed the spiritual role of the Prophet. However, 
eventually Ali accepted the decision of the community. 
When Abu Bakr died in 634, Omerd had been selected as 
caliph. Later, Osmane took power in 64 6 as caliph of the 
Muslim community. Osman initiated some reforms in the 
community, such as codification of Quran. His rule caused 
dissatisfaction among some groups, especially for groups that 
had an interest in the status quo. The dissatisfaction led to 
the resistance of these groups and these people begun to ask 
for Ali's rule. 
When Osman was killed by assassination in 656, fighting 
occurred between Ali's supporters and Osman1s. This is known 
dIn some sources Umar used as Omer. 
eIn some sources Uthman used as Osman. 
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as fitnah (trials) era, and also the end of having four 
sequential and universally accepted caliphs as single head of 
Islam. 
Muawiyah, the governor of Syria and a member of the Banu 
Umayyah, called for revenge for his kinsman, Osman. Ali's and 
Muawiyah's armies fought several times without clear result. 
So, both sides agreed on arbitration and each side selected an 
arbitrator. 
In this point, some of Ali's supporters refused 
arbitration on the basis that the caliph should not be subject 
to the decision of his followers. They left Ali and chose 
their own leader. This group, known as the Kharadjites(those 
who seceded) believed that Ali was motivated by personal 
interest rather than principle. Ali lost arbitration, refused 
to accept it, and continued his struggle from Iraq with 
Muawiyah and the Kharadjites. He was killed by the Kharadjite 
Abd ar Rahman ibn Muljam al Muradi in 661.15 
Muawiyah declared himself caliph and Ali's son Hasan did 
not resist him. However, the partisans of Ali, the Shia, 
refused to accept his caliphate. Yazid, the son of Muawiyah, 
proclaimed himself as a caliph without waiting for his 
father's death. This event caused opposition to him and Ali's 
young son, Hussein refused to accept his rule. Before Hussein 
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could gain wide support and gather his forces, Yazid attacked 
him and killed Hussein along with his 400 men at Karbela, in 
680. This day became a mourning day for the Shia in the 
following years. Yazid established his dynasty and kept the 
Caliphate within the Ummayad dynasty. 
It is important to note that the Shia believe that Osman 
passed the leadership to Ali and Ali became an Imamf for the 
Muslims. Since then, they accepted twelve Imam9 who are the 
descendants of Ali as their leaders.16 The Shia believe that 
except for the twelfth Imam, all of the Imams were killed by 
the Sunni Caliphate. 
They believe that the twelfth Imam, Mohammed el-Mehdi, 
known as a Imam-e-Asr(the Imam of the period) and the Sahib 
al-Zaman{the Lord of the age) is in hiding and he will 
eventually reveal himself to save humanity and the believers. 
When Mehdi became Imam, he disappeared and only his messengers 
knew his hide-out. There were four messengers, and last 
messenger died in 940. The period of messengers is known as 
Gaybet-i  Sugra(minor occultation), and the period of the total 
f
 Imam means successor to the Prophet, Caliph according to Shiite doctrine, however in 
Sunni doctrine it means only prayer leader. 
^t must be noted that some of the Shia belive that there were only five Imams. Some of 
them believe that there were seven Imams. These groups are called the Fiver and Sevener Shia 
respectively. There is a struggle within the Shia because of this discreapancy. 
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disappearance  of Mehdi  after  940  is  known  as Gaybet-i 
Kubra (greater occultation) .17 
The first Shia state was established in Yemen in 901 by 
Yahya el Huseyin. The second Shia state was the Ismaili Fatimi 
which was established in Egypt in 909. Meantime the Shia 
increased their power in Iraq and Syria. The Samanid rule let 
the Shia gain power in Iran also.18 Especially in the tenth 
century, the Shia gained tolerance and were able to collect 
their ideas as a set of books. 
However, this movement lost tolerance to continue their 
studies during the rule of the Seljuks. Following the Mongol 
rule, on the other hand, a good opportunity occurred for them 
to develop several sects and gain political power. Among them, 
the sect of Hodja Ali (1392-1429) and his son Ibrahim (1429- 
1447) became powerful in Iran and later in eastern Anatolia. 
In this period they developed new supporters from the 
Turkomans in Anatolia. Tamerlane, the Mongol ruler, gave 
Erdebil and its provinces to Hodja Ali and let some Turkoman 
prisoners free by his request. This made Turkomans feel great 
loyalty to him and they began to work for Hodja Ali. 
Tamerlane's victory over the Ottomans permitted the Shia to 
establish their belief in Anatolia also. 
■17- 
The leadership of Shia passed to Sheikh Cuneyd in the 
following years and he reorganized the structure of the sect. 
He asked permission from Murad the second to settle in the 
Ottoman's Sultanate but was refused. Cuneyd temporarily 
settled down in Konya by permission of Karaman Emirate. 
However, because of his work to develop Shia in this area, he 
was forced to leave Konya. Cuneyd traveled in the region for 
a while, and finally settled in Ak-Koyunluh Sultanate. Uzun 
Hasan, leader of the Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate tried to use his 
influence and let him marry his sister. At the same time, 
Cuneyd established an army among his followers and tried to 
conquer new lands. However, he died in the war in 14 60.19 
His son, Haydar became the new Sheikh and he continued to 
follow the same policies as his father. He strengthened the 
organization of the sect and tried to recruit more followers 
among the Turkoman tribes. He asked his Turkoman followers to 
wear a red turban with twelve knots on it. The number of 
twelve represents the twelve Imam of Shia. For this reason, 
their followers begun to be called 'Kizilbaslar'(red heads). 
Haydar also got married to Uzun Hasan's daughter to empower 
his position in Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate. 
hIn some sources, White Sheep is used as Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate. 
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Meantime the Ottomans became powerful in Anatolia and 
conquered Istanbul, all of the Balkans, and many areas in the 
West. The Ottomans also began to gain new territories in 
Anatolia including the Karaman Sultanate and the Kingdom of 
Trabzon. 
Uzun Hasan, on the other hand, began to challenge the 
Ottomans and helped the Kingdom of Trabzon. He also tried to 
gain territory from the Karaman Sultanate. This led to the 
confrontation between the Ottomans and Uzun Hasan, and 
eventually he was defeated by the Conqueror of Istanbul, 
Mehmed the Second. Although Uzun Hasan managed to survive, his 
Sultanate lost most of its territories and power. Uzun Hasan 
died in 1478 and his brother, Yakub became the Sultan of Ak- 
Koyunlu Sultanate.20 
In 1488, Haydar died in the battle with the Sultan of 
Shirvan. His family was first protected and later put under 
custody by Yakub. When Yakub died, his successors began to 
rally for the control of the Sultanate. Rustem tried to use 
the influence of Haydar to gain advantage in this struggle and 
let them free in their activities. Ali, the elder son of 
Haydar, became the new Sheikh and Ismail became his successor. 
Ali reestablished his sect and gained so much power that 
Rustem decided to get rid of him. Rustem's army defeated Ali's 
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followers, and Ali died in this battle. On the other hand, 
Ismail, another son of Haydar, escaped and managed to gather 
his sect together. Later Rustem died in an assassination in 
1497.21 
Ismail became a powerful Sheikh and also one of the 
leaders of Sufism1. He became a very powerful spiritual leader 
and his followers venerated him not only as the Mursid-i 
Kamil(the perfect guide), but also as an emanation of the 
Godhead.22 He enjoyed the support of several Turkoman tribes, 
and the Shia and Sufi believers. He created a strong army of 
believers and defeated the Ak-Koyunlu Sultanate in 1501. He 
captured Tabriz and declared his rule over Iran and 
Mesopotamia. Thus Ismail established the Safavi dynasty in 
Iranian history3 and came to be called "Shah". 
Ismail accepted Shiism as a state religion and tried to 
influence other Muslim areas as well. He attacked the Ak- 
Koyunlu Sultanate once again and demolished this Sultanate. 
Following his succses over the Ak-koyunlu Sultanete, Ismail 
captured Iraq and came closer to the Ottomans. 
1
 Sufism is an Islamic mysticism, which accepts that worldly pleasures distract from true 
concern with the salvation of the soul. 
j
 Some sources claim that Ismail used his grandfather's name, Sheikh Safi ad Din, who 
was the founder of their order and claimed descent from Shia Islam's Seventh Imam, Musa al 
Kazim as a name for his dynasty. 
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He sent his followers to conduct Shia propoganda in 
Anatolia. He especially concentrated on the Turkoman tribes of 
Anatolia. His rule became the flash point of the Shia, the 
Shia became very powerful in Iran and established their 
hegemony over the society. During this era, they created their 
first institutes of the Shia in the society. To suppress the 
resistance of the Sunni population in Iran, they used all 
means of power.23 From then on, the Shia gradually became 
powerful in Iran and after the eighteenth century, it became 
dominant in Iranian politics. 
The Safavids (1501-1722) managed to create a central 
government that brought other weak tribes under its control. 
They expanded the Sultanate whenever it was possible in Iran. 
Ismail did not face a major challenge from the other Emirates 
of Iran and this let Ismail attack neighboring countries. 
Ismail chose Turkistan first because there was a revolt of the 
Cossads to central authority. He defeated Shaybane Khan in 
1510 and invaded Turkistan. His first action was to attempt 
the genocide of the Sunni population. 
C. THE OTTOMANS ERA 
As mentioned before, the Ottomans began the creation of 
a Turkish Empire in Anatolia in 1299. The Ottomans were one of 
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many "Ghazi" states. From the first days of state,  the 
Ottomans advanced to the West against the Christian world. 
The Ottomans were Sunni Muslims who devoted themselves 
to delivering the message of God and being a sword of the 
faith. They were very skilled in military power and diplomacy. 
Their wisdom and experience in establishing and administering 
empires helped them to create a very strong government 
structure. 
Their tolerance to other nationalities and distribution 
of responsibilities and benefits among their population 
equally according to their capabilities were other factors 
that led to a strong administration. They created the Millet* 
system in which all religious institutions in the Empire were 
preserved and were represented by their leaders in the Divan, 
the court of the Sultan.24 All of the different nations were 
able to have a seat at different levels of administration, 
even in the highest positions of the Grand   Vezirs(prime 
minister). 
Except for the period of renaissance following the defeat 
of Bayazid against Tamerlane in 1402, the Ottomans advanced 
k
 The Millet system is the harmony of different nations under the fair administration of the 
Ottoman Empire. This notion became an important element of the Pan-Ottomanism in the 
nineteen century. 
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very rapidly. They regained Anatolia after the Tamerlane 
dynasty collapsed. The Ottomans completed the conquest of the 
Balkans in a relatively short period of time. 
Mehmed the Second was determined to conquer Istanbul, the 
second Rome, capital of Byzantine and Orthodox Christianity. 
It was so strong that many commanders have failed to capture 
it. Even the Prophet promoted a special status for a commander 
who could capture Istanbul. Mehmed the Second prepared his 
army for this holy mission, even building a castle to control 
sea traffic in the Bosphorus. Eventually, he conquered 
Istanbul in 1453 and it became the capital of a new world 
Empire. In the following years, each Sultan advanced the 
boundaries of the Empire and conquered new territories. 
When Selim was a governor in Anatolia, the propaganda of 
Ismail caused revolts of Turkoman tribes against the Ottomans. 
Selim had the spirit of a warrior and was very aggressive and 
vigorous. His two elder brothers on the other hand, were calm 
and their talents were rather for administration. Bayazid, the 
Second was aware of the threat of Ismail but preferred to deal 
with administrative reforms for the Empire. The Ottoman armies 
thus opposed Ismail, but did not confront him in battle. 
Bayazid was in poor health and favored his second son 
Ahmed. Selim was aware of this fact, he gathered support and 
-23- 
asked his father to accept his claim of succession. Bayazid 
refused but Selim was able to overthrow his father and became 
the sultan of the Empire in 1512.25 
The first move of Selim was to turn the attention of the 
Ottomans to the East, and to the emerging threat of the Shia 
and Ismail. Selim cleaned Ismail's army of propaganda among 
the Turkoman tribes. Meanwhile, Ismail tried to create an 
alliance with European powers, but could not achieve his 
goal.26 Selim moved quickly and forced Ismail into a decisive 
engagement. The two armies fought at Chaldiran in 1514. The 
victory of the Ottomans was very clear and Ismail barely 
escaped from being killed. Selim continued his campaign and 
captured Tabriz and much of the Safavids's territory. The 
Safavids did not pose a threat for a long time because of this 
loss. 
Victorious against Ismail, Selim turned his attention to 
the Mamluks, another Muslim and largely Turkish Sultanate that 
held the Caliphate. The Mamluk Sultan, Al-Ghawri, marched a 
force to stop Selim. Selim conquered Syria, Lebanon, and 
defeated the Mamluks. Al-Ghawri died on the battlefield, and 
Selim easily reached Egypt. Tuman Bey, the successor of Al- 
Ghawri, refused to accept Selim's proposals. Selim defeated 
Tuman twice and Tuman died in the battle. He completed the 
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conquest of Egypt and Arabia and returned to Istanbul with the 
holy possession of the Prophet. He could then claim to be head 
of Islam and Caliph, hence he captured the Caliphate. 
Although, Selim destroyed the influence of Shiism in 
Anatolia, the Shia regained its power. This led to another 
action of the Ottomans. Suleiman, the Magnificent, continued 
the campaign of his father and captured Baghdad and the 
remaining parts of Iraq in 1533. 
Suleiman made his second campaign against the Safavids in 
1548. In this campaign he captured east Anatolia including Van 
and its provinces. Suleiman was forced into a third campaign 
because of the Safavids's attacks. Suleiman crossed the Upper 
Euphrates and entered Iran. Tahmasp, the successor of Ismail, 
could not face the Ottomans' army because of the superiority 
of the Ottomans over his forces. On the other hand, Suleiman 
could not advance more because of developments in Europe. 
Under these circumstances, the truce of Amasya was signed and 
Suleiman returned his attention to the West again. 
When Suleiman died in the campaign against Hungary, the 
Ottoman Empire had reached its zenith. The Ottomans controlled 
the Mediterranean, Red, Aegean and Black Seas and had sailed 
to the Indian Ocean. The area from Crimea to Budapest, from 
North Africa to Iran, from Egypt to Sudan, from the Balkans up 
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to Vienna, and from Azerbaijan to Caspian Sea, came under the 
hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. This vast area enjoyed the 
fair rule of the Ottomans for centuries. 
After the sixteenth century Europe gradually became 
powerful. Europe managed to develop a better understanding of 
science and the arts following the Reform and Renaissance 
movements and established strong central governments. They 
were able to adopt better technology in the military field and 
in their administration. The Ottomans first were stopped in 
their positions and following the eightennth century, 
gradually lost their territories against European powers, such 
as Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, and Britain. 
There were many factors that caused the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire, but the main threat to the Ottomans came from 
Europe. The Ottoman land system was known as Timar; based on 
the new victories, new territories were distributed to people 
who were responsible for training military personnel known as 
Sipahis among Muslim population. So, the loss of territories 
to powerful Europeans caused the malfunction of the Timar 
system. 
In addition to this, the loss of territories and less 
plunder  from wars  caused problems  within the Yeniceri 
(Janissaries)  system.  The problems of the Timar system 
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destroyed the balance between Muslim forces and Janissaries. 
The Janissaries became more powerful in the interior politics 
of the Ottomans and less willing to fight on the frontiers. 
Their discipline and ethics diminished and they became a 
threat to the stability of the Empire. Although there were 
attempts to create a new military system recruited from the 
Muslim population who were loyal to the Empire, the 
Janissaries destroyed those attempts and even killed the 
Sultans in their revolts. 
After the death of Suleiman, none of the successor 
Sultans were strong enough to dictate reforms or create a new 
dynamism to Empire. In the absence of a strong ruler, the 
responsibilities of governance fell upon the Grand Vezirs. 
Because of the corruption of the Janissaries and the system as 
a whole, they were not able to implement strong policies. 
After the Ottomans adopted the Caliphate, they put more 
emphasis on religion than improvement of industry or other 
areas. As a response to the decay of the Empire, the Ulema 
became powerful in the decision making process and they gained 
greater influence over the administration. The Ulema resisted 
change in the Empire for a long time and insisted on 
increasing the role of religion on the administration. 
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Once, religious leaders forced the Empire to grow and 
change according to the situations. In those times, the 
Ottoman culture and technology were overwhelmingly more 
advanced than Europe's. Ottoman scientists created many 
innovations that were immediately adapted to the military 
field. Later, the Ulema gave more attention to increasing 
their personal power than to the decay of the Empire. 
Besides political factors, the economy of the Empire was 
threatened by the European economies. The Capitulations, 
economic and political privileges to the Europeans that were 
granted as a gift, soon became a tool for the Europeans to 
control the Ottoman economy. Another effect of the 
Capitulations was the damage to Ottoman industry and trade. In 
addition to the Capitulations, the discovery of new trade 
routes and America shifted the trade center of the World from 
the Mediterranean to the Oceans. 
Of course, some of the Sultans, such as Murad the Fourth, 
tried to change the situation, establish better administration 
and regain territories that were lost to enemies. 
One of them was Murad the Fourth. Murad the Fourth 
became the Sultan of the Empire after long lasting power 
struggles when he was a child. After careful struggle against 
the power centers in the Empire, Murad gained freedom in his 
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actions and established his rule by clearing opposition to 
him. He was the last Padishah of the Ottomans who attacked 
Iran. He regained Baghdad and territories in the Caucasus 
after two successful campaigns but could not advance more. He 
made the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639 and established 
frontiers both in Iraq and in the Caucasus that remain 
virtually unchanged today, although there has been some 
exchange of territories.27 
In the meantime, the Safavids suffered from similar 
problems. They had faced two main external threats, the 
Ottomans and the Uzbeks. After serious defeats against the 
Ottomans, the Safavids made peace with the Ottomans. This let 
them confront the Uzbeks with ease. 
The Safavids reached their zenith under the leadership of 
Shah Abbas(1587-1629) . Abbas fought successful campaigns 
against the Uzbeks and the Ottomans. In this period the 
Ottomans had interior problems and were under the pressure of 
European powers. Thus, Abbas regained Iranian control over 
Iraq, and parts of the Caucasus. He established strict control 
over the tribes and developed all the levels of 
administration. He put an emphasis on commerce and arts in 
addition to empowering the Shia institutions. He entered in an 
alliance with Britain to expel the Portuguese from their bases 
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in Bahrain and Hormoz. Abbas achieved his goal by capturing 
Bahrain in 1602 and Hormoz in 1623. 
The following Safavids Shahs were not as successful as 
Abbas, and the dynasty lost power. The decline resulted from 
weak rulers, interference by women of the harem in politics, 
a decline in military power, and increasing rivalries among 
the tribes. At the same time, the Ulema were increasing their 
power and influence over the society so that they could 
question the rule of the Safavids.28 However, the Ulema could 
not manage the intricacies of imperial administration. One of 
the actions of the Ulema was to force the Shah to convert the 
strongly Sunni Afghan tribes to Shiism. The Afghan tribes were 
revolted and captured the Safavid capital. 
Finally, following the death of last Safavids Shah, Nadir 
Quli Bey, a leader of the Afshar tribe; another Turkic tribe, 
established his rule in 1736. He accepted the name of Nadir 
Shah, and led his force to successful campaigns against Afghan 
tribes. After expelling Afghan tribes from Iran, he turned his 
attention to the Ottomans and to Czarist Russia. He regained 
territory in Georgia and expelled Russians from the Iranian 
coast of the Caspian Sea. Later he attacked India, and 
returned with many treasures including the throne of the 
Mongols. 
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His strong rule and success allowed him to regain 
political unity. He was Sunni and so tried to force the Shia 
Ulema into a compromise with the Sunnis. Thus the division 
within Islam would end, by making the Jafari (after Imam 
Jaffar) one of the regular schools of Sunni Law. However, 
because of his harsh methods in the administration, he was 
assassinated in 1747 before completing his project. 
Following his death, another period of anarchy and power 
struggle for supremacy among four major tribes, Afshar, Qajar, 
Afghan, and Zand, occurred. Despite the temporary rule of the 
Zands under the leadership of Karim Khan Zand(1750-1779), 
Qajar, another Turkic tribe was able to gain supremacy and 
establish a Qajar dynasty that would last until 1925. Their 
leader Aga Mohammed Qajar became the new Shah of Iran. Aga 
Mohammed was able to unite the country through the use of 
force. He established his rule in some parts of the Caucasus 
including Georgia. As it has become custom in Iranian 
politics, he was also assassinated after a year of reign. 
The Qajar dynasty established unity and order, then tried 
to implement reforms to improve the situation in the country. 
However, they could not change the tribal structure of their 
military forces to create a regular standing and well trained 
army. They could not change the tribal structure of the 
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country. Besides, religious institutions of the Shia gradually 
became most powerful in the society. 
The power of religious institutions increased after the 
dispute among the two main schools of thought, the Akbaris and 
the Usulis. The Akbaris believed that in the absence of Imam, 
clergy could not interpret the Book (Quran) and derive a 
certain judgement on religious and other issues. Contrary to 
this, the Usulis insisted on the power of clergy to interpret 
the Book and give a decision on every subject on the basis of 
Ijtihat  doctrine. 
The triumph of the Usulis rapidly increased the power of 
clergy. They began to challenge the power of the Qajars and 
declared their decisions on daily events by issuing the 
Fatwas(orders or declerations of clergy). Their first 
challenge was issuing a fatwa to force the Shah to declare a 
war against Russia in 1826. The result of this war was 
disaster for Iran.29 
In the nineteenth century, Iran came under the threat of 
new external power centers, Czarist Russia and Britain. Russia 
attacked several times and Iran was forced to sign the Treaty 
of Gulistan in 1812, and the Treaty of Turkmanchay in 1828. 
Following the wars with Russia, Iran lost its territory in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Britain, on the other hand landed 
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troops twice and forced Iran to give up its territories in 
present-day Afghanistan. Britain also forced Iran to sign the 
Treaty of Paris and agree to the status quo in 1857. 
The influence of two major external powers became so 
strong that they began to dominate Iran and its administration 
on every issue such as the economy, trade, internal affairs, 
and the selection of important officials. They gained special 
privileges similar to those of the Ottoman Capitulations. The 
situation became worse due to the corruption and inefficiency 
of the administration.30 
Some members of the Qajar Dynasty and their Grand Vezirs 
tried to change the situation in the country. Mirza Taqi Khan, 
who became a Grand Vezir of Naser ad Din in 1848, tried to 
improve the tax system and central control over the 
bureaucracy. He also tried to reduce the influence of the 
clergy and foreign powers. The establishment of the first 
university which was based on the European school system, Dar 
ol Fonun, aimed to educate the elite in the fields of science 
and foreign languages. This was one of the important parts of 
his modernization program. Mirza Hosain Khan Moshir od Dowleh, 
another Grand Vezir of Naser ad Din, convinced him to 
establish a European-style cabinet with administrative 
responsibilities.31 
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The influence of Russia and Britain increased rapidly in 
the nineteen century. In 1872, Baron Reuter, a British 
financier acquired a broad range of rights including building 
railway and streetcar lines, mining, and even managing 
Iranian customs.32 Later he was granted a right to open the 
first bank of Iran, the Imperial Bank, in 1889. He was not 
alone in economic privileges, a British company acquired the 
right to erect telegraph lines in Iran. Another British 
company was granted a tobacco monopoly by the Shah in return 
for a fat payment of bribes to the Shah and his officials. 
Britain was not alone in these capitulations, the 
Russians also gained some control over Iran. The Russians 
established and trained the Persian Cossacks which dominated 
Tehran and many of the northern population centers. Also the 
Russians gained economic privileges similar to the British, 
such as a grant to open the second bank of Iran, and fishing 
rights in the Caspian Sea. 
Naser ad Din Shah preferred Britain dominance to Russian 
dominance, thus he tried to protect the territorial unity of 
Iran. His acceptance of British dominance was based on the 
simple idea of choosing the threat furthest rather than facing 
the closer threat and being absorbed by the closer enemy. 
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He was challenged by the Ulema and merchants. As 
mentioned above, the tobacco monopoly that was granted to 
Britain jeopardized the interests of the merchants. They 
created an alliance with the religious leaders, and the Ulema 
declared fatwa, forbidding Iranians to use and sell tobacco in 
1891. The effect of this fatwa was so strong that it was 
accepted nationwide, including the harem of the Shah. The Shah 
tried to force religious leaders to change this decision, but 
he was threaten by the call of a Jihad, an Islamic struggle 
against him. Finally the Shah gave up, and had to rescind the 
tobacco concessions. 
This event became a test of the political power of the 
Ulema, and they began to use their power more frequently in 
the following years. Another point was the alliance of 
merchants and the middle class with religious leadership that 
shaped future politics of Iran.33 
The Qajar dynasty enjoyed a relatively good relationship 
with the Ottomans. Mahmud, the Second sent an ambassador to 
Iran to establish better relations. The ambassador, Necip 
Efendi, was able to sign a treaty of friendship and 
understanding between the two countries in 1824. The Erzurum 
Treaty declared the boundaries as they were determined in the 
Qasr-i Shirin,  improved the trade terms,  and rules for 
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pilgrimage of Iranians to the holy places. Under the terms of 
this treaty, both countries established permanent embassies.34 
However, despite the relatively good relations of the two 
countries, which was basically a product of Ottoman will, the 
Shia caused many problems by continuing their efforts to 
influence Iraq and Anatolia, especially the Turkoman tribes. 
Sometimes their efforts caused revolts of those tribes. The 
provocations of the Shia became a continuous problem between 
the two countries. 
At that time, the decline of the Ottomans became evident 
and they were forced to retreat in Europe and other areas of 
the Empire. The vulnerability and attractiveness of its vast 
holdings, the emergence of nationalism among the Empire's 
subject peoples, the ambitions of the great powers, the 
collapse of the Ottoman economy and the periodic crises 
resulting from these and other factors collectively resulted 
in raising the "Eastern question". The Ottomans were called 
the sick man of Europe in this period.35 
The great powers of Europe- France, Britain, Austria- 
Hungary, and Russia, tried to get whatever they could from the 
Ottoman territories. They created fluid alliances with others 
to solve the Eastern question for their interests. The 
political balance of the European powers dictated these 
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alliances but they were so fluid that any advantage of one of 
the European Powers against the political balance resulted in 
another alliance of the disturbed powers. 
Austria and Russia tried to control the Balkans. Russia's 
main goal was to enter the warm waters of the Mediterranean 
and the Persian gulf. France tried to consolidate its position 
in Europe and control the Mediterranean. Another important 
goal of France was to gain Egypt and the Middle East. Britain, 
on the other hand, tried to strengthen its position in the 
Mediterranean and stop any other power from threatening its 
connections with India36. 
The Ottomans found themselves consistently at war with 
one or more of the European powers in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The Empire lost vast lands as a result of 
these wars. Besides these losses, the economy collapsed and 
the Ottomans had to borrow money to finance the economic 
burden of wars. After the nineteenth century, the Ottomans 
tried to halt the advance of the European powers by using the 
rivalries between them to gain advantage from the political 
balance in Europe. However, the European powers acted quickly 
to create and demolish alliances amongst themselves, keeping 
the Ottomans from following what was going on. 
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Although the first reform actions took place as early as 
the late 1790s, the Ottomans could not manage to stop the 
collapse of the Empire. The first important reform trial was 
done by Selim the Third (1789-1807), by westernizing some of 
the Ottoman institutions. He was influenced by the French 
Revolution and called his reform program a New Order, similar 
to the French after the revolution. 
As a first step, he tried to establish a new army with 
western weaponry and tactics and to discipline Janissaries. He 
brought several Western military personnel to train his new 
experimental troops. 
He was the first Padishah to establish permanent 
embassies in Europe and send students to study at Western 
institutions. He also tried to establish a national economy. 
He recognized the main problems of the Empire but could not 
change the root causes the problem. The Ulema and Janissaries 
revolted against him. He was forced to abdicate and later was 
killed.37 
Mahmud the Second (1808-1839), continued the reform 
program his uncle, Selim, tried to implement. He put emphasis 
on westernization of the country. He created another 
professional army and was able to abolish the Janissaries. He 
tried to reorganize the administration system of the Empire 
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and established ministries instead of the traditional Divan. 
Mahmud tried to empower central administration. Mahmud also 
continued reforms in the education system. He aimed to 
establish a better code system that would allow people to 
trust the administration.38 
Because of the continuous involvement of European powers 
in the internal problems of the Empire, Abdulmecit (1839-1861) 
inaugurated the Gulhane Hatti Humayunu or Tanzimat Fermani(law 
of reorganization)in 1839 which was prepared by Mahmud the 
Second. Under the terms of this law, the Padishah granted some 
of his rights to the people, declared the equal treatment of 
all the population, and accepted the superiority of laws. It 
was declared that, the basic rights of each citizen were under 
the protection of law which the Padishah took an oath to obey. 
It was the first time in the Ottoman history that the 
unquestionable power of Padishah was limited by law. However, 
the Tanzimat reforms were not implemented fully because of the 
resistance of the Ulema. 
Continuous contacts with Europeans and the French 
Revolution influenced some Turkish intellectuals to think 
about the future of the Empire differently than others. They 
criticized the administration on every issue, but the basic 
problem was how to gather public support to protect the 
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sovereignty of the Empire. They assumed that if the people had 
an opportunity to participate in the administration of the 
Empire, they would feel the responsibility for protecting it 
as well. Another assumption was that to be an equal with 
European powers, the Ottomans had to adopt Western political 
institutions; including strong central government, efficient 
administration, and definite superiority of laws. They began 
to express their ideas, and created a movement, known as Young 
Turks. 
The immediate danger of the collapse of the Empire forced 
them to move quickly. The Ottomans borrowed huge loans from 
the Europeans to finance their ongoing reform programs and to 
repay the interest payments from old loans. The economy of 
Empire was also under the stress of new capitulations granted 
to the Europeans due to political pressure and which 
increasing their role in the economy each day.39 As a result 
of these factors, the Ottomans declared their inability to pay 
these debts letting the Europeans control the economy. The 
mixed commission collected public revenues of the Empire and 
transferred these receipts directly to the creditors.40 
The economic burden and the huge losses from the wars 
with European powers sped-up the Young Turks movement. They 
deposed  Abdulaziz, and finally Abdulhamit became the new 
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Padishah in 1876. He promulgated a constitution and called for 
the first parliament of the Empire in 1876.41 
However, Abdulhamit was not in favor of the constitution 
and parliament. Abdulhamit was also against the idea of a 
parliamentary system, believing that as a Caliph of the 
Islamic world, he could recover the situation of the Empire by 
using the power of Caliphate. He noticed the success of the 
Slav nations under the banner of Pan-Slavism. He believed that 
if he promoted the idea of Pan-Islamism, all of the Moslem 
population of the Empire would gather around the green flag of 
the Ottomans. Then, under his leadership, the Islamic armies 
would defeat the West and reconquer all the lost territories. 
He used the Turco-Russian war of 1877 as an excuse to 
dissolve Parliament. The decisive defeat of the Ottoman armies 
in this war against Russia was very important. Russia achieved 
all of its goals to enter Mediterranean via Bulgaria, and 
conquered most of the Balkans except for a few enclaves. On 
the other hand, they entered Anatolia from east, capturing 
eastern Anatolia up to Erzurum. 
This defeat caused disasters for the Empire from both the 
West and the East. The pan-Ottomanism, or the idea of 
gathering all nations under the Ottoman flag by granting a 
constitution and establishing a parliamentarian system, 
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suffered seriously from the revolts of the Balkan nations 
against the Empire. 
The Empire now began to be dominate! by European powers. 
The European powers start forcing the Ottomans to accept 
whatever demands were on the table even if they were 
irrelevant to the agenda of the meeting. For example, Britain 
and Russia forced the Ottomans to give Katur and its provinces 
to Iran although Iran was not a party at the Berlin Conference 
which was held to stop Russia from gaining absolute supremacy 
in the Balkans after the Turco-Russian war.42 
Besides problems abroad, the Ottoman Empire also had 
internal problems. Although Abdulhamit put an emphasis on the 
Pan-Islamism, none of the Moslem nations living inside of the 
Empire considered it seriously and the Islamic armies were not 
gathered from the Islamic World. The Empire was loosing huge 
territories instead of recapturing them. 
In addition to this, the oppressive regime of Abdulhamit 
the Second, increased internal tension that already was high 
because of the overall situation of the Empire. The Young 
Turks movement became even more popular among the 
intellectuals and young officers. One of the officers who was 
involved in this movement was Mustafa Kemal. He established 
his organization in Damascus and Salonika. Later nationalist 
-42- 
Young Turks created the Committee of Union of Progress to 
struggle against Abdulhamit's regime. 
The Movement organized a revolt in Macedonia and forced 
Abdulhamit to call for a second Parliament and implement the 
Constitution in 1908. Following the power struggle between 
constitutionalists and Abdulhamit, the Young Turks movement 
seized power and declared Mehmed the Fourth as the new 
Padishah of the Empire. The leadership of the movement became 
dominant in the politics of the Empire. 
The Ottoman Empire could not escape the threat from 
external powers although she accepted the parliamentarian 
system. Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared 
its complete independence, and Italy attacked Libya. The 
alliance of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro declared 
war and occupied Macedonia, and eastern Thrace, the last 
Ottoman territories in Europe. This was a total disaster for 
the Ottomans and came as a great shock. The nations that were 
under the Ottoman control for a centuries became its enemies 
once again. 
As mentioned before, the idea of the movement to gather 
all nations under the flag of the Ottomans, emphasize the 
notion of Millet, and open channels to them to participate in 
its administration. Unfortunately, as were evident by the 
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events in this era, the Christian members of Parliament began 
to seek a way to declare the independence of their nations 
instead of working for the improvement of the Empire. The 
independence of Bulgaria and the following Balkan wars became 
proof of it. 
This event empowered the idea of Pan-Turkism, a 
nationalistic movement. The Young Turks divided into two 
camps, liberals who believed in Pan-Ottomanism, and 
authoritarians who believed in Pan-Turkism. The internal 
dispute among the liberalist and authoritarian groups of the 
movement was solved by the coming of Enver Pasha(an army 
officer), an authoritarian, as the new leader of the movement. 
However, this dispute would determine party politics in the 
future. 
The Ottomans were not alone in their efforts to reform 
the administration and halt the collapse of the Empire. Iran 
had the same problems and the same struggle of reform groups 
with different backgrounds. There were many similarities 
between the evolution of the Ottoman Empire and Iran. 
Meanwhile, there were new winds of change in Iran. 
Especially after the nineteenth century, people who were 
trained in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire returned to the 
country with new ideas. They established newspapers and 
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explained their ideas to the public. That meant the emergence 
of a new center, secular intellectuals, in the domestic 
political scene. They saw westernization of the country as a 
solution to the problem. They began to demand a 
Majlis(parliament) and a constitution. 
Notorious for his weakness in the administration and his 
royal extravaganza, Muzaffar ad Din (1896-1907) caused severe 
problems in the economy and politics of Iran. He borrowed huge 
loans and granted new capitulations to the Europeans, 
especially Russia to finance his extravaganza. 
This let the Ulema and the merchants rally public support 
for their demands for the rule of law. They created an 
alliance with the secular intellectuals because they assumed 
that the constitution would be a safeguard for the Shia and 
they would gain more political power if there were a Majlis. 
Under public pressure, the Shah drafted the parliament 
and promulgated a new constitution in 1906. After the struggle 
between reform groups, the Ulema gained power. The Ulema 
positioned itself over the parliament by establishing an 
advisory counsel of five mujtahids(religious leader)1 to 
'However, the Ulema did not establish this counsel because of the ideologic discreapancy 
on the subject. Some of the Ulema were against any compromise with the Constitution or 
Parliamentary system because they believed that it was against the religion. So, this counsel was 
never activated. 
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examine the laws proposed by the parliament for consistency 
with Islamic values. 
The new Shah, Mohammad Ali, was determined to overthrow 
the constitutionalists and establish his rule without any 
interference. He demolished the parliament and ignored the 
Constitution with the help of Russian troops in 1908. Despite 
the Russian troops, resistance grew and constitutional forces 
reestablished the Constitution in 1909. 
The Shah went into exile in Russia but did not give up. 
He tried to regain his throne with Russian support in 1910. 
At the same time, the constitutionalists declared Ahmad, the 
son of Mohammad Ali Shah, as the new Shah of the country. 
However, this was not the end of chaos in the country. Iran 
was ruled by several powerful notables, Baktiari chiefs and by 
the parliament and their Shah until 1921. 
Iran was also under the pressure of foreign powers in 
this period. In 1907, Britain attempted to gain an advantage 
in Iran by forcing Russia to divide the country into influence 
areas. Russia, who was trying to control Iran completely, 
accepted this offer in view of their involvement in the 
Russian-Japan war. Another factor for compromise was the 
emerge of Germany as a power center in Europe. The two powers 
divided Iran into three parts; the Russians took the northern 
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part, the British controlled the southeastern part, and the 
central part was declared a neutral zone by both powers. 
Their control over these areas was so complete that even 
the Iranian government in her attempt to collect taxes was 
unsuccessful. Besides, Russia gave an ultimatum to the Iranian 
Parliament to dismiss their American Treasurer, Shuster when 
he tried to establish Iranian control or face the threat of 
war. Despite the efforts of Shuster to improve the economy, 
the Iranian parliament dismissed him because of the Russian 
threat of war. 
Relations with the Ottoman Empire were relatively normal 
except for minor boundary disputes. There were no wars between 
the two countries. The main problem was the propaganda of the 
Shia in the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire. Although the 
Ottomans granted some religious rights to the Shia, such as 
smooth conditions and increased quottas for pilgrimage, they 
understood the danger of Shiism. As they figured out, the 
increasing power of Shiism caused a danger for Islam and the 
unity of believers. When Abdulhamit called all Muslims to 
fight against the Western World, and gather under the banner 
of Pan-Islamism and under the flag of the Caliph, the Shia 
refused to participate. 
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The Shia refusal of Pan-Islamism was basically due to 
religious and political discrepancies between Shiism and Sunni 
Islam. Later, despite these discrepancies, some of the Ulema 
asked the administration and their believers to support the 
Ottomans in their struggle against colonialism when they were 
threatened by the invasion of colonial powers in 1911.43 
The Shia were not satisfied by refusing the Caliphs call, 
and increased their propaganda of Shiism in Iraq and eastern 
Anatolia after 1880. The Shia sent religious agents, known as 
Ahonds, to continue this religious war with the Sunni Ottoman 
Empire and cause revolts among the people.44 
Because the Ottomans were so concentrated on the Western 
front, they tried to minimize disputes with Iran. So, instead 
of declaring war against Iran, they decided to respond to this 
challenge by the same methods. Under the leadership of Ahmed 
Cevdet Pasha, the Ottomans implemented a social and religious 
reform program in these areas. They concentrated on the 
education program for the people and opened schools 
everywhere, empowered the position of religious and tribal 
leaders who were loyal to the Empire, improved the 
infrastructure in the holy areas, and strictly controlled the 
Ahonds. By the help of religious leaders and nomads they were 
able to stop the Ahonds and reduce the Shia propaganda.45 
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The efforts to stop the Shia propaganda lost its 
acceleration due to a change in the Ottoman throne. The new 
Padishah, Mehmed the Fourth, was under the influence of the 
Young Turks movement. The triumvirate consisting of Mehmet 
Talat Pasha, Ahmet Celal Pasha, and Enver Pasha was in fact 
controlling the Empire. They had other areas of concern rather 
than the Shia propaganda in eastern Anatolia and Iraq. So, the 
Shia found an opportunity to regain power in these areas. 
The Ottoman Empire, after the disasters of the Balkan 
wars, tried to reorganize its military and administration 
under the influence of Germany. Germans were pro-Ottoman 
during the Balkan wars and offered support for them. With 
relations extending beyond this period, Germany became the 
dominant actor in this era. The Germans were granted the right 
to open a railroad from Berlin to Baghad in 1902. When the 
Ottomans could not find any support from their traditional 
allies in the 1900s, Germany was quick to fill this vacuum. 
Continued German investment, introduction of German officers 
to train the army, and exchange of students increased German 
influence in Istanbul. 
The leader of the Young Turk movement, Enver Pasha, was 
also sympatic to the Germans. He found the opportunity to 
practice his dream of uniting all of the Turkish peoples of 
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Central Asia and the Caucasus under his leadership. He made 
secret contacts with nationalist leaders of Caucasus, and also 
a secret alliance with Germany.46 All of his efforts were 
concentrated on his dream of establishing Turanm. 
When the World War One began, all the leaders of the 
Empire were in favor of being neutral except Enver. As a 
Minister of War (and son-in-law of the Padishah) , he had used 
his position and the fear of the traditional enemy of Russia, 
an ally of Britain and France, to force the government to 
enter the war. He made a secret treaty with Germany to enter 
the war as an ally of the Central powers. He began to wait for 
the provocation of Germany for the casus belli. In a short 
period of time, the events provided him a good excuse.47 
Many people believed that this would cause the total 
collapse of the Empire. One of them was Mustafa Kemal, who was 
a rival of Enver. Mustafa Kemal declared long before that the 
Empire should be neutral and if there was a side to choose 
this should not be Germany who would lose eventually. He was 
also against the idea of the involvement of military personnel 
in politics. Because of these discrepancies, he separated 
m
 As mentioned before, the word Turan first used in Persian accounts as a name for 
Turkish tribes. Here, it became a country that includes all of the Turkish speaking and ethnically 
Turkish people from China to the Balkans, from Iraq to Caucasus. It was frequently used by the 
supporters of Pan-Turkism to define the boundaries of the new Turkish Empire. 
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himself from the Young Turks movement and devoted his efforts 
to the military field. 
Two German warships-the battle-crusier Goeben and the 
crusier Breslau- which were running away from British warships 
entered the Turkish Straits. Meantime, Britain refused the 
delivery of two newly-build warships she had sold to the 
Ottomans before the war. This caused great public anger, 
because the money that had been paid for those ships was 
collected by the people voluntarily. The Germans gave the 
Goeben and Breslau to the Ottomans along with their personnel. 
They raised the Ottoman flag, and took the name of Yavuz and 
Midilli. Without any orders from the Ottoman government, these 
ships sailed into the Black Sea, hunted Russian ships and 
attacked Russian ports without. As a result, the Ottomans 
found themselves in a war that they were not preapared for. 
The results of this war became total disaster, and the Empire 
finally collapsed. 
The Ottomans were forced to fight everywhere, from 
Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, to Egypt and the Middle 
East, even in Gallipoli to defend the Empire. They were also 
asked to participate in operations in Romania after the defeat 
of Austria on this front. 
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The Ottomans could not advance and capture the 
territories lost before. On the contrary, revolts of other 
nations within its boundaries forced them to be defensive in 
the war. Arab revolts, sponsored by Britain, halted the 
advance of the Ottoman army to Egypt although there were 
successful campaigns. Later they were forced to retreat slowly 
to Iraq. It was noteworthy that, as a Caliph of the Islamic 
world, the Ottoman call for Jihad could not stop Arabs from 
fighting against the Empire. British gold was more important 
than the holy war against the traditional enemies of religion 
for Arabs. 
As soon as the Ottomans became involved in the war, Enver 
sent an army of 150,000 troops under the command of his uncle, 
Halil Bey, whose goal was to reach the Caspian Sea by sweeping 
through northern Iran. Enver believed that the immediate 
operation would bring victory, and by isolating Russian 
troops, he would be able to combine Central Asian Turks with 
the Ottoman army. 
The operation began in December, 1914. Following the 
initial success of the Ottoman army, the army faced the 
danger of winter. The army was not ready for winter and 
logistic supplies were not prepared before the operation. The 
limited supply channels were under continuous attack of 
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Armenian irregulars. These irregulars also attacked Turkish 
villages and massacred Turkish people.48 As a result of winter 
conditions, the army lost over 90,000 men during its campaign 
in the mountains.49 Thus, the Russians were able to defeat the 
Ottoman army at Sarikamish. 
The Russian advance forced the Ottomans to retreat. They 
lost Van, Mus, and Bitlis. The Ottomans took, then lost Tabriz 
in January 1915. Later, the Ottomans attempted to take Tabriz 
again, but were stopped in Nahjivan. The Ottomans lost Erzurum 
and Trabzon in 1916. This war was also costly for the 
Russians; their toll reached  146,998 dead and wounded.50 
Britain attempted to capture Iraq for several reasons. 
First, Iraq was strategically located between India and Egypt. 
They also wanted to divide Ottoman power in this area to keep 
the Ottomans from recapturing Egypt. Second, they wanted to 
secure their holdings in Iran, especially in Abadan. The oil 
rafineries in Abadan was providing necessary oil for British 
warships in this region. Third, they wanted to advance north 
and establish a link between the Russians in the Caucasus and 
British forces. This would give them another channel to 
provide logistic supplies to Russia. 
British troops landed at Basra in November 1914. However, 
the Ottomans first stopped the advance of British army in 
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1915, and later captured all of the British army including 
their commander, General Townshed in 1916. Despite the success 
of the Ottomans, Britain landed an even more powerful army at 
Basra. This time, the Ottomans, who were dealing with the Arab 
revolts in the Middle East, and fighting on the Egyptian 
front, could not stop the British advance. Thus, British 
troops captured Baghdad in 1917 but could not advance north 
via Iraq. Another British army advanced north via Iran and 
formed a link with the Russians in the Caucasus. 
Another important event was the attempt by the Allied 
powers to capture the Turkish Straits. The main idea was to 
neutralize the Ottoman Empire by invading its capital, 
Istanbul. Another major goal was to create a vital link with 
Russia. By opening a new front, the Allied powers forced the 
Central powers to relieve their pressure on the Western front. 
The operation began in February 1915 with the bombardment 
of Turkish defense points at Kumkale and Sedddulbahir at 
Canakkale. After heavy bombardment of the Turkish batteries 
for more than a month, they gathered a huge naval power to 
open the Strait. The attack of the impressive fleet on March 
18, 1915 became a major naval defeat in history. 
The Allied powers realized that they could not pass the 
Strait using naval power, so they landed ground troops in 
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August 1915. Although Turkish plans recommended against 
allowing the landing of enemy troops, the German commander, 
Liman Von Sanders, let the enemy land its troops in Gelibolun 
to relive the pressure on the German armies on the Western 
front. 
Realizing the immediate danger of these landings, Mustafa 
Kemal attacked the British and Anzac troops without waiting 
the order of high command. His victories in Anafartalar and 
Conkbayiri stopped the advance of the enemy. Later, he became 
commander of Turkish troops in Gelibolu, and forced the enemy 
to withdraw. The withdrawal of the Allied powers concluded in 
1916. The Turkish army lost over 230,000 and the Allied powers 
lost 210,000° in the tiny area of Gelibolu. Despite the heavy 
losses on the Turkish side, this victory reconciled the 
nationalistic feelings in the country. This war also 
introduced another hero, Mustafa Kemal to the nation.51 
Mustafa Kemal later was appointed to the Russian front. 
He organized the Ottoman army,  and began a successful 
"The Turkish troops were deployed behind Gelibolu, not on the coastal defense line The 
troops that showed resistence to the landing troops of the enemy were the mufrezes(platoon) on 
patrol In one event, only one mufreze(40 men) were fought against the landing of the Anzacs 
(2000 men). They resisted untill all of them became martyrs, however they managed the delay the 
landing for a full day. 
0
 These figures consist of dead, wounded, missing, and other war-related losses. 
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counteroffensive against the Russians. He recaptured much of 
the territory in eastern Anatolia. Following his success on 
this front, he was appointed commander of Ottoman troops in 
Mesopotamia. 
It was noticeable that whenever Mustafa Kemal succeeded 
on the battlefield, he was moved to another front with ever 
greater risk to his reputation and without advancing much on 
the fronts where he succeeded. This was a result of his 
rivalry with Enver, who was the Minister of War in the Empire. 
Despite this, Mustafa Kemal continiously proved his leadership 
and extraordinary capabilities as a military commander. 
Before the arrival of Mustafa Kemal to Mesopotamia, the 
Ottomans lost Hicaz, and Necef in 1916 following the revolt of 
the Arabs. With the help of Arabs, British troops were able to 
advance to Syria and Palestine. In 1918, France and Italy 
landed troops in Syria. The British troops in Iraq also 
advanced more. 
Mustafa Kemal gathered all of the Ottoman troops under 
his command. By a successful retreat to Syria and Iraq, he 
preserved the army and created a defensive line in Iraq. 
Before he could be challenged on this front, the war was over. 
He never lost a battle, all of his campaigns were full of 
victories, and he became a national hero. 
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On the eastern front, after the departure of Mustafa 
Kemal, the Ottomans advanced slowly. The collapse of the 
regime in Russia, and emergence of a communist regime let the 
two countries sign a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. 
Meanwhile, a communist diet was established in the Caucasus 
which then contacted the Ottomans. The Ottomans insisted that 
before negotiations could begin, first the diet must represent 
an independent state. Thus the Transcaucasian Federation was 
born in April 1918.52 
The Ottomans captured the rail line from Aleksandropol 
through the Julfa on the Iranian-Russian border in order to 
pursue the war against British forces in Iran. The advance of 
the Ottoman army was welcomed in Azerbaijan. Georgia, under 
the influence of the Germans declared its independence in May 
1918. This led the Azeris and Armenians to declare their 
independence. 
The Azerbaijani government signed a treaty with the 
Ottomans which promised Ottoman armed assistance to defend the 
newly born state. The Ottomans and Azerbaijanis created a new 
army, called the Islamic army, and forced Armenian troops to 
retreat. The advance of this army to Baku caused fear among 
the British and Russians of losing control of Baku oil. The 
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Islamic army also defeated Soviet forces and advanced to 
Baku.53 
The control of Baku oil by the Turkish also caused fear 
in Germany. They made a deal with the Soviets, that in return 
for a share of the oil, the Germans would force the Ottomans 
to backdown. Meanwhile, a British army advanced north with the 
aim of either controlling or destroying the Baku oil field. 
Its commander was General Dustrerville. The British advanced 
quickly and captured Baku before the Islamic army could reach 
it. However, they had to evacuate, and the Islamic army 
conquered Baku.54 
The Empire could not stand against the Allied powers 
alone after the defeat of Germany and Austria. It was forced 
to sign the Mondros Armistice on October 9, 1918. As a result 
of the treaty, the Ottomans were forced to leave Azerbaijan 
and the Caucasus. However, some troops of the Ottoman army 
remained as a part of the Islamic Army. 
The Ottoman advance to the Caucasus increased the power 
of the nationalistic movement among Azeri Turks. The teachers 
that had been sent to Azerbaijan aimed to Turkicize the 
education system. Turkish military personnel trained Azeri 
Turks in military art and led them to create a national army. 
Since the Azeri Turks were excluded from military service in 
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the Russian army, they had no weaponry and equipment to combat 
despite the well trained and equipped Armenians and Georgians 
who were constantly massacring the Turkish population in the 
Caucasus. After the evacuation of the Ottoman army, the 
British gained control of Baku and Azerbaijan. 
As can be seen from the flow of events, despite declaring 
her neutrality in the World War One, Iran could not escape 
involvement in the war. Iran became a theater of competing 
armies of the Ottomans, British and Russians during the war. 
In addition to this, a group of notables led by Nezam os 
Saltaneh Mafi, with the help of German agents,revolted and 
created a provisional government in Kermanshah. They hoped to 
liberate Iran from Russian and British dominance. Although 
they were able to stand against British and Russian forces 
during the war, they could not gain much support. 
After the end of war, the British gained total control of 
Iran. While Russia was dealing with its internal struggles, 
Britain offered a loan and advisers in every field to Iran in 
return for an agreement that would led the British 
protectorate of Iran. The agreement was signed in 1919 but 
rejected by the Majlis. However, the control of foreigners 
over Iran continued. 
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D. IN THE MODERN HISTORY: FROM ATATURK TO KHOMEINI 
The Ottoman Empire collapsed after the World War One. It 
lost hundreds of thousands of people among its four million 
army. The territory of the Empire was divided among the Allied 
Powers and their puppets. They landed British, French, 
Italian, and Greek troops in Istanbul to force the 
implementation of the armistice. By interpreting the terms of 
armistice according to their will, they occupied the Empire 
and Anatolia. 
The new Padishah, Mehmed VI, could not resist the Allied 
Powers. He became a prisoner in the hands of the occupation 
army. The guns of the allied fleet were pointed at his palace. 
The Allied Powers dismembered the Parliament and imprisoned 
its nationalist leaders. The triumvirate that led the Empire 
into the war fled the country, and two of its members, Talat 
and Cemal Pashas were assassinated by Armenian terrorists. 
Enver continued his struggle to create Turan with the minor 
support of Turkish tribes and died in battle against Russian 
troops in Central Asia in 1922. 
Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun on May 19, 1919 as a 
military inspector with the duty of disarming the Turkish 
irregulars who were supposedly attacking Greek people in that 
area.  However, his goal was completely different than what 
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was ordered. He organized the irregulars and created a 
national army. Mustafa Kemal was called back to Istanbul but 
he refused and resigned from the Ottoman army. He became an 
outlaw. Following two conferences, first at Erzurum and later 
at Sivas, he was able to gather the nation for the 
independence struggle. Only the regulars of the Third army, 
under the command of General Karabekir, accepted his 
leadership. The Third army attacked the Georgian and Armenian 
forces and forced them to make a peace treaty. 
The Allied Powers finally solved their disputes on the 
question of how to divide the Ottoman Empire amongst 
themselves and forced the Padishah to sign the Treaty of 
Sevres. The Sevres treaty distributed all of the Empire's 
territories among the Allied Powers except for a tiny area in 
Central Anatolia. In addition, they created an Armenian state 
in Eastern Anatolia, and a Kurdish state in southeastern 
Anatolia. Thus the Sevres treaty became a declaration of the 
collapse of the Empire, and Mustafa Kemal became a symbol of 
the independence struggle. 
Mustafa Kemal accelerated the nationalist movement and 
established his capital in Ankara. He assembled a Turkish 
Grand National Assembly with representatives from the 
provinces.  A Turkish national army was also established and 
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it successfuly resisted Greek and French advances. The first 
victories of the Turkish troops in the Inonu battles and 
strong resistance against allied forces made the French 
recognize Mustafa Kemal and sign the Treaty of Ankara. The 
Italians evacuated Anatolia without significant fighting. 
Mustafa Kemal established his authority and heavily 
defeated Greek troops in the Battle of Dumlupinar in 1922. Few 
survivors from the defeated Greek army were able to reach 
Izmir. The Greeks put the city to torch before the arrival of 
the Turkish army. When the Turkish army turned to Istanbul and 
Thrace, British troops were in front of it. Under these 
circumstances, the British were saved from defeat only by 
signing of an armistice on October, 1922. 
Mustafa Kemal created a new state according to the 
national boundaries. He negotiated heavily with the allied 
powers and forced them to sign the Treaty of Lausanne which 
nullified the Sevres treaty. He also removed the capitulations 
which were a big threat to economy of the country for 
centuries. 
He abolished the Sultanate, and established a new Turkish 
republic in October 1923. He became its first president, and 
Ankara became the new capital of the state. Later he abolished 
the Caliphate and declared a secular structure for the 
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republic in 1924. To empower the secular structure, he 
demolished religious schools, sects, dervishood, and abolished 
"Sheriat"p. He abolished all of the titles of honor from the 
Ottomans and introduced surnames. He was granted the surname 
of "Ataturk" by the Grand National Assembly. He made several 
radical reforms to modernize the country, his main goal being 
to match contemporary civilization (which he defined in 
Western terms) and change the mentality of the society. 
In foreign affairs, he based his strategy on the 
realities of power. His main aim was full independence and the 
preservation of the integrity of the republic. He put a great 
emphasis on creating good relations with neighboring 
countries, and mutual agreement in the region. His motto was 
"peace in the country, peace in the world". As an example of 
his active diplomatic efforts, the new republic negotiated 
friendship treaties with fifteen states in 1925. The Treaty of 
Neutrality and Friendship was signed with the Soviet Union, 
and renewed for ten years in 1935, which lasted until their 
aggression in 1945. Turkey also joined the Balkan Pact and 
increased its efforts to create better relations among the 
Balkan countries. Ataturk also regained Turkish control of the 
straits by the Montreux Convention in 1936. 
pSheriat means ruling every aspect of state affairs according to the religious laws. 
-63- 
Meanwhile,  Iran  was  under  the  influence  of  a 
modernization movement led by Reza Shah who came to power by 
a coup d'etat. The Iranian government was overthrown by a 
Persian Cossack Brigade officer, Reza Khan in February 1921. 
He was also of Turkic stock. He became Minister of War and 
Commander-in Chief of his army until 1923. Sayyid Ziauddin 
Tabatabai was Prime Minister. Reza Khan soon forced Tabatabai 
to leave the country and established his authority in the 
country. Following the departure of the last Qajar, he first 
declared himself Prime Minister, and later became the new Shah 
of Iran in 1926. Thus the Pahlavi dynasty occupied the throne. 
Reza Shah had similar goals to Mustafa Kemal. He tried to 
gain full independence and preserve the sovereignty of the 
country. He demolished all the institutions against his 
reforms except for the Ulema. He tried to westernize the 
country. He abolished the capitulations except for those of 
British, and gained limited control of the economy. 
Personally, Reza Shah was influenced by the achievements 
of Mustafa Kemal. As Mustafa Kemal managed to transform the 
religious structure of the society, Reza Shah also tried to 
break down religious institutions to transform the society to 
a secular structure. He also tried to create a powerful 
central administration by using the army to bring tribes under 
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control. He contacted Mustafa Kemal and visited Turkey. The 
relations of Turkey and Iran began with the honeymoon of two 
countries under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah. 
Both leaders realized the necessity of mutual understanding 
and need for a peaceful region. 
The close association of the two countries led Iraq and 
Afghanistan to develop similar relations with neighbouring 
countries. Turkey acted actively to help these countries solve 
border disputes amongst themselves. As a result, a 
Nonaggression Treaty among Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey 
was signed in 1937. By doing so, these countries established 
the Sadabat Pact at the same time. Eventually, Turkey secured 
its position in the region. 
Mustafa Kemal died in 1938 without finishing his program. 
However, the power of change was so irresistible that the 
nation continued his program after his death. Despite the 
pressures, Turkey remained neutral during the World War Two. 
However, the nation felt the economic burden of the war. 
Turkey joined the Allied powers just before the end of war as 
a diplomatic maneuver to find a place in the new era. 
On the other hand, Iran became a theater for foreign 
powers in the war. Reza Shah was suspicious about Britain and 
the Soviet Union. He switched his foreign policy to a more 
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independent route; he abolished remaining capitulations, 
offended Britain by cancelling the oil agreement with the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and outlawed communism in Iran. 
Although an oil agreement was signed later, neither Iran nor 
Britain was happy about it. To create a balance against 
Britain and the Soviet Union, Reza Shah depended solely on 
Germany. 
Despite the declaration of neutrality at the beginning of 
the World War Two, the Allied powers attempted to force him to 
expel all German nationals in Iran. Reza Shah at first refused 
these demands. Meantime, the attack of Germany on the Soviet 
Union in June 1941 required the aid of Allied powers to this 
country. To create a supply channel, British troops attacked 
Iran from the West and South while the Soviets attacked from 
the North in August 1941. Reza Shah could not resist the 
Allied powers and abdicated the throne in favor of his  son. 
He was sent into exile by the British. Later, Iran  signed a 
treaty of alliance with the Allied powers, in turn they 
accepted Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity in 1942. 
In 1943, Iran declared war against Germany. 
The war and occupation of the country by foreign powers 
led to changes and disturbances in the society. The communists 
became active among the industrial workers and intellectuals. 
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The first active communist party was established under the 
sponsorship of the Soviet Union. It was named the Tudeh. 
In December 1945, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party 
revolted against the government and created an autonomous 
Azerbaijan republic. Similarly, the Kurdish elements 
established another republic, Kurdish Republic in Mahabad in 
1946. Both republics were the result of Soviet propaganda, and 
Soviet troops stopped government troops from intervening in 
the situation. 
The Soviets requested oil privileges in northern Iran and 
continued their occupation. They evacuated Iran only after 
being granted oil privileges by the Iranian government. 
Without Soviet support, both republics could not resist the 
government's forces and they quickly collapsed. 
Later, Iran looked for the support of the United States 
to balance the Soviet threat. The United States quickly 
grasped the situation and understood the immediate danger of 
communism and the degree of Soviet aggression. Under the 
pressure of the United States, Britain, and partially the 
United Nations, the Soviets withdrew. The Majlis refused to 
grant oil privileges to the Soviets and, furthermore, to any 
other foreigners.Following the signing of a bilateral 
agreement with the United States in 1949, Iran relied on 
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United State's aid and power. Iran also became a member of the 
United Nations. 
Iran was not the only country that under the threat of 
Soviet aggression. Stalin demanded Kars, Ardahan, and their 
provinces from Turkey in 1945. He also demanded joint control 
of the Turkish straits. Stalin asked for unspecified revisions 
of the Turkish-Bulgarian border. Turkey refused these demands 
and prepared itself for a struggle with the Soviet Union. 
Meanwhile, Turkey looked for allies. The Truman Doctrine 
gave this opportunity to Turkey in 1947. Subsequently, Turkey 
participated in the United States sponsored European Recovery 
Program known as the Marshall Plan. Because of the immediate 
Soviet threat, Turkey changed its foreign policy from being 
neutral to becoming a part of the Western alliance system. 
Turkey also participated in the United Nations. 
The postwar domestic situation of Turkey led to changes 
in the state. The people were demanding economic reforms to 
relieve the economic burden of war. President Inonu let some 
former party members form an opposition party under the name 
of Democratic Party in 1946. Thus, multi party democracy was 
established in Turkey. The new party based its program on the 
free enterprise system and used religion as a campaign tool. 
The competition between the two parties relieved the pressure 
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from the religious sects and the government reopened religious 
schools 1947 despite Ataturk's ideology. 
Following their success in the elections, the Democratic 
Party came to power in 1950. They continued to use religion in 
their propaganda. Meanwhile they encouraged private enterprise 
and foreign investments. Turkey became a close ally of the 
United States. Under the leadership of the Democratic Party, 
Turkey participated in the Korean War, and joined the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. The basic reason 
was to gain a security umbrella from the West to defend the 
country against Soviet aggression. 
Turkey, in addition to his membership of NATO, undertook 
development of regional security systems in the Balkans and 
in Southwest Asia. First, Turkey, contacted Greece and 
Yugoslavia to establish a new Balkan Pact which would create 
a defensive link against the communist threat in the Balkans. 
These countries signed a Treaty of Nonaggression and 
Friendship, thus they established the Balkan Pact in 1954. At 
the same time, Turkey tried to secure its southeastern front 
and increased its diplomatic efforts to create another 
alliance with its neighbors. The idea was consistent with the 
Northern Tier Defense doctrine of the United States which was 
based on the Rimland theory. 
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Turkey signed a security treaty with Pakistan in 1954. In 
the same year Turkey increased its diplomatic efforts to 
create a regional security organization in the Middle East and 
in Southwest Asia. Turkey and Iraq declared their common will 
to create a new organization during the visit of the Iraqi 
Prime Minister in October, 1954. 
The new organization was seen as a threat to Egyptian 
efforts to create an Arab league that would gather all Arabs 
in the region under their leadership. So Egypt forced other 
countries not to participate in this organization. The Turkish 
Prime Minister visited Damascus and Beirut to convince Syria 
and Lebanon to participate in the new organization. Both 
countries did not show any intention of participating, and the 
Baghdad Pact was declared and signed as a Treaty by Iraq and 
Turkey in 1955. Following the declaration, Britain joined the 
pact. Although the United States was not a member,  it 
supported the Pact. Pakistan was asked to join and was 
accepted as a fourth member in 1955. In the same year, Iran 
also joined to the organization. 
Postwar Iran had domestic problems; a nationalist 
movement gained power. The Majlis assumed many roles of the 
Shah under the leadership of Prime Minister Mossedeq. The oil 
resources of the country became a symbol of this movement. 
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Although the sentiment to nationalize oil had existed 
before, Mossedeq was able to pass the bill to nationalize the 
oil resources and implement it. Britain was very upset about 
this development and tried to stop Iran. The International 
Court of Justice could not produce what Britain was looking 
for, and British offers to share revenues were refused by 
Mossedeq. Mossedeq also increased his authority by limiting 
the Shah's power and ability to control events. The attempts 
of the Shah to dismiss the Prime Minister were not successful. 
Under pressure from Britain, Iran's oil exports were halted 
and oil production came to virtual standstill. The economic 
problems and increasing domestic pressures forced Mossedeq to 
be close to the Tudeh. 
At this point, the United States intervened. The CIA and 
the British MI-6 prepared a plan known as Operation Ajax to 
overthrow Mossedeq. The operation's first stage was 
unsuccessful; the Shah left the country. But soon pro-Shah 
army units defeated Mossedeq's forces in August, 1953. The 
United States immediately granted economic aid to help Iran 
overcome its economic difficulties. 
This event forced the Shah to become a close ally of the 
United States and Britain. He established his authority at 
each level of his administration and other institutions. He 
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reacted boldly against any activities of the opposition. He 
diminished the power of the Majlis by all means, even 
controlling candidates for the legislature as had his father. 
He banned the Tudeh, the National Front, and other parties. He 
suppressed religious leaders and censored the press. He 
increased the role of his secret police, the SAVAK(Sazman-e 
Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar). 
To tie itself closely to the United States and Britain, 
Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Thus, the northern tier 
countries established a link between NATO and the South East 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to halt the advance of 
communism. Iran had achieved its goal of gaining security 
agreements for external threats and internal threats to its 
monarchy. 
Iraq withdrew from the Pact after the coup d'etat in 
1958. The pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) and moved its headquarters to Ankara. In 1959, Iran 
signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. 
Later, in order to strengthen the commitments of the United 
States, Iran approached to the Soviet Union and normalized its 
relations with that country in the mid-1960s. 
Turkey also faced a domestic crisis in this era. The 
Democratic Party government began to suppress the opposition 
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which was heavily criticizing the situation of the country. 
The country was under pressure from inflation and foreign 
debt. The economy was close to break down. In spite of the 
oppressive, unconstitutional methods; the corruption and 
mismanagement of the administration kept increasing the 
tension in the country. The Democratic Party moved to 
dictatorship and departed from the basic principles of 
Kemalist ideology. Under these circumstances, the army carried 
out a coup d'etat in May, 1960. 
The coup was accomplished without violence and was 
accepted throughout the country. The leadership of the 
movement established the Committee of National Unity composed 
of the officers who had organized the coup. The committee 
acted as an interim government. General Gursel assumed the 
Presidency. The major issues of the interim government were to 
transfer the administration to civilian leadership, to create 
a new constitution, to organize the central administration and 
bureaucracy, and to manage the economic problems. 
The new constitution was declared in July, 1961 and 
accepted by the public in a referendum. The 1961 constitution 
was basically similar to the 1924 constitution; the principles 
of Kemalism being protected in the new constitution as well. 
The main concerns of the authors of the constitution were the 
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empowerment of the individual versus the administration, and 
the protection of multi party system. General Gursel resigned 
from the military and became President of the country. New 
elections were held in October, 1961. 
The leaders of the former Democratic party and some 
government officials faced trials known as the Yassiada 
trials. They were charged for the dictatorship and 
mismanagement of the country. Although 15 death sentences were 
given, the interim government pardoned all of them, except for 
Prime Minister Menderes and two of his ministers. The 
sentences of former president Bayar and the others were 
commuted to life imprisonment. Several years later all of them 
were pardoned, and their rights restored. 
Turkey concentrated its efforts on normalizing its 
economy. Efforts were also made to increase economic ties with 
the European Economic Community(EEC). Turkey signed an 
agreement of membership with the EEC in 1964 which would allow 
Turkey to be a full member by 1995. 
At the same time, Turkey addressed the need for economic 
assistance among the members of CENTO in a meeting in 1964. 
This idea was welcomed by Iran and Pakistan, and the three 
countries established the Regional Cooperation for 
Development(RCD) in July, 1964. This organization would lead 
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to the development of these countries by sharing technical 
know-how and economic assistance. 
Turkey was forced to reevaluate its alliance with the 
West. This was a result of a series of events from 1962 to 
1964. The first question mark occurred when the United States 
removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for the 
removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962. This event 
showed Turkey that the United States might risk the security 
of Turkey at the negotiating table. 
Another important event was the 1963-64 Cyprus crises. 
The United States preferred to intervene in favor of Greece 
and President Johnson sent a harsh letter requesting Turkey 
not to be involved in any activity in Cyprus. Johnson's 
pressure on Turkey to cease the production of opium was also 
accepted as an intervention in domestic events by the public. 
The Turkish approach to the Soviets was also accelerated 
by the reliefe of cold war tension. Additionally, the Soviet 
Union  appeared  to  be  following  a  policy  of  peaceful 
coexistence. The Soviet foreign policy was seen as being in 
favor of Turkish demands in Cyprus in the 1960s. 
In Iran, the Shah was trying to implement economic and 
social reforms to create a strong and contemporary country 
with the goal of regional leadership. However, his reforms 
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were challenged by several opposition groups, including the 
nationalists, the communists, and the Ulema. The Ulema 
gradually increased its power in domestic politics and 
empowered its base in rural society. In 1963, when the Shah 
granted rights to women, proposed land reform, nationalization 
of forests and postureland, and profit-sharing for industrial 
workers under the program he called "White Revolution", the 
Ulema challenged him directly. 
Many clerical leaders were against the program, 
especially land reform and woman's rights. They assumed that 
this program would increase royal authority and government 
involvement. Ayatollah Khomeini directly attacked the Shah in 
his speeches and was later arrested. Following his arrest 
there were very violent demonstrations lasting several days. 
The Shah controlled the situation by harsh methods and 
suppressed the clergy for a while. 
Although these reforms, backed by the increase in oil 
revenues, seemed successful, they could not solve the basic 
problems of the masses. The opposition violently challenged 
the Shah in 1964 and 1971. When a bill to grant diplomatic 
immunity to United States personnel and their dependents in 
Iran was offered in the Majlis, the opposition, remembering 
the humiliating capitulations of 1900s, revolted. The Ulema, 
-76- 
led by Khomeini, prepared mass demonstrations against the 
bill. In 1971, when the Shah celebrated the uninterrupted 
Persian monarchy of 2500 years with lavish celebrations, the 
Ulema and other opposition groups made mass demonstrations. 
In the foreign policy area, the Shah began to shift his 
pro-Western policy to a more moderate policy. Following the 
1965 Kashmir War, the policy shift became more clear. It went 
from pro-Western to closer to non-aligned. The Shah observed 
the inadequency of the Baghdad Pact to protect the throne in 
Iraq in 1958. This time he understood that even bilateral 
agreements with the West would not ensure his security if a 
threat came from another power other than the Soviets. The 
reluctance of the United States to provide support to Pakistan 
made it clear that Iran needed to diversify its military 
supply sources. 
Besides the lack of the United States 's commitment, the 
lessening of tensions in the cold war stimulated this shift. 
A change in Soviet foreign policy assured less threat to Iran. 
Additionally, Iran saw a chance of acquiring more material and 
economic aid both from the Soviet Union and the West. 
The Shah was determined to be a regional power with a 
strong military in the 1970s. Iran was enjoying huge increases 
in oil revenues and the Shah also considered a strong army as 
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a protector of his throne. He established a powerful army, 
increased the size, and improved its technology by acquiring 
a modern arsenal. The Shah wanted the Navy and the Air force 
to be able to penetrate the Persian Gulf. 
He began to intervene in the politics of the Persian Gulf 
and tried to increase his position in the Middle East. 
Although in international politics Iran was less important, 
it emerged as a dominant figure in the Persian Gulf. Iran was 
equipped with the most advanced and extensive weapon systems 
of the West. This shifted the power balance in the region 
against the relatively small Gulf countries. 
Iran showed its new intentions by supporting the 
royalists in the Yemen civil war(1962-1970) and assisting the 
sultan of Oman in suppressing a rebellion by military force. 
Although Iran gave up its traditional claims on Bahrain and 
let Bahrain be an independent state in 1970, it invaded three 
disputed islands, Great and Lesser Tunbs, and Abu Musa as part 
of the secret deal with the British to give up its claims on 
Bahrain. In order to improve its position on the world scene, 
Iran participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
However, Iran was challenged by Egypt and later by Saudi 
Arabia in this role. Iraq saw the invasion of the three 
islands as a threat to its security and broke its diplomatic 
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relations. Turkey also became uncomfortable because of the 
Shah's aggressive policies and ambitions. 
The Shah's policy was approved by the United States and 
Britain. The basic motive of this was to create a friendly 
security environment in the Gulf. Under the leadership of 
President Nixon, the United States encouraged Iran to increase 
its military power. Nixon sought to encourage the allies of 
the United States to shoulder greater responsibility for 
regional security. In the post-Nixon era, the United States 
accepted Iran as a force for peace in the region, and 
increased its military aid and the transfer of modern weapons 
to Iran. 
On the other hand Turkey was under pressure of the West 
after its intervention in the Cyprus crisis in 1974. The 
Turkish peace operation in 1974 established peace on the 
island between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The 
operation was a response to a Greek attempt to capture the 
island by a coup d'etat in 1974. The United States put an 
embargo on its military sales and aid programs to Turkey after 
the operation. As a response to the embargo, Turkey suspended 
all of the military operations of the United States on Turkish 
soil and tried to reduce the effect of the embargo by any 
means. In this period, Turkish-Soviet relations became very 
-79- 
positive and the Soviet Union offered economic and military 
aid to Turkey. 
The embargo was an effective lesson for Turkey, thus 
Turkey understood clearly the need to create a national 
industry for modern weapons and not to depend solely on one 
power. The Turkish economy was also hit by the embargo, adding 
to the pressure caused by the oil crisis of 1973. Meanwhile, 
the country was under the threat of internal disputes and 
terrorism which gradually increased tension within the 
society. 
Turkey was not alone in its struggle to overcome internal 
difficulties. The opposition in Iran also established new 
organizations and began armed resistance to the Shah. The 
nationalist, communist, and religious groups established their 
organizations under different names, such as the Fadayan and 
the Mojahedin. These organizations were inspired by the 
guerilla movements of Cuba, Vietnam, and others. These 
organizations opened their guerrilla operations as early as 
1971.55 
The anti-regime movements sped up in 1977 when the 
economy began to collapse due to mismanagement, corruption, 
and other reasons. The Ulema increased its propaganda, 
declared the regime of the Shah abhorrent to Islam, and 
-80- 
advocated it be replaced by Islamic rule. Their propaganda was 
also based on the threat Westernization posed to the country. 
The threat to Islamic values and traditions was symbolized by 
dress, the life style of the upper class, music, films, and 
television programs. This propaganda also used the extensive 
foreign presence as evidence of the threat of the West against 
the identity and culture of the society. 
The traditional allies of the Ulema- bazaar people, urban 
workers, and the lower class masses, were under pressure from 
the economic burden created by their fixed salaries or low 
incomes. The Ulema easily increased its base of supporters as 
a result of political repression by the Shah and his inability 
to control the situation. When a regime controlled newspaper 
attacked the personality of Khomeini by declaring him a 
British agentq, the Ulema responded with violent mass 
demonstrations in Qom and Tabriz in 1978. Deaths occurred, and 
this added fuel to the fire of anger among the masses. 
These demonstrations were a turning point in Iran's 
history. The opposition always aimed at the restoration of the 
Constitution and demanded basic rights for the people until 
qThis article was probably delivered by the Ulema itself through their secret ally, General 
Fardust, the Shah's liason between the Court and SAVAK, with the purpose of provoking popular 
demonstrations. 
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1978. The 1978 demonstrations marked a major shift in these 
goals; this time the Ulema directly demanded a total change in 
the regime and in society. 
This shift is confirmed by the mass strikes of workers in 
September 1978. Despite the fact that the economic demands of 
the workers, such as an improvement in salaries and working 
conditions were met quickly by the administration, the workers 
also demanded political changes in the country. 
The National Front approached the Ulema and they combined 
their efforts to create a "democratic and Islamic" government 
in November,  1978.  The communist elements also saw an 
opportunity to establish a Marxist regime. To the communists, 
the propaganda of the Ulema was based on their arguments. 
Although, the communist elements did not directly approach the 
Ulema, they cooperated on many points with the religious 
groups. 
Thus, the same thing occurred in 1979 as it did in 1906 
and again in 1953. However, this time the Ulema grasped 
control of events and increased the tension in the country 
very quickly. 
The Shah tried to meet their demands to find a moderate 
way to control the situation. He could not resist the change, 
so negotiated with opposition moderates on a reform program. 
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An interim government was established by one of the leaders of 
the National Front, Baktiari, in January, 1979. The Shah left 
the country in the same month as it was negotiated. Baktiari 
also declared the withdrawal of Iran from both the CENTO and 
RCD in 1979. Following Iran, Pakistan also withdrew, and 
Turkey declared the closure of these organizations. 
The departure of the Shah was a turning point. The leader 
of the Ulema,  Khomeini returned from exile and assumed 
control. Although the Baktiari government tried to implement 
moderate reforms to protect the monarchy, he was undermined by 
Khomeini. Khomeini declared his own Prime Minister, Bazargan, 
and the country moved toward chaos. The confrontation between 
the people and the security forces became daily events. In 
many areas authority was grasped by revolutionary committees. 
Meanwhile the United States tried to bolster the Iranian 
military and encouraged a coup d'etat. The special emissary of 
Carter, General Huyser arrived in Tehran in January, 1979 and 
established daily contacts with security elements of the 
government.56 However, the armed forces soon tired of clashing 
with its own people, and some of them joined revolutionary 
units. General Huyser could not accomplish his mission and 
returned to the United States. Finally, the leadership of the 
armed forces declared their neutrality in this struggle in 
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February 1979. This became the end of Baktiari government and 
also the end of monarchy in Iran. 
E. THE POST-REVOLUTION ERA 
The early stage of the revolution was chaos. Various 
armed factions assumed responsibility in their areas, and 
began to clash with one another. Murders of ex-regime 
supporters were common. Revolutionary committees were 
established everywhere. The situation was completely out of 
control. 
Mehdi Bazargan was declared Prime Minister by Khomeini. 
Bazargan tried to establish a government structure to control 
the events in the country. Besides the formal government 
structure Bazargan was trying to establish, there was a shadow 
government under the name of the Revolutionary Council which 
was created by Khomeini. This council acted like the Politburo 
of the Soviet Union. The council was composed of clerics close 
to Khomeini and his aides, such as Abolhasan Bani Sadr. It 
held the supreme decision making authority. Khomeini saw 
himself above any institution and established his authority in 
the country. 
Khomeini also established an irregular army loyal to him 
and revolution called the Pasdaran. It was established as a 
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counter balance to the army and other armed groups such as 
Marxist guerrillas or ethnic groups. 
Some problems occurred between the ethnic groups and the 
Revolutionary Council. Some of these problems were handled by 
settlement, such as a dispute by the Turkomans. Others, such 
as the Kurdish demand for autonomy, Arab demands for autonomy 
in Khuzestan resulted in armed struggle. The Kurdish uprising 
proved more deep-rooted, serious, and durable. Khomeini used 
the army to suppress the revolt for the first time. 
Khomeini decided that the new form of the regime would be 
purely Islamic, so all of the opposition was to be suppressed. 
Following his decision, opposition newspapers and parties, 
including the National Front and Marxist elements, were closed 
and their leaders arrested. 
Khomeini ordered the preparation of a new constitution. 
He held a referendum in which the people would select what 
kind of regime they desire; but the only choice was an Islamic 
regime. So, it was no coincidance that the 98 % of Iranian 
people were in favor of the Islamic Republic when it was 
declared. Khomeini declared the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran on April 1, 1979. In November a new 
constitution was finished and approved by the leadership. The 
Constitution gave all the privileges to Shiism while the Shia 
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clergy assumed all of the superior powers. All of the 
minorities were also required to obey the same principles 
incumbent on the Shia. 
Another important incident was the seizure of the 
American Embassy by the followers of the Imam. Although it 
seemed an unplanned action of irregulars to humiliate the 
United States, it soon became a propaganda tool for 
revolutionary organizations. 
As a moderate person, Bazargan tried to put limits on the 
Revolutionary Courts which were established to implement 
revolutionary justice. He also tried to increase the power of 
the cabinet and establish law and order. However he failed and 
resigned in November 1979. The Revolutionary Council took over 
the duties of Prime Minister. 
Later Bani Sadr was appointed as President and new 
elections were held to fill the positions in the new Majlis. 
From the beginning, disputes between Prime Minister Racai and 
Bani Sadr occurred. Bani Sadr, with the support of Khomeini, 
assumed a powerful position. He tried to control the Majlis. 
But in the following days, he lost the confidence of Khomeini. 
He could not gain power to control the Ulema and the 
revolution, and finally resigned in June 1981. He escaped from 
death by fleeing to exile in France. 
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Iran was not the only country transforming its leadership 
in this period. Turkey had another military coup d'etat in 
September, 1980. The basic reason of the operation was to 
reestablish law and order in the country which was under the 
threat of undeclared civil war, among the different terrorist 
groups and between these groups and the Turkish security 
forces. 
Terrorism was backed by different ideological elements 
and was leading the country to civil war, especially after 
1977. One of the most important incidents was the clash of 
Sunni and Alevi people caused by the provocation of rightist 
and Marxist elements in Kahramanmaras. The clash ended with 
more than 100 dead and several hundred wounded just in two 
days in 1978. 
None of the political institutions could produce 
solutions to the problem because of the corruption and 
polarization amongst themselves. The economy collapsed, and 
the Parliament was unable to select a new President more than 
six months. 
Under these circumstances the military took over the 
country and quickly reestablished law and order. All former 
parties were banned and a National Council was appointed to 
rule the country for an interim period. The operation was 
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welcomed by a majority of the people and did not meet any 
resistance. General Kenan Evren, who was then Chief of the 
General Staff, assumed the leadership. 
The new constitution was prepared by the Constituent 
Assembly and approved by the people in a fair referendum in 
1982. Evren became President through the same referendum. 
Democratic elections were held in 1983. The Motherland Party 
led by Turgut Ozal won the elections. Ozal became Prime 
Minister even though he was not preferred candidate of the 
military. 
The situation in Turkey became more important for 
regional security with the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in 
September, 1980. 
Iraq was very anxious about the intentions of the new 
Iranian regime because of its immediate efforts to export 
revolution. Iranian propagandists were spreading the message 
of the revolution to other places where Shia Muslims were 
living, especially Iraq and the Gulf countries. They 
established links with other radical Islamic groups in Egypt 
and Algeria. With a substantial Shia population, Iraq was 
direclty threaten by the propaganda of the new regime in Iran. 
Iraq was already facing the opposition of the Shia, so it was 
important for them to contain the opposition. 
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Ongoing disputes over the Shatt-ul Arab waterway and 
Kurdish issues led Iraq to move quickly to solve these 
problems by means of armed struggle against Iran. Iraq tried 
to gain advantage from the weak situation in Iran before 
Revolutionary elements could consolidate their power. 
In the beginning phase, Iraq launched attacks along three 
fronts and made a surprise attack on Iranian air power with 
limited success. Iraq advanced quickly on the battle field 
untill Iran fully mobilized its power. In the second phase, 
Iran stopped the Iraqi advance and put Iraq on the defensive. 
Meantime, the Revolution consolidated its power in 1984 by 
eliminating virtually every opposition. In the third phase, 
Iran successfully pushed back Iraqi forces and gained Iraqi 
territory. A Syrian-Iran alliance and the occupation of Iraqi 
land in the Gulf led Iraq to depend on the only major pipeline 
from Turkey for its oil exports. 
From the beginning of the war, each side tried to stop 
the oil exports of the other by attacking ports, oil 
facilities, and oil tankers in the Gulf. This movement sped up 
after the Iraqi acquisition of French Exocet missiles in 1983. 
Iran began to attack tankers going to Kuwait on the basis that 
Kuwait was supporting Iraq. This led the United States and 
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other Western powers to intervene and protect international 
ship traffic in the Gulf. 
In 1987 the balance of the war shifted back to Iraqi 
side. With Saudi and Kuwaiti financial help, Iraq was able to 
acquire more advanced weapons from the West and the Soviet 
Union. Iran, on the other hand, could not mobilize any more 
resources to the war. As a result, Iraqi forces won a series 
of battles and pushed Iranian forces back in the Spring of 
1988. In the Summer of 1988 the war ended with a ceasefire 
between the two countries. 
During the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey remained neutral and 
offered its services in finding a peaceful settlement. Turkey 
became very active in the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, and also became a member of the Islamic Peace 
Committee (IPC). The IPC was established to find a peaceful 
solution to the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey's main concern was 
preserving the power balance in the region and securing the 
oil supply lines. Another concern was the Kurdish problem in 
southeastern Anatolia, which was being affected by the power 
vacuum in northern Iraq. Relations with Syria were also a 
source of problems given its traditional territorial claims 
and support for terrorist groups attacking to Turkey. 
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Turkey became anxious about the Iranian policy of 
exporting its revolution. The official news media of Iran 
launched a campaign targeting extreme religious groups in 
Turkey. This campaign openly attacked the secular structure of 
the country and its leader, Ataturk. In 1987, President Evren 
warned of the immediate danger these extreme religious groups 
posed against the secular structure of the country. Iran 
questioned the belief that Iranian opposition groups were 
using Turkey as a transit route to Europe. 
Iran also questioned Turkish operations against Kurdish 
rebellion in northern Iraq. Iran insisted that Turkish efforts 
to suppress the Kurdish rebellion were aiding the Iraqi war 
efforts by enabling them to post fewer troops in the north. In 
response to this, Iran offered support to the PKK, and invited 
another organization, the ASALA, to open an office in Tehranr. 
Turkey saw a threat from an Iranian invasion of northern Iraq 
and its efforts to organize a Kurdish revolt in this area. 
Turkey also saw a threat to its interests when Iran decided to 
attack the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline. Turkey warned Iran 
about the possible consequences of cutting the pipeline. 
The PKK is a Marxist-separitist Kurdish terror organization established in the 1970s. 
The ASALA is another well known Armenian terrorist organization which has attacked to 
Turkish diplomats and officials in order to create an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. 
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Despite the many problems of the ambitious regime in 
Iran, Turkey wanted to improve relations with this country by 
ignoring their propaganda campaigns. Turkey assumed these 
campaigns were the result of Iranian domestic politics an 
internal problem of Iran. So Turkey preferred to remain 
neutral without intervening in the situation unless Turkey was 
directly threatened. 
Turkey worked to improve relations with the West which 
had deteriorated after the military coup d'etat. Bileteral 
relations with the United States also improved rapidly. The 
United States expressed an understanding for the reasons of 
the military operation, but the West was still not cooperative 
for certain reasons. Turkey, understanding the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 
and the documented support to terrorist groups in Turkey 
before the coup, acted as a close ally of the United States 
despite certain problems. One of the major problems between 
the United States and Turkey was the political support of the 
United States to the claims of Armenian terrorist groups. 
In late 1980s, Turkey launched a campaign to enter the 
European Community which had been previously agreed to by the 
European Community back in 1963. Without regard to Turkey's 
ongoing efforts to integrate itself with Europe, the EC 
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postponed its entry and forced Turkey to implement another 
integration program. 
In contrast to the improvement of relations between 
Turkey and the West, Iran was left alone by the West. Some 
factors influencing the West were the export of regime to 
other countries (especially to the Gulf countries), the 
presence of Iranian-backed terrorist groups and their 
activities (especially in Lebanon), the hostage crisis, and 
the Salman Rushdi crisis. 
As a response to its weak position in the international 
arena, Iran sought the support of the Soviet Union in 1989. 
Despite the fact that Khomeini declared the United States as 
a great Satan, and the Soviet Union as a lesser Satan; Iran 
greatly needed Soviet aid. Khomeini personally concerted these 
efforts, and the rapproachment was established. Soviet 
political, economic, and military support were gained. 
Relations with the Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and 
Eastern Europe countries were also improved in this period. 
Iran was shocked by the death of Khomeini in June 1989. 
Following his death, the more pragmatic Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsancani came to power and created his cabinet with fewer 
extremists in August 1989. As a spiritual leader, Ayatollah 
Ali Hoseni Khameni was  selected. However, Khameni was less 
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powerful than Khomeini, so he preferred not to intervene in 
Rafsancani's policies. Rafsancani placed more moderate 
professionals in the senior posts. Khameni became involved in 
more religious and political duties rather than in the 
administration. Rafsancani tried to improve the economic 
condition of the country and implement a privatization 
program. 
The improvement of the economy became important because 
of the effect of the protracted war with Iraq and diminished 
oil revenues.  The poverty of the people increased the 
influence of the opposition, causing several riots in 1992. 
Rafsancani and other moderist politicians tried normalizing 
Iranian relations with the West, and other international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, and the IMF. Two major 
factors forcing the moderates to do so were economic and 
political. Iran also tried to break down the Arab league, 
which had exculeded it, by trying to improve its relations 
with some Gulf countries. This helped Iran undermine the 
strength of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC has 
been acting against Iran under the leadership of Saudi Arabia. 
Iran attacked the organization, and refused to recognize it. 
Iran preferred to continue its dialogue on an individual 
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country basis which might further split the cooperation in the 
GCC. 
Turkey also had severe economic problems during this 
period. The export boom had decreased and inflation had 
increased. Turgut Ozal became President in 1989 and Suleyman 
Demirel became Prime Minister. Turkey faced increasing tension 
in the southeastern region from the Kurdish rebellion 
following power vacuum in northern Iraq after the Iran-Iraq 
war. 
Following several weeks of tension and military build up, 
Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In an extremely rare 
instance of immediate international cooperation, the Coalition 
forces were established and the Desert Storm campaign began on 
16 January 1991. 
Before this crisis occurred, Iraq approached Iran to 
create peaceful relations which would relieve Iraqi army 
concentrations on the Iranian front. Iraq accepted the peace 
terms of Iran and a peace treaty was signed in August 1990. 
Normalization of relations were quickly established, Iraqi 
troops left Iranian territories, war prisoners were exchanged 
and embassies opened respectively. By doing so, Iran gained 
the peace treaty on its own terms, but it did not support Iraq 
in the Gulf crisis. Iran could not let Iraq become powerful in 
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the region by the acquisition of Kuwait and its huge 
resources. Iran did not support Iraq, despite domestic 
pressure to confront the Great Satan (the United States). 
President Ozal was anxious about Iraqi movements and so 
kept Turkey as a close ally of the Coalition in this crisis. 
Although it was against the philosophy of Kemalist ideology to 
intervene in crises with neighbors, Ozal was determined to be 
seated at the table when peace conditions and regional 
balances in the postwar era would be shaped. So, despite the 
resistance of certain groups, including high ranking officials 
and army officers, Turkey supported the operation. The support 
of Turkey was crucial for the Coalition. Economic sanctions 
were strictly enforced and a second front threating Iraq from 
the north was opened with the help of Turkey. On the down 
side, this operation and further sanctions against Iraq became 
a heavy economic and political burden on Turkey. 
Syria and Egypt gathered at a meeting of the GCC 
countries in Damascus in March, 1991 to discuss future 
security arrangements for the Gulf. This meeting resulted in 
a new cooperation for peace and stability in the Gulf region, 
which was later known as "the GCC plus two" formula. In this 
cooperation, Egypt and Syria would provide manpower, and the 
GCC would assume the financial support of providing security 
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in the Gulf Region. With this agreement Egypt completely 
renewed its image in the Arab world, and increased its 
influence in the Middle East. However, this cooperation 
considered neither Iran nor Turkey in the regional security 
process. 
One of the problems that this war caused in the region 
was the quick collapse of the balance of power in the area. 
Iraq tried to regain influence over northern Iraq by means of 
force, causing another crisis situation resulting in Western 
intervention in the Winter of 1991. When Iraqi forces tried to 
control the area, their harsh methods caused the Kurdish 
people to flee the country. Some of them choose Iran, a few 
of them preferred Syria, but most of the Kurds immigrated to 
Turkey. Turkey opened its door to these people because of 
humanitarian reasons, but the burden was so high that it could 
not bear any more immigration. 
In just a few weeks, almost a half million Kurdish people 
found safety in Turkey. However, these refugees were not only 
peasants, but also some Pesmerges and PKK members. A further 
escalation in the crisis was prevented using Western pressure. 
To provide basic security and humanitarian aid to Kurdish 
people in this region, Operation Provide Comfort was 
implemented by some Western countries under the auspices of 
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the United Nations. Additionally, all Iraqi military 
activities were restricted and No-flight zones were 
established in north of the 36th parallel and south of the 
32nd parallel, where the Iraqi army was operating against Shia 
opposition groups. 
However, the most important event of the late 1980s was 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of cold war era. 
The collapse did not happen overnight, dramatic changes 
occurred in the Soviet Union as early as the late 1980s. The 
dissolution of the Soviets began in 1990 and was sped up in 
1991 following the attempted coup in Moscow. This event 
changed the international political stage and global power 
structure that forced every country in Southwest Asia to make 
major alignments in their foreign policies. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union introduced new countries 
to the region. The new republics of Central Asia and 
Transcaucasus began to declare their independence from the 
Soviet Union near the end of 1991. These new states 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan) are ethnically Turkish and religiously either 
the Shia or Sunni Muslims speaking some form of Turkish (with 
the exception of Tajikistan which is officially using Persian 
but Turkish is also spoken). 
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Besides these countries, Armenia and Georgia were 
established in the region. The introduction of these states 
to the political scene also introduced many disputes and 
problems for the security of the region. Some examples would 
be: the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh, border 
and ethnic disputes in the Central Asian republics, and the 
power struggle of parties for regime in these countries. 
Both Turkey and Iran interpreted the situation 
differently and have tried to create areas of influence in the 
region by emphasizing cultural, religious, or linguistic and 
economic ties with these countries. Both countries 
simultaneously opened embassies in these new countries. 
Turkey's initiative was successful in creating another 
regional organization. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC) was a result of Turkish efforts which began in 1990. 
The first meeting was held in Moscow with the Foreign 
Ministers from Turkey, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania 
attending. Yugoslavia, Greece, and some republics of the 
Soviet Union (Moldavia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and 
Armenia) participated as observers. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a pause, but not 
an end. The establishment of the organization was signed by 
the  Presidents  of  Turkey,  Russia,  Ukraine,  Georgia, 
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Azerbaijan,  Armenia,  Bulgaria,  Romania,  and Moldavia in 
Istanbul in June, 1992. 
In the late 1980s, Turkey also increased its activities 
in the Economic  Cooperation Organization (ECO). The ECO was 
established in 1964 as Regional Cooperation for Development 
(RCD)  between Iran,  Turkey,  and Pakistan. However,  this 
organization lost its initiative in the following years. 
Turkey addressed the need for economic and technological 
cooperation in the region. The RCD was reactivated by the same 
founding countries and renamed as the Economic Cooperation 
Organization in 1985. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also joined the organization 
during its summit meeting February 1992. 
Likewise, Iran tried to increase its influence in the 
Central Asian republics by creating a similar organization 
that would increase the cooperation in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. In this perspective, Iran was able to sign the 
Caspian Sea Cooperation (CSC) with Azerbaijan, Russia, 
Kazakhistan, and Turkmenistan. 
Turkey and Iran established diplomatic relations with the 
Central Asian and Caucasus states. Ministrarial visits 
occurred especially in 1991 and the following years. Turkey 
hosted Presidents of these states on several occasions, and 
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Turkish Prime Minister Demirel visited these states in 1992 
following the visit of his Foreign Minister. President Ozal 
visited these states in 1993. At the same time, Iranian 
officials paid visits to these countries as the representative 
officials from the Central Asian and Caucasus states were 
visiting Iran in 1992. 
Another development in the region was the ongoing peace 
arrangements between the Palestinians and Israelis called the 
Middle East Peace Process, began in Madrid during October, 
1991. A peaceful solution to Palestinian problem would bring 
moderate and more stable relations to the surrounding Middle 
East countries, especially aiding ongoing Israeli-Syrian 
negotiations. Iran vehemently opposed the process, and 
continued to adhere to uncompromising rhetoric on the Arab- 
Israeli conflict more because of domestic pressure than its 
policy prerequisites. Turkey, however, welcomed the peace 
process and supported the normalization of the situation in 
the Middle East by leading to a fair and acceptable peace 
solution. 
Iran involved itself in another dispute with the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) by forcing Arabs to leave Abu Musa-a tiny 
island in the Gulf. Iran had seized control of Abu Musa and 
two more islands in the Gulf back in 1971. In the 1971 
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agreement with the UAE, Iran allowed 700 Arabs to remain on 
the island and share control with the UAE. Iran claimed the 
islands were a natural part of Iran, but the UAE did not share 
this view. 
Khameni and Rafsancani worked together to prepare new 
elections to be held in 1992. These elections forced hard line 
groups out of administration. Rafsancani was able to create a 
moderate administration from among his supporters. 
In 1993, Rafsancani was elected as President for a second 
term. In the same year the Turkish President, Turgut Ozal died 
from a heart attack following his visit to the Central Asian 
states. Suleyman Demirel was elected as President after Ozal's 
death. For the first time in Turkish history, a woman, Tansu 
Ciller was elected as a Prime Minister. 
Another change in the presidency occurred in Azerbaijan 
but this time by a coup d'etat in June, 1993. Elchibey, the 
former President, was known for his close links with Turkey. 
Haydar Aliyev who came to power following the coup of armed 
units, was an ex-communist party leader and politburo member 
of the Soviets who was closer to Russia then Turkey. Turkey 
remained neutral during the conflict despite domestic 
pressure. 
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In February 1993, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Central 
Asian states agreed to cooperate on steps towards a Southwest 
Asian common market. In the same month, talks between Turkey, 
Iran, and Syria were held in Damascus regarding the future 
situation of Iraq. This meeting was followed by several 
meetings held to understand each other's viewpoint on the 
issue. 
Relations with Russia were an important factor in Turkish 
and Iranian foreign policies. For this reason, both countries 
paid visits to Moscow at different political levels. Russia 
also signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran on June 
1993. Consequently, Russia increased its trade and arm sales 
volume to Iran in this period. The Turkish Prime Minister 
Ciller also paid a visit to Moscow in September, 1993. 
Turkish relations with the West also increased in 1993 
although there were still some problems. Turkey hosted the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher in June, 1993. In 
September 1993, Ciller visited the United States. In the same 
month, Ciller visited Germany. Turkey continued its efforts to 
cooperate with the EC, and hoped to have a full membership 
status in 1996, although the EC postponed entrance until an 
undetermined date. 
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Meantime, the GCC countries held a meeting in Abu Dabi in 
June 1993. Egypt and Syria also joined the GCC countries. This 
meeting did provide far from creating a security arrengement 
in the Gulf, but another arena where the UAE's claim on the 
three islands was reissued. 
Turkey and Iran kept to a minimum confrontation on 
certain problems. An exchange of visits occurred on several 
different diplomatic levels. The Vice President of Iran 
visited Turkey in December, 1993. Several Ministers of Turkey 
visited Iran. However, keeping relations open became very hard 
for Turkey following the involvement of Iranian groups in the 
assasinations of secular and prominent figures of Turkey. 
Despite these strains, both countries continue their efforts 
to preserve cordial relations. 
-104- 
m. CURRENT ISSUES 
This chapter addresses the major issues between Turkey 
and Iran that may shape their future relations. It is quite 
easy to see disputes between sovereign states. However, some 
of them require special attention because of their impacts on 
the state's future well-being, and possible side effects of 
these disputes on regional stability. So, the main areas 
addresssed in this chapter are: 
a. Kurdish Problem 
b. Status of Northern Iraq 
c. Export of Regime 
d. Rivalry in Central Asia 
e. Azerbaijan Nationalism and Nahcevan 
f. Extensive Military Build-up of Iran 
All of the major issues are a result of developments in 
the region and are, of course, influenced by the global 
environment. Some of these issues impact countries other than 
Turkey and Iran. These issues are result of developments over 
long time period. The historical setting of events proves the 
necessity of being literate in history as the first 
prerequisite to understand 'recent' problems. In addition, 
knowledge of culture and geopgraphy of region we are concern 
-105- 
with are just as important as knowledge of the history. The 
cultural aspect will reveal the behavior of the people and how 
they respond to challenge. Geography limits the actions taken 
and determines what can be done. However, these aspects will 
only be briefly mentioned in this chapter. 
A. KURDISH PROBLEM 
1. Historical Setting 
One of the most important problems in Southwest Asia is 
the Kurdish problem.  The Kurds basically live in four 
countries:  Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. A few Kurds also 
live in the Caucasus. The growing ethno-nationalism among the 
Kurds has become a major source of conflict in this area, 
threatening the stability and security of the region. This 
problem has continuously been a tool for external actors to 
intervene in the politics of the host country or countries. An 
examination of Kurdish revolts, especially after the 19th 
century, shows that these uprisings (whether they were in a 
feudal or ethnonationalist form), occurred in times of greater 
conflict among the regional actors or other external actors 
and a weakened status of the host government. 
The origin of the Kurds is not clearly defined by 
scholars,and this issue is a current source of controversy. 
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Modern-day Kurdish intellectuals trace their origins back to 
the Medes tribe that ruled what they call Kurdistan from 614 
B.C. to 550 B.C.57 Other sources claim the Kurds were another 
Turkic Stock that came to Anatolia in the first wave of 
emigration of Turks from Central Asia.58 
So called "Kurdistan" is an area which includes 
southeastern and parts of eastern Anatolia, northeastern 
Syria, northern Iraq (from Khaneqin-Kirkuk-Mosul), 
northwestern Iran (from Kermanshah to Lake Urmia), and south 
of Armenia (from Yerevan). This area is very mountainous and 
contains other nationalities besides the Kurds. Certainly, 
Anatolia as a whole definitely has belonged to the Turks since 
1071. Hundreds of thousands Turkomans (who are also Turks) 
live in Mosul and Kirkuk. In northwestern Iran there are large 
number of Azeris and in northeastern Syria there are many 
Arabs. 
It is estimated by some sources that there are total of 
17,110,000 Kurds of whom 9 million are currently living in 
Turkey, 4 million in Iran, 3 million in Iraq, 750,000 in 
Syria, and some 360,000 in the remaining areas.59 It is 
impossible, however, to depend on any source because of 
conditions of the area, and the policies of the countries 
involved. It is not possible to have any reliable numbers. 
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Some Kurdish leaders go well up to 35,000,000 of whom 25 
million live in Turkey. From our point of view, this claim can 
be regarded as being highly exaggerated. 
The Kurds themselves have numerous divisions, so to does 
their language. The Kurdish language also has different forms. 
The major Kurdish languages are: Kurdi (including the Gurani 
and Sulaymani dialects), Kurmanji, and Zaza. However, these 
Kurdish languages are mutually exclusive and in some cases 
inaccessible to speakers of other dialects. In essence, it is 
hard to tell the existence of a language linguistically, 
because these languages consist of early Turkish, Arabic, and 
Persian words. The Kurds are also divided in religion. With 
the exception of a few Yazidis-a paganist religion, Kurds are 
Shia and Sunni Moslems. The religious sects, such as Sufism 
and Naqshibendi, are established amongst the tribes. 
Tribalism and feudalism remain important in Kurdish 
society. Tribal leaders, "Aghas", are dominant actors on the 
domestic political stage. Aghas gain their authority from 
being a leader of the tribe, from their wealth and 
landholdings. The third leg of authority of the Aghas came 
from the acceptance of being a religious leader or Sheikh by 
their followers. Although being a sheihk is not a rule, it is 
common. For the average Kurd, loyalty to his tribal leader 
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comes first, then his religion. The ethno-nationalism was a 
main aspiration for the Kurds during the twentieth century. 
The tribal factors dominated many revolts between 1919-1975 
rather then nationalistic aspirations. 
2. Kurdish Movements in Iran 
The Kurds in Iran showed political or ethnic activity as 
early as the late nineteenth century. The very first revolt of 
Kurds occurred in 1880 under the leadership of Sheikh 
Obeydollah. He tried to control the area between Lake Urmia 
and Lake Van. He contacted the Russians and the British, and 
was supported by the British. The British provided arms and 
ammunition to him. However his revolt was suppressed by a 
coordinated effort of the Ottoman and Iranian armies.60 
The end of World War One created a power vacuum in the 
region. Following this vacuum, the area became a theater for 
continuous revolts until 1943. Most of these revolts shared 
the same tribal and feudal character, including the role of 
external and regional actors. These revolts were clashes of 
tribes against each other, with other ethnic groups, and host 
states. 
The first revolt following of this pattern occurred in 
Iran in 1920 under the leadership of Ismail Aga Simko as 
-109- 
uprising started in an area consisting of Lake Urmia, Salinas, 
and Khoi. However, Simko was challenged by the Shia Azeris. A 
series of revolts by Simko finally ended when he died in a 
battle against Reza Shah's forces. Reza Shah, following the 
example of Ataturk, refused to recognize any other identity 
other than Iranian and tried to unify Iran. 
One clear example of the role of an external actor is the 
short lived Kurdish republic of Mahabad. World War Two 
transformed the politics of Iran and weakened the authority of 
the central government. Soviet's expansionist policy used the 
Kurdish problem in its efforts to influence Iran. To do this, 
the Soviets coopted many of Kurdish tribal chiefs and honored 
them with the rank of "general".61 The Kurds established their 
ideological groups during Iran in this era. The Komala-e 
Zhian-e Kurdistan(Committee for the Resurrection of Kurdistan) 
was established in Mahabad, a predominantly Kurdish city.62 The 
Komala, looking for alliances with other tribes, signed a pact 
entitled "Peman  e Se Senur"   (The pact of three brothers) with 
representatives from Iraq and Turkey.63 This pact did nothing 
more than create a map that could later be used as a basis for 
an artificial Kurdistan. 
In an alliance of authoritarian Kurdish figures, who were 
supported and supervisioned by the Soviet Union,  a new 
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political party, the Kurdish Democrat Party (KDP), was 
established under the leadership of Qazi Mohammad in 1945. 
Following the establishment of the new party, the leaders of 
the party declared the new Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. At the 
time, they were wearing in Soviet general uniforms in the 
presence of the Soviet officers.64 
The Republic enjoyed neither the support of Shia Kurds 
nor other ethnic groups in the area. The Soviet-Iranian 
agreement on economic coordination and extensive oil 
privileges resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
northern Iran. A few months later, the Iranian army recaptured 
all the territories of the republic and hung the leaders of 
revolt. The puppet "Republic" enjoyed less than a year of 
authority. The Shah then increased the authority of the 
central government and accelerated the reintegration of non- 
Persian ethnic groups into a Persian identity. 
The Kurdish Democratic Party continued its activities in 
secret, popping up only in favorable conditions. In 1952-53, 
and again in 1956 the Kurdish people revolted against the 
harsh methods of the military or against their feudal 
landlords. The Shah himself favored some of these tribes as 
well as some landlords. Certain tribe members came to high 
positions in all levels of government including the military. 
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When the Baath Party came to power by coup d'etat in 
Iraq, the Shah became suspicious of the radical policies of 
the Baathi regime. So, the Shah used the common wildcard of 
the region, the Kurds, to hinder the progress of a Baathi 
Iraq. He supported Mullah Mostafa Barzani for the purpose of 
"securing some direct influence within the Kurdish national 
movement. The idea was to make Barzani 's movement depend upon 
the aid and to increase that aid as the movement grew so that 
eventually the Kurdish movement's very survival would depend 
upon it."65 In addition, by dividing the Kurds, he could then 
quickly reintegrate them. The Shah was not alone in his 
support of Barzani; Israel and the United States also rallied 
to support Barzani in hopes of diminishing the authority and 
power of the Baathi regime.66 
Not enjoying the idea of depending on the Shah's 
decisions, some Kurdish leaders separated from Mullah Mostafa 
and revolted. Mullah Mostafa believed that with the Shah's aid 
he could win an immediate victory in Iraq. He blockaded the 
escape route of the rebels and the rebels who continued to 
fight in Iran soon found themselves surrounded by the Shah's 
armies.67 
When the Islamic revolution began, the Kurdish people 
again were divided on how to respond. Most of them, peasants, 
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and urban people were in favor of the revolution from the 
beginning. However the tribal leaders and landlords preferred 
a wait and see approach. Only a few, who were favored by the 
Shah, acted against the revolution. 
The revolution and the Islamic regime did not provide 
them what they were hoping for. In theory in an Islamic 
government there are no differences or privileges regarding 
ethnic background. The Islamic state is universal and not just 
for the Persian, or Arab, or Kurd but for all Moslems. Only 
other religious groups can be called a minority in the Islamic 
sense. As Khomeini addressed it: 
Sometimes the word minorities is used to refer 
people such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians, 
Baluchis, and such. These people should not be 
called minorities, because this term assumes that 
there is a difference between these brothers. 
There is no difference between Muslims who 
speak different languages, for instance, the Arabs 
or the Persians. It is very probable that such 
problems have been created by those who do not wish 
the Muslim countries to be united... they create 
the issues of nationalism, of pan-Arabism, pan- 
Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to 
Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam 
and Islamic philosophy.68 
The constitution of the Islamic republics also addresses 
the same issue and in Article fifteen of the Constitution, 
Persian is recognized as the official language of Iran. 
However,  the use of local vernaculars in the media and 
-113- 
classroom is permitted so long as they are used in conjunction 
with Persian. The only recognition given to minorities in the 
constitution is for religious minorities(Christian, Jewish, 
and Zoroastrian).69 As an Islamic Republic, it refused the 
notion of nationality among the followers of the Prophet, and 
classified all its citizens as brothers except followers of 
other religious groups. 
Kurdish groups began a campaign for autonomy in Kurdistan 
province. They boycotted the constitutional referendum, and 
joined other opposition groups. They tried to establish a 
greater support base and strongholds in Kurdish towns. In the 
military field, they joined other Marxist guerilla groups and 
began to attack the revolutionary government. Although Prime 
Minister Bazargan tried to  reassure non-Persian ethnic 
minorities of the government's commitment to create mutual 
understanding by opening a debate between those groups and 
government, he failed. His attempt to solve the problem by 
negotiation was a failure because of his lack of control over 
the government. 
The hard line clergy saw the efforts of the Kurds as a 
Marxist inspired conspiracy. The Kurdish demands of extending 
the provincial borders of Kurdistan at the expense of the 
provinces of West Azerbaijan, Ham, and Kermanshah were not 
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acceptable to the residents of these areas. Following the 
failure of negotiations, fighting intensified between Kurdish 
groups and the Islamic Pasdarans in March 1979. Fighting also 
increased between Kurdish groups and the Azeris and Turkomans. 
Khomeini used army troops to suppress the revolt for the 
first time in the revolution. Army units were able to 
reestablish control over Kurdish areas, forcing the Kurdish 
Peshmergas to flee into the countryside. After regaining 
control, the regime sent its harshest judge (Sheikh Sadeq 
Khalkhali) to Kurdistan. Khalkali sentenced hundreds of 
suspected guerrillas to death. Sentences were carried out by 
the Pasdarans immediately.70 
In August 1979, another attempt was made to find a 
solution to the rebellion through negotiations. Although the 
Bazargan administration was willing to compromise, Khomeini 
was steadfast against any compromise. Khomeini sent his 
associate, Hojjatoleslam Husseini Kermansani, to oversee the 
crushing of the insurgency. 
Bazargan continued his efforts to find common ground for 
agreement, and sent his representative, Minister of Labor, 
Dariush Foruher, to continue the negotiations. Foruher was 
presented an eight point plan. The major demads listed in the 
plan were legal recognition of Kurdish autonomy in the Iranian 
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Constitution, recognition of Kurdish autonomy over the area 
including of West Azerbaijan, Ham, and Kermanshah, 
establishment of a Kurdish parliament with jurisdiction over 
all local matters, inclusion of Kurdish officials in all 
levels of central government, use of Kurdish language in all 
official communications and in schools, and allocation of a 
certain amount of the national budget for the Kurdish economy. 
The administration representative agreed to these demands but 
Khomeini refused any compromise with the Kurds.71 
A presidential change occurred in the administration, 
when Bani Sadr was elected as the new President of the Islamic 
Republic. Bani Sadr made the disarmement of Kurdish groups a 
first step in the negations, but this was rejected by the KDPI 
leadership. Another wave of rebellion occurred in Kurdistan 
province in February 1980. A cease-fire was declared by the 
parties involved on April 29. Another round of negotiations 
ended in failure and fighting  intensified. 
In 1980, a major crisis between Iran and Iraq developed 
and Iraqi armies attacked Iran in September. Saddam Hussein 
saw the regime of Iran as a threat to Iraq's internal 
stability. He tried to strike first at a time of great chaos 
in Iran before the Islamic regime could establish its total 
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control  of  the  country  and  empower  its  military  and 
ideological capabilities. 
The Kurdish groups under the leadership of the KDPI 
accepted military and logistical support from the Iraqi army. 
Iraq attacked from the north and captured Qasr-e Shirin and 
Nowdesheh in January 1981. This victory enabled the Baathi 
regime to create a supply route for the KDPI. With Iraqi 
weapons and military aid, the KDPI launched a coordinated 
attack on Pasdaran units and was able to establish a liberated 
zone in Kurdistan by April 1981. However, the decision of the 
KDPI to side with Iraq found resistance among its followers 
and some of them turned away from the party. 
The power struggle of Bani Sadr and the Islamic 
Republican Party resulted in a series of defeats for 
President. The radical groups first captured seats in the 
Majlis, and then selected their candidate as Prime Minister. 
The defeat of Bani Sadr's policies in the Majlis led to his 
political defeat on the streets. Mass demonstrations occurred 
and his supporters clashed with Pasdarans. His newspaper and 
party were banned. Khomeini removed him from his post as a 
Commander-in-Chief of the military. Bani Sadr went into hiding 
and fled to France with the head of the Mojaheddin-e-Khalq, 
Massaud Rajavi, in July, 1981. The two leaders announced the 
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formation of the National Council of Resistance (NCR) to fight 
the Islamic government.72 
The KDPI joined the NCR and continued its struggle to 
establish an autonomous Kurdish area in Iran. The Kurdish 
Pesmerges were able to control some towns in the countryside 
and infiltrate some major cities at night. The Peshmerges also 
held control in the country side. Meanwhile other opposition 
groups, especially the Mojaheddin, were extensively active 
during this period. After Bani Sadr's impeachment, opposition 
groups opened an extensive armed struggle against the Islamic 
government. The political leadership of the Islamic government 
and the IRP were assassinated. President Rajai, Prime Minister 
Mohammad Javad Bahonar, the chief justice and IRP party 
secretary general Mohammad Behesti, four cabinet ministers, 
twenty seven Majlis deputies, many government officials, 
several  religious  leaders,  judges,  and  members  of 
revolutionary organizations were all assassinated during 1981. 
Growing bolder opposition groups tried to control several 
towns and cities, and attacked the Pasdarans with grenade 
launchers and machine guns. 
The Islamic government responded with harsh methods, 
increasing the activities of the Pasdarans. There were 
widespread arrests and immediate executions. As Amnesty 
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International documented, 2,94 6 executions occurred during 
this period.73 Many executions were never reported and 
sometimes over 100 people were executed in a day. The armed 
guerrilla activity lost its momentum largely because it could 
not win the support of the military or the public. The 
governments' ability to dispose of the guerrilla groups by 
counter-terrorist methods, plus the regime's ability to fill 
the vacuum in the leadership also contributed to a decline in 
activity. 
The Kurdish Peshmerges soon lost their control of the 
towns and fleed to the countryside in November, 1981. Iranian 
forces launched a series of counter-offensives against the 
Iraqi troops and the KDPI by the end of May, 1982. In 1983, 
the government units established their control over Kurdistan 
province. Peshmerge activities decreased, and becaming 
restricted to tiny regions of the country. The KDPI then 
became a marginal actor in the Iraq-Iran war. 
Iran also used the common wild card-the Kurds- in the 
war. After Iranian troops put the Kurdish rebellion under 
control, Iran tried to exploit the Kurdish revolt in northern 
Iraq. Iran's long time ally, the Barzanis were ready to fight 
against the Baathi regime once again by 1983. Iran 
concentrated on creating a united Kurdish effort to overthrow 
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Saddam. The Iranian policies were succsesful in creating an 
alliance of Barzani and Talabani in their efforts to 
destabilize the Baathi regime. When Iran launched another 
offensive against Iraq in 1983, the Iraqi Kurds were 
cooperating with the Iranian army. With the help of the 
Iranian army, the Barzani Peshmerges were able to capture Haj 
Omran and its environs. This victory had a significant effect 
on the KDPI's struggle, because its bases and supply routes 
were located in this area. In 1985, Iran, by using the Kurdish 
groups, launched another offensive in northern Iraq, and the 
Iranian-backed Kurdish groups captured new territories. 
An internal conflict within the KDPI ended with the 
separation of some groups from the KDPI. As a result, more 
radical Marxist groups who were against any negotiations with 
the administration, established their organization, Komala-ye 
Shureshgari-ye Zahmat Keshan-e Kordestan-e Iran -Committee of 
the Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kordestan- (KOMALA), in 
1985. Another problem was Iraqi aid to the rebellion. New 
groups were established still split on the question of 
compromise versus armed struggle in 1988. Some KDPI members 
established another Marxist organization, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran-Revolutionary Leadership (KDPI-RL). 
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The conflict among these groups led to armed clashes in this 
period. 
The leader of KDPI, Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, was 
assassinated while he was secretly negotiating with Iranian 
officials in Vienna in 1989. Although it was not proven, 
evidence points towards the involvement of the Islamic 
government of Iran. However, many groups benefitted from the 
assassination.74 
By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had consolidated 
its control over the internal opposition. The opposition 
groups were forced to leave Iran. Iran's counter offensive in 
Kurdistan put an end to the armed struggle of many Kurdish 
groups. However, the KOMALA became more powerful in this 
period. The ceasefire between the KOMALA and the KDPI created 
a weak alliance of these groups, but they were not able to 
create strongholds in Iran. Despite their current weakness, 
several groups continue their struggle for an autonomous 
Kurdistan or another Mahabad Republic. The Kurdish problem 
for Iran did not disappear but was weakened for a while. 
3. Kurdish Movements in Turkey 
When Mustafa Kemal established a national state in 
Turkey, its southeastern borders remained in dispute with 
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Britain. The Lausanne Treaty let the dispute be solved 
bilaterally between the Turkish government and the British. 
The problem was the situation of Mosul. According to Turkey, 
it was part of the homeland with an extensive Turkish 
population. When the independence war began, the declared 
national border "Misak-i Milli" consisted of Mosul and its 
provinces which are now part of northern Iraq. Mustafa Kemal 
established the last defensive line of the Ottoman army on the 
southeastern borders of Misak-i Milli. These areas had an 
extensive Turkish population. 
Mustafa Kemal also learned from the past experience of 
the Ottoman Empire that it was crucial to create a nation in 
which all aspects would have the will to protect the state. 
Neither the old notion of Millet nor the Islamic brotherhood 
would protect the state in a crisis. So, the unity of the 
nation and full independence became the main goals of Mustafa 
Kemal. Modernization of the country included every aspect and 
institution of social life, administration, economy, and 
judiciary was necessary to attain the level of the 
contemporary Western powers. He understood that catching and 
surpassing the higher standarts of the Western powers was a 
basic prerequisite in achieving full independence. 
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With this determination in mind, he made several reforms 
to change the structure of society and government. One of them 
was the seperation of religion from the government. His 
secular reforms had a goal of eliminating the power of the 
Ulema who were selfishly guarding their own positions rather 
than working for the well-being of the nation. The removal of 
the Ulema was necessary to create a dynamic the state capable 
to responding to future challenges. Having a dynamic structure 
in the state was essential for having a contemporary state. 
In terms of a cultural revolution, he emphasised that 
being a Turk was enough to be proud of; given the many Turkish 
accomplishments, not to mention the legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire. He created instutions to study the pre-Ottoman Empire 
era, and worked to remove foreign influences from the Turkish 
language, including Arabic and Persian influences. 
He also tried to establish a harmony within the nation 
and welcomed peaceful co-existence with minorities. The 
groups, such as the Lazs, the Yoruks, the Tatars, who had a 
Turkish origin obviously were not considered minorities. He 
pointed out that there were many things in common between the 
Kurds and the Turks which could be explained only with a 
common ethnic tie back to Central Asia, the homeland of Turks. 
The minorities were only the Christians, the Greeks, the 
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Armenians, and the Assyrians. Additionally, Mustafa Kemal 
stated that feeling himself as a Turk was as important as 
being a Turk. 
Mosul and its provinces were rich in oil and it was 
between Egypt and India. The French involvement in the Middle 
East by controlling Syria required extra attention from the 
British. The emergence of the Soviet Union with a hostile 
ideology to the British and their efforts to gain supremacy in 
the great game was another concern of Britain. At the 
beginning, they were in favor of a Kurdish state in 
southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq and an Armenian state 
in the Caucasus and in eastern Anatolia. Thus the British 
would create buffer zones that were crucial for their imperial 
interests in the region. The Wilson principals were a good 
camouflage for the British and French imperial interests. The 
Sevres treaty was a document in which they were able to create 
their puppet states on paper. 
Contrary to the expectations, Mustafa Kemal tore the 
paper into pieces and demolished the British dreams. Following 
the Turkish military success, the British had to choose other 
ways to establish their control on this area. Thus, the 
British created the kingdom of Iraq and placed Faisal as Emir 
of this  kingdom.  Faisal was the agent of Britain who 
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undermined the Ottoman efforts to protect the holy areas from 
the enemies of religion. 
The question of Mosul remained unsolved in the Lausanne, 
and the problem was referred to bilateral talks and later to 
the League of Nations for determination. The committee was 
unable to determine the will of the people beacuse there were 
too many groups whom were in favor of autonomy, or Turkish 
rule. But it was definite that they were not in favor of the 
Arab rule of Faisal.75 
The tribes in Suleymanieh, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Marivan did 
not participate in the referandum to give a legitimacy to the 
Faisal regime.76 Other evidence were the constant revolts of 
the Kurdish tribesmen against the British-Arab existence in 
the region which dated back to the Sheikh Mahmud revolt of 
1919. Later, the Dilo Kurds revolted against the British in 
1920. Other clashes between the British and the Kurdish tribes 
were suppressed by the overwhelming fire power of the British 
and their agents in rival tribes.77 
Under these circumstances, the Kurdish revolt in 
southeastern Anatolia was not difficult to understand. Sheikh 
Said of Palu, who was also a Naqshbendi dervish, revolted 
under the guise of religion in February, 1925. It has been 
said that the Sheikh Said revolt was a response to the secular 
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and nationalist reforms of Mustafa Kemal. However, the timing 
of this revolt and the covert British aid to the rebels were 
clear indicators of British involvement. The revolt occurred 
at the time of the visit of the committee of League of Nations 
to Mosul.78 Before the revolt, Mustafa Kemal was preaparing his 
army for a military action against Mosul. 
The rebellion was suppressed by the army in a few months. 
The leaders of the revolt were captured and hung or they fled 
to Iraq. As explained, this revolt was neither religious, nor 
nationalist. It was just a financial leverage of the British. 
The League of Nations decided in favor of the British and 
awarded Mosul to Iraq under the British Mandate based on the 
report of the Commission which included anti-Turk 
representatives in December, 1925.79 This was also a result of 
the Sheikh Said revolt which had destroyed the solidarity of 
the Kurds and the Turks. 
The decision of the League of Nations was not a suprise 
for the Turks, they were used to loosing on the table what 
they won on the battlefield. Besides, Turkey was not a member 
of the League of Nations, and its members had been enemies of 
Turkey for centuries. Turkey did not accept the decision of 
the League of Nations, and Mustafa Kemal was determined to go 
to war. However, he had to choose between the well-being of 
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the new state and another armed struggle with the lack of 
resources. The country had fought decades ceaseless with one 
enemy then another and it had dried up all of its resources. 
Under these circumstances, Turkey signed a tripartite 
agreement with Iraq and Britain in June, 1926. By this 
agreement, Turkey gained some territory, and a share of the 
oil revenues. Also, anyone would be free to choose Turkish 
nationality in the region. By signing this treaty, Turkey did 
lose its claims on the overall territory of Mosul, but 
consolidated its right to control Mosul and gained time to 
implement its reforms in the country. 
Some articles of this treaty require special attention to 
prepare a better ground for further analysis. It was briefly 
mentioned in this treaty that this area would be a neutral 
zone in which no insurgent bands could be formed. Articles 6, 
7, and 8 expressed that "... any preparations made by one or 
more armed individuals with the object of committing acts of 
pillage or brigandage in the neighbouring frontier zone...", 
and that a reciprocal information exchange regarding such 
bands would be undertaken. Article 12, guaranteed that the 
parties would refrain from "... all correspondence of an 
official or political nature with the chiefs, sheikhs, or 
other members of tribes which are nationals of other state and 
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which are actually in the territory of that State... They 
shall not permit in the frontier zone any organization for 
propaganda or meeting directed against either state."80 
While the talks for agreement were proceding, another 
British inspired revolt occurred in Turkey led by Seyyid 
Abdullah in July, 1925. Seyid Abdullah led a series of raids 
in the same region. The revolt was crushed swiftly, and Seyyid 
Abdullah fled to the protection of his patrons in Iraq.81 
Another revolt of tribes occurred in 1927 as a raid of 
armed groups infiltrated across the Iranian border. The first 
raid was led by Sheikh Pasho on Telit in August, 1927 from a 
sanctuary in Iran.82 The Jelali and Haideranlu tribes of Iran, 
with the support of the Kotch-Ushag clan in Dersim, actively 
participated in this revolt. The Iranian involvement and the 
British conspiracy led the Turkish government to send a 
protest note to the Iranian government. The basic motive of 
the Iranian involvement could have been the hope of the 
revision of the Turco-Iranian border of 1918.83 
The rebels tried to control Mount Ararat and its vicinity 
and to declare an independent state. They established the 
Khoybun    (Kurdish Independent Government) among themselves. 
However, the rebellion was supressed within a few months by 
the Turkish army, and the so called Khoybun, never existed. 
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The southeastern border was also dispute with French 
controlled Syria. Syria and Turkey resorted to international 
arbitration to solve the problem. It was the same scenerio as 
Mosul. When the commission was working on the problem, Sheikh 
Hadjo of the Badr Khan tribe revolted in Nisibin in 1928. The 
tribe had links with the Kurds in Syria, and the revolt was 
staged from Syria. The guise of revolt was the response to the 
efforts of the Turkish government to establish central 
authority at the expense of tribal authority.84 The revolt was 
quickly supressed and the leaders of revolt fled to Syria. 
However, the border dispute was finally solved by the 
agreement of the French and Turkish governments in July 1929.85 
Another border problem with Syria regarding the status of 
Hatay continued. Hatay was also in the Misak-i Milli borders 
of Turkey, however, it was occupied by French troops. The 
residents of this area were Turks, and they were struggling 
against the Arab-French yoke. They had an autonomus status 
which was established by the Turco-French agreement of Ankara 
in 1921. The international commission recommended the 
establishment of an independent state in Hatay. After a long 
struggle, the residents of Hatay established their own 
republic, and by a plescibite, they decided to join Turkey and 
to demolish the Republic in 1938.86 
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One of the major revolts of Kurdish tribes occurred in 
1930. It was also the first example of the alliance of 
different tribes from other areas. The Jelali, Haideranlu, 
Belikali, Moulari tribes from Iran, the Herkis tribe from 
Iraq, and some Turkish tribes of Dersim and Ararat region were 
participated in this revolt.87 These tribes had close kinship 
among themselves and were living in adjacent areas. 
The main area of revolt was Mount Ararat and its 
vicinity. The main leaders were Hussein Yusuf Abdal of the 
Iranian Jelalis, Sheikh Hadjo of Syria, and Ishan Nuri. They 
tried to create a stronghold to declare their independence.88 
The coordinated efforts of different tribes from Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria were the result of the external actor, which was 
probably the Soviet Union. The Soviet Armenians actively 
supported the rebellion which was not suprising. Also there 
was strong evidence regarding Iranian aid to the rebels.89 
The rebellion was crushed by the Turkish army and air 
force in October, 1930. Turkey forced Iran to cooperate and 
used hot pursuit to supress the rebellion. 
Later, the Haideranlu tribe with the support of the 
Kalan, Deman, and Lolanis tribes revolted in Dersim area in 
March, 1937. The leader of the revolt was Sayyid Riza. The 
revolt was local, and its main aim was to resist the authority 
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of the central government regarding taxation and other laws. 
This revolt was supressed within months by the Turkish army, 
and Sayyid Riza was hung.90 
After the 1937 revolt, Turkey did not face any more armed 
action from the Kurdish tribes. Besides its careful domestic 
policy toward the issue, the Turkish government followed a 
sensitive policy toward the developments in the region. For 
example, Turkey carefully followed the developments in Iran. 
When the attempts to establish the Kurdish Mahabad Republic 
occurred, Turkey declared that the problem was not an internal 
problem of Iran anymore.91 
The Turkish government tried to create cooperation among 
the regional powers against the Kurdish groups several times. 
One of them was the Turkey-Iraq conferance at Ankara in March, 
1946. One of the key objects of the conference was mutual 
support against the Soviet Union as well as "mutual protection 
against dangerous individuals" which were interpreted as the 
Kurdish groups.92 This was followed by the signing of a pact 
between Turkey and Iraq in March, 194 6. One of the benefits of 
this pact was that it would provide "mutual assistance on the 
question of public order" in the respective countries.93 
The beginning of a multi-party system in Turkey opened a 
new era in domestic politics. In return for the votes of their 
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people, the Democrat Party gave importance to the positions of 
the Aghas and other feudal landlords. These people still 
controlled votes of their people. They are accepted as a 
source of bulk of votes in viewpoint of the parties. The Kurds 
voted overwhelmingly for the DP, because of the DP's tolerance 
to the authorities of Aghas. The agriculture and economic 
program of the DP also attracted the support of feudal 
landlords. 
The constitutional reforms of 1961 allowed many extreme 
groups to be active in the following decade. The leftist 
elements established the Worker's Party of Turkey (WPT) in 
the 1960s. This party was successful enough to win fifteen 
seats in the assembly. Although communism was banned, the WPT 
followed the same ideology as the communists. 
Many parts of Turkish society became politicized in this 
period, especially the young intellectuals. They began to 
rally around extreme ideas as their counterparts did in Europe 
in 1968-69. The extreme elements, such as the communists, the 
racists, and the religious groups, established their 
underground organizations. They began to clash with the 
government security forces, and with each other. 
Under these circumstances, some of the Kurdish students 
began to establish their organizations. Their banner was the 
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improvement of the status of the eastern part of Turkey. 
However, some more radical elements began to ask for the 
seperation of southeastern Anatolia, and a Kurdish uprising. 
All of these groups were inspired by socialist ideology, they 
followed the examples of Cuba and China. 
The economic situation of the country forced peasants to 
immigrate into cities. This was a common problem in the 
country; many immigrants were concentrated in the big cities 
of western Anatolia. They established shadow suburbs called 
"gecekondu". They provided labor force for the industries of 
these cities. The leftist groups established strongholds in 
the suburbs. The urbanization of the Kurdish peasantry by 
immigration increased their politicization by the propoganda 
of the leftist groups. 
In 1969, the Kurdish intellectuals, under the propoganda 
of the leftist groups, established the Revolutionary Cultural 
Society of the East (DDKO) . The WPT and DDKO began to 
criticize the government and blamed it by being a fascist and 
totalitarian.94 
The military interfered in the administration in 1971, 
forcing the administration to implement effective measures 
against the terrorist groups in Turkey. The legal groups who 
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were campaigning against the state, including the WPT and the 
DDKO, were banned. 
However, in the following years the administration fell 
victim to party rivalry. By the end of 1973, the 
administration could not implement any stable policies on any 
of the major problems of the country. The economy began to 
collapse and the society began to be divided by the extreme 
movements. Each side created its own stronghold and confronted 
with the government security forces and opposing groups. The 
leftist groups split because of ideological differences. 
The Kurdish groups also underwent the same changes. The 
ideological differences forced them to be divided among 
themselves in the 1970s. The Kurdish separatist groups 
established many ideologic and etnic organizations in this 
period. Main organizations of this group were: the Komala- 
Rizgari, the Ala-Rizgari, the Liberation Path Revolutionary 
People Culturel Society (DHKD), the Kawa, the Kurdish People 
Liberation Army (KHKO), the Kurdistan Democratic Party Of 
Turkey (TKDP) , the Tekosin, the National Liberation of 
Kurdistan (KUK), the Road to Freedom (Ozgurluk Yolu), the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the Kurdistan Socialist 
Party Of Turkey (TKSP).95 
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Some of them were ideologically Marxist and others were 
ideologically Maoist. However, the common point was their 
ultimate goal of the seperation of southeastern Anatolia and 
establishment of the Kurdish state. The differences were the 
way to reach the goal and the future ideology of the proposed 
Kurdistan.96 
All of these groups were actively working to create the 
base of supporters and were running terrorist campaigns. Their 
strategy was based on terrorizing the Kurdish society to win 
their support if it could not be gained by propaganda. Thus, 
the people in the southeastern region became silent because of 
their terrorist campaign. 
The overall situation of the country was worse, terrorism 
was the main issue of the country. The economy collapsed and 
Turkey began to seek for additional debts to pay the regular 
payments of previous debts. The party politics left no room 
for compromise among the major parties. So, there was no 
strong administration in this period to implement necessary 
measures to overcome the problems. 
The terrorism staged several phases; the last stage was 
the civil war which began in Turkey after 1979. The extreme 
elements created their strongholds, called liberated regions, 
and established their full control over these areas. Later, 
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they began to attach these areas to each other. The security 
forces of the administration could not implement law 
enforcement in these areas, and they created their own trials. 
In the early civil war period (September, 1979-1980) the death 
toll in the country reached 2,812 (not including terrorist 
dead) in a total of 23,841 terrorist incidents. This number 
was much higher than the death toll of 898 in a total of 9,052 
terrorist incidents between December, 1978-September,1979.97 
Under these circumstances, the military operation of 
September 12, 1980 happened. The people welcomed the operation 
and fully supported it. The bloodless operation achieved its 
aim of establishing law and order in the country. Terrorism 
was hit severely by the operation. The extreme elements were 
captured and tried. The country began to feel peaceful harmony 
in the society. 
Next step was to prepare new constitution which would put 
barriers for extreme elements. The 1982 constitution favored 
strong administration. The constitution also put strict limits 
on terrorist activities. 
The Kurdish terrorist groups were also hit by the 
operation. Most of them lost their leadership and 
organizations.  The peaceful  atmosphere  eliminated  their 
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influence on the Kurdish people. Some of them escaped from 
total destruction only by fleeing to neighbouring countries. 
One of them was Abdullah Ocalan, who established his 
Marxsist organization, the workers party of Kurdistan (PKK) in 
1979. However, Ocalan's activities dated back to 1974. The PKK 
advocated the establishment of an independent Kurdistan that 
united Kurdish regions throughout the Middle East. 
The PKK recommended a two-tiered revolution, first 
national, then Marxist. The PKK attacked the feudal and tribal 
structure of Kurdish society to create a classless society. 
Armed struggle, by all means, was accepted as the only way to 
liberate the Kurdish masses from the Turkish yoke.98 By this 
reasoning, the PKK attacked the Kurdish people violently and 
killed even babies and pregnant women. All of its activities 
were only brutal murders under the banner of the independence 
struggle. Before the military operation of 1980, the PKK found 
an opportunity to establish its organization by creating 19 
regional committees, 63 county representatives, and armed 
groups." 
The military operation of 1980 crushed the PKK along with 
other organizations. Ocalan escaped by fleeing to Syria. Syria 
welcomed Ocalan as it did many other terrorist groups which 
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were acting against Turkey. Ocalan continued his efforts and 
reestablished the PKK with the Syrian aid. 
The Syrians saw not only the opportunity to use the PKK 
against Turkey, but also against Iraq.100 Syria was not the 
only country to provide aid to the PKK. Greece, Bulgaria, the 
Soviet Union, Armenia, and the Greek republic of southern 
Cyprus were eager to support the PKK. Even some European 
countries, such as Germany, were symphatetic to the PKK and 
let it open branches in their countries. The Armenian 
terrorist groups actively participated in the actions of the 
PKK.101 The Turkish security operations killed some Armenians 
among the Kurdish PKK squads. 
The PKK began its activities in the region in 1982 on a 
small scale. In 1984, the PKK launched major wave of attacks. 
Its first targets were small villages in Eruh and Semdinli 
near the Iraqi border. Later, the PKK launched extremely 
violent attacks against the state and the Kurdish people to 
achieve its goal. Thousands of people died in the attacks of 
the PKK between 1984-1994. 
As a response to growing ethno-nationalist terrorism, the 
Turkish government followed domestic and regional policies to 
overcome it. Regionally, Turkey contacted Syria, Iraq and Iran 
and forced them to suspend their support of terrorist groups. 
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In several meetings with Syrian officials, Turkey used 
rewards and covert threats. As a reward, Turkey guaranteed the 
steady flow of the waters of Euphrates river and economic 
cooperation. As a covert threat, Turkey reminded Syria that it 
could use hot pursuit tactics and might cut the flow of 
Euphrates. The agreement, regarding the cooperation of both 
countries on security matters, was signed by Ozal and his 
Syrian counterpart in 1987. However, Syria continued to give 
a support to the PKK by allowing it to establish a base in the 
Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley.102 
Turkey was more succesful in its efforts to gain Iraqi 
support to suppres the terrorist activities of the PKK. In 
1983, Turkey contacted Saddam Hussein, and reminded him of the 
agreements that were signed before. Although, Turkey asked 
regional countries not to provoke the Kurdish groups against 
each other, Iraq continued to play the Kurdish card. However, 
Iraq gave permission to Turkey to use hot pursuit tactics in 
Iraq in case of necessity. 
Turkey made its first hot-pursuit into Iraqi territory in 
1983. The main goal of this attack was to destroy the PKK 
camps in Iraq. The PKK groups were preparing armed groups to 
attack from this territory to their targets in Turkey. The 
Iraqi army left this area uncontrolled when the Iraq-Iran war 
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was began. The PKK and other groups used the army posts to 
launch raids against Turkey. 
On the other hand, Iran saw the attack as a Turkish 
support of the Iraqi regime in the war ignoring the threat of 
the PKK against the integrity of the Turkish nation. The 
Iranians believed that the timing of the attack was coincided 
so to prevent the Iranian-backed Kurdish attacks against the 
pipeline and the Iraqi territory. They accepted Turkish 
intervention as a Turkish attempt to control northern Iraq. 
Despite the opposition of Iran and Syria, Turkey countinued to 
use hot pursuit tatctics whenever necessary in northern Iraq. 
Turkey increased its efforts to improve the economic and 
social conditions of the southeastern region. The Southeastern 
Anatolia Project (GAP), became a symbol of this effort. The 
GAP is the most expensive ($20 billion) , and the biggest 
project that Turkey ever began. It will change the structure 
of the southeastern region, and the whole country will benefit 
from the project. 
The project includes the building of several dams(21 dams 
and 17 hydroelectric power plants) on the Euphrates and 
Tigris, an irrigation network, and related infrastructure. 
This project will lead to greater employment and greater 
prosperity for the 4.5 million people in the proposed 
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catchment area. The disturubition of government lands to the 
land-less peasantry will hit the feudal structure of the 
region. 
Politically, Turkey changed its policy and recognized the 
Kurdish existance in Turkey. It granted several rights for the 
Kurds, such as removal of the ban on the speaking of Kurdish. 
Turkey let the Kurdish opposition establish parties. These 
parties won several seats in the parliament. 
Although, there was no suppression of political rights to 
any person in Turkey, and the Kurdish politicians became 
Ministers, and even President (Ozal declared that his mother 
was a Kurd103) , the new parties followed a different path than 
others. Instead of integrateing themselves to the democratic 
structure of Turkey, they positioned themselves against it. 
They criticized the government and called it fascist and 
imperialist. The PKK established its control over the People's 
Labor Party (HEP- later renamed as DEP) , and the HEP became a 
lip service of the PKK in the parliament. The connections of 
several HEP deputies and the party with the PKK and their 
seperatists actions were proven by the evidence gathered by 
the intelligence sources of Turkey. 
Several  newspapers,  such  as  Ozgur  Gundem,  were 
established by the Kurdish opposition groups and began to 
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attack the state and the military in their publications. They 
also established links with the PKK. When the PKK attacked a 
military installation and killed several soldiers, the Ozgur 
Gundem wrote that "the liberation army (the PKK) captured . . . 
area and destroyed a battalion of the enemy(Turkish 
soldiers) ".104 
When Turgut Ozal became President, he played the role of 
the Shah in the 1990s and contacted the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. 
The talks with Jelal Talabani and Mesud Barzani were held in 
1991. Ozal supported their claims in Iraq in return for 
cutting the supply channels of the PKK. When the extensive 
immigration of the Iraqi Kurds occurred, Ozal was the first 
leader who proposed to establish a buffer zone in northern 
Iraq. 
Ozal forced the administration to open talks with the 
PKK, and the PKK declared unileteral ceasefire in the area in 
1993. However, the ceasefire was ended by the PKK itself when 
the PKK squad, led by Semdin Sakik, killed 35 unarmed soldiers 
in Bitlis who completed their terms as soldiers and were on 
their way to their homes. 
As a result of political and military efforts, the PKK 
lost its initiative in 1993. The Turkish army established 
strict control in the region and removed the support channels 
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of the PKK. In 1994, the PKK became a defeated armed group 
rather than a broad-based guerilla group. It could neither 
duplicate the unity of other groups nor rally the people to 
revolt. Despite its failure and huge losses, it managed to 
survive as a minor terrorist group and continued to attack 
Turkish security forces on a small scale. Most of all, the 
Kurdish problem in the region continued. The threat to 
Turkish territorial and social unity continues. 
4. The impact of the Kurdish Problem on the relations of Turkey and Iran 
The Kurdish problem affected the relations of the two 
countries negatively. Turkey did not support any anti-regime 
groups in the region. Turkey always accepted regime struggles 
of different groups in other countries as an internal problem 
of these countries. It tried to establish a mutual cooperation 
with the regional countries without considering the regime or 
the leadership of these countries. Additionaly, Turkey tried 
to create a regional security institution that would create 
peaceful harmony in the region. It strictly recommended to 
other regional countries not to interfere in the internal 
problems of each other. 
Turkey, also did not favor any attempt to use ethnic 
groups in any country. When Iraq, Iran, and Syria began to use 
-143- 
the Kurdish groups in oppposite countries, Turkey warned these 
countries about the future problems of playing with such a 
dangerous card. 
The support of Iran to the Kurdish groups in Iraq and the 
PKK deteriorated the relations of the two countries. The 
Pasdaran participation in the PKK activities and the 
establishment of the PKK camps in Iran were considered a 
hostile policy by Turkey. Whenever the Turkish security forces 
established relative control in southeastern Anatolia and 
northern Iraq, the PKK always moved to Iran and launched its 
raids into eastern Anatolia. The Mount Ararat region is 
accessible only via Iran or Armenia, and the PKK used both 
routes to attack to this area. It has been reported that Iran 
provided a base to the PKK near Lake Urmia.105 
The 1992 operation of the Turkish army in northern Iraq 
forced the PKK to move their camps to other areas. Ibrahim 
Ocalan (brother of Abdullah Ocalan and the commander of the 
PKK squads in northern Iraq) escaped from the operation only 
by entering Iran. Later, the PKK remmants (around 700) were 
gathered in Iran and launched a raid to Erzurum and its 
province via Iran. This group was destroyed by the Third Army 
units. However, the PKK activities in Iran continued. 
Iran also permitted the ASALA to open branch offices in 
Iran. The ASALA was notorious for its attacks on Turkish 
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officials. Besides, the ASALA attacked Turkish diplomats, and 
bombed the Turkish embassy in Iran just before they opened 
their offices in Tehran in 1984. As was noted, the PKK-ASALA 
alliance was known by Turkish officials. So, Iran's decision 
became a severe problem for the security of Turkey. 
In June 1993, the PKK simultaneously attacked several 
Turkish embassies and tourism offices in twenty-nine cities in 
Europe. The PKK also prepared mass demonstrations in front of 
Turkish embassies. This kind of terrorist activity could not 
be prepared only by the PKK. Turkish officials were suspicious 
of Iran's involvement. 
B. THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
The Iran-Iraq war had an important side effects on the 
regional power balances. One of the side effects was the loss 
of the Iraqi control over northern Iraq. Northern Iraq was a 
scene for the war efforts of both sides after the second stage 
of war. As noted, the Kurdish groups were used by the two 
sides; and the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq became more 
powerful than before. The Kurds in Iraq obtained greater 
degree of autonomy from Iraq and gained a much degree of 
freedom in their actions in northern Iraq. 
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This raised the question of the future of northern Iraq, 
including the Kurdish controlled areas and oil rich Mosul and 
Kirkuk. As addressed before, there are Turkish claims on 
northern Iraq based on the historical setting and the 
existence of Turkish people (mainly Turkomans). 
Turkey could not stand and watch the establishment of a 
puppet state in a region that threats its territorial 
integrity and economic interests. Besides, a Kurdish state 
that will be established in northern Iraq may eventually claim 
the territory that was promised to them in the Sevres treaty. 
The existence of such a state will attract the radical Kurdish 
elements in Turkey and they will increase their terrorist 
campaign. In any case, the existence of a Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq will lead to the participation of Turkey. So, 
any attempt to establish the control and sovereignity of the 
Kurds in northern Iraq will be a major threat to the national 
security of Turkey. 
Economically, the Iraqi pipeline that carries the Iraqi 
oil from Mosul to the Mediterrean via Turkey is an important 
source of revenue for Turkey. The exports to Iraq are also a 
substantial amount of Turkish exports. Turkey can ill afford 
to loose these revenues in a time that it needs hard currency 
the most. 
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Politically, Turkey could not let Turks in Iraq be 
oppressed and removed from their lands and replaced by the 
Kurds. The Iraqi Turks number between 300,000 to 500,000 and 
live in the Kirkuk area.106 Their situation would worsened if 
a Kurdish state with constant claims towards Kirkuk and Mosul 
were established. 
Under the light of these reasons, it is not hard to 
understand the motivation of Turkey to keep the Iraqi 
sovereignty as a whole. Any attempt to divide Iraq will be 
harmful for Turkey, in this case, Turkey will react to protect 
its rights in the region. 
The example of this reaction was given during the Iran- 
Iraq war. The Kurdish groups with the support of the Iranian 
army began to attack the pipeline and establish its control in 
the northern Iraq. Turkey declared that it will not allow any 
attempt to do so, and forced Iraq not to grant any major 
concessions to the Kurds. By using the hot pursuit rights, 
Turkey used its troops in northern Iraq on search-and-destroy 
missions when the Kurdish groups attacked Turkish villages via 
northern Iraq. In 1984, The Turkish delegation, led by Foreign 
Minister Vahit Halefoglu, visited Iraq and warned about the 
consequences of granting any major concessions to Kurds.10" 
The action of Turkey was accepted as being in support of 
Iraq in the war by Iran. The actions of the Turkish army 
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caused the relief of the pressure on the northern flank of the 
Iraqi army. Thus the Iraqi army increased their efforts in 
other areas. Additionally, the Kurdish groups were restricted 
in their actions and could not cut the pipeline. This kept the 
revenue flow generated from the pipeline for Iraq. Based on 
these arguments, Iran blamed Turkey for being a supporter of 
Iraq. 
Additionally, the Turkish media which was rallying for 
the Turkish protection of northern Iraq caused concern in 
Iran. It is not hard to understand that Iran will prefer a 
weak Iraqi control, or a puppet state in northern Iraq, 
instead of the existance of a strong Turkey. The political 
advantages of controlling northern Iraq and the economic 
benefits generated from oil, would strengthen Turkey's 
position in the region. 
Another stage of the problem occurred after the 
immigration of the Iraqi Kurds. At the end of the war, the 
Iraqi troops attempt to regain their control over northern 
Iraq. Their swift actions, including the usage of chemical 
weapons against the Kurdish villages, caused the first wave of 
the immigration of the Kurds to Turkey and Iran in 1989. Chaos 
occurred and it caused anarchy in the region. 
However, the scene was changed rapidly following the Gulf 
crises in 1991. By the fear of retaliation of the Iraqi troops 
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after their failed uprising during the Desert Storm in 
northern Iraq, the Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran by the 
hundreds of thousands. President Ozal asked for an 
international protection for the Kurds because of the huge 
burden of immigration to Turkey. In this period, Ozal also 
shifted his policy on the Kurdish problem. He tried to gain 
influence on the Iraqi Kurds to shape their decision-making 
process and to use them as a barrier to more radical elements 
that were attacking Turkey. 
His call was supported by the English Prime Minister John 
Major. As a result of combined efforts of Turkey and respected 
countries, the Operation Provide Comfort was launched to 
create a safe heaven for the Kurds to the north of the thirty- 
sixth parallel by the participation of the United States, 
Britain, France, and the Netherlands. 
Operation Provide Comfort facilitated a massive Kurdish 
repatriation while squeezing out the Iraqi government's 
authority. By the end of September, all Kurdish-dominated 
areas in Iraq had come under local Kurdish control whereby the 
Iraqi authority disappeared.106 
As a result of Western support and a power vacuum in the 
region, the Kurds established a de facto government which was 
supported by some 100,000 armed Kurds. They voted for the 
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posts of de facto government in May,  1992. The Kurdish 
National  Assembly  and  the  Kurdish  administration  were 
established in Irbil. The KDP and the PUK shared the posts as 
a result of the elections.109 The members of the administration 
began to use the title of "Minister of Kurdistan". When a 
delegation from the administration visited Iran, their visit 
was declared a first visit by officials from the "Kurdistan 
region government", and the head of the delegation used the 
title of "Minister of Justice".110 
The Western powers, especially the United States, began 
to use any opposition group in Iraq as a tool to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein. The economic sanctions or any other measures 
of the West did not work to overthrow Saddam. Saddam Hussein 
was accepted as a cause of the instablitity of the Gulf region 
and  should be  deposed and replaced by a pro-Western 
administration. As Robert Gates, the deputy national security 
advisor of President Bush, declared in May, 1991: 
..all possible sanctions will be maintained on Iraq 
while he (Saddam) is in power... Iraq will be 
nothing but a pariah state as long as he is 
there... Saddam is discredited and can not be 
redeemed, i i i 
With 100,000 armed men, the Kurds shared their part of 
role from the United States in its efforts to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein. The Kurdish leaders were aware of the fact that to 
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gain  the  support  of  the West,  they should join other 
opposition groups. 
As a result of the incentives of the West, the opposition 
groups in Iraq joined in the meeting at Damascus in December, 
1990. In this meeting they declared coordination in their 
efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein and established the Iraqi 
National Congress, led by the Leadership Council consisting of 
the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders of the opposition. 
The Kurdish leaders were rewarded by the United States, 
and they were accepted by the Secretary of the State in 
Washington. Another meeting of the opposition groups was also 
held in Washington in July, 1992. As a result of the 
activities of the United States, the fate of the Kurds is 
placed largely in the hands of American policy-makers. The 
United States enjoyed the support of France, Britain, Germany 
and other Western countries in its efforts. 
Ozal also supported the United States and opened the 
talks between Turkey and the opposition leaders, especially 
the Kurdish leaders, Talabani and Barzani. His efforts were 
interpreted as gaining levarege and influence over the Iraqi 
Kurds. If there would be any Kurdish state in the future, to 
make sure that it will be under Turkish influence. 
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However, this idea was against the traditional Turkish 
foreign and national security policies. Ozal's policy towards 
the Kurdish problem and his willingnes to be actively involved 
in the Gulf crises caused many critics. The Chief of General 
Staff resigned because of Ozal's willingness to compromise and 
his foreign policies in 1990. The Foreign Minister joined him 
and resigned because of the involvement of Ozal in the foreign 
policy. The existence of foreign troops as a part of Operation 
Hammer was also criticized heavily in the Parliament. 
Iran saw the Turkish policy as a threat. Iran was always 
anxious about the existence of Western military in the Gulf. 
This time, the foreign actors, especially, "the Great Satan" 
began to exercise their control in northern Iraq.  The 
situation reminded them the Shah era when the United States 
and Israel were actively supporting the Iraqi Kurds who were 
under the leadership of Mullah Mostafa. At that time, the 
United States and Israel used the Kurds to weaken Iraq and its 
rhetoric of pan-Arabism. 
As it was noted by Rafsancani in his address, using a 
pretext  of  protecting  the  people  of  the  region,  the 
expansionist  powers  justify their military presence  to 
establish their goals: 
...In practice, the expansionist countries of the 
world have opted in the past to create some sort of 
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policeman and arm one power in order to serve as 
the guardian of the region... to serve as a 
protector of their interests.. They either had to 
occupy the area, which was not a viable alternative 
since the age of gunboat diplomacy had passed and 
some semblance of cordial ties with the indigenous 
people had to be maintained, or resort to an 
archaic method which is still in practice; this 
approach entailed a military presence in the 
region, reestablishing military bases and 
dispatching naval forces. Even this were a choice, 
it would be one which should be considered as one 
that was forced upon them by the circumstances and 
witjout prior planning. In other words, it may be 
considered as the only way out of the problem.112 
Although Iran supported the opposition groups, also 
declared that it is against the participation of Iraq. This 
was the result of fear that Turkey will use the participation 
as a pretext to occupy the Mosul and Kirkuk region. 
Additionally, they may calculate the side affects of a Kurdish 
state for their Kurdish population. To ensure that Iran will 
be a party in the decision-making process of the fate of Iraq, 
Iran followed a dual strategy. 
First, they approached Turkey and Syria to discuss the 
future of Iraq. The three countries held a series of meetings, 
in Damascus, Istanbul, Ankara and in Tehran. In these 
meetings, all parties accepted not to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of Iraq and stressed the importance of 
preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq. All countries 
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declared their will for determining of the fate of Iraq by 
implementing the common and free will of the Iraqis.113 
As a second, Iran tried to show its determination by 
means of force. Iranian jets bombed the facilities of the 
opposition group, namely the Mojaheddin, in Iraq, in May, 
1993.114 The timing of this was interesting, it occurred just 
before the beginning of the tripartite meeting in Tehran. This 
action may be interpreted as a show of determination and power 
to the other countries, especially Turkey. It may be a 
response to the military activities of Turkey in northern 
Iraq, and has a meaning of "if Turkey intervenes militarily in 
the situation in northern Iraq, then we will do the same 
thing." 
Neither the future of northern Iraq nor the policies of 
the parties involved are clear at the present. So, the 
situation in northern Iraq remains crucial problem and a 
danger for the stability of the region because of its effects 
on the domestic and security policies of the parties. 
C. THE EXPORT OF REGIME 
1. The Religious Movements in Turkey 
Mustafa Kemal clearly showed the direction of development 
to Turkey, it was the West that Turkey would take a part. The 
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westernization of the country was accepted as a fundamental 
instrument to establish a strong and contemprorary state. For 
Mustafa Kemal, the reason was simple: "A science oriented mind 
was open and initiative; a religion-oriented one was narrow 
and underdeveloped."115 
The influence of religion on the state mechanism was 
removed and the new state based its structure on secularism. 
The role of religion was limited to the individual. Religion 
is between the individual and God, the state has no part 
between the individual and God. Everyone is free to chose any 
religion or not to chose at all. 
The power of religious groups was eliminated and 
religious instutions were demolished. To remove the influence 
of foreign cultures, such as Arabic and Persian, the Arabic 
call to prayer [Ezan) was replaced by the Turkish call. The 
Dervishood and religious sects were also demolished. The 
mosques became only a place to pray, their political role was 
diminished. 
The first challenge from the religious groups was their 
attempt to control the party that Mustafa Kemal permitted in 
order to create a multi-party system. The religious groups 
tried to use the Progressive Republican Party to prepare a 
revolt in 1926. The party was dissolved by its founders. The 
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religious groups within this party tried to assasinate Mustafa 
Keraal in 1926.116 Another attempt by Mustafa Kemal to create a 
multi-party system in the form of an authorized loyal 
opposition party failed. The party, which was established by 
his collegues, was captured by religious groups. The revolt in 
Menemen by the religious groups and the murder of third 
Lieutenant Kubilay was accepted as the malfunction of the 
multi-party system. Fethi Okyar, the founder of the new party, 
dissolved it in 1930. 
The strict enforcement of secularism in Turkey was set 
back by the multi-party system. To gain more votes, the DP 
removed some of the secular measures and let the religious 
schools (the Imam Hatips) open. Arabic replaced the Turkish 
call to prayer and in the teaching of the Quran. Religious 
education in the schools became compulsory for Muslim 
students. Many mosques were opened and tombs were reopened to 
visitors in this era(1950-1960). The reluctant secular 
policies of the political parties continued and the religious 
groups increased their power. 
In the following years, the religious groups increased 
their activities by using the religious schools and favored 
sects. For example, there were 337 teachers and 4,548 students 
in the Imam-Hatips in 1960. In 1971, there were 1,547 teachers 
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and  4 9,308  students  in  the  Imam-Hatips .117  This  number 
increased greatly in the following years. 
The Islamic groups established political parties and 
began to seek opportunities in this era. These groups also 
published several newspapers and periodicals. One of the 
religious parties was the Nation Party. It was established in 
the 1950 and won a seat in the Parliement. Because of its 
militant overtones, the party was banned in a few years.118 
Another Islamic party of the 1960s was the Islamic New Order 
Party which was banned after the military intervention of 
1971. The remmants of it established the National Salvation 
Party (NSP) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan.119 
In 1974, the NSP found an opportunity to come to power. 
Because of the balance of seats in the Parliement, none of the 
major parties could create a government. The RPP made a 
coalition government with the NSP in 1974. Necmettin Erbakan 
became Deputy Prime Minister, and some NSP deputies became 
ministers. In the following years, the NSP continued to hold 
key positions in coalition governments. They affected foreign 
policy and followed anti-western and pro-Islamic policies.i:o 
The presence of the NSP in the administration increased 
the activities of the religious movements. The extreme 
religious  groups  established their organizations.  Their 
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organizations had dual structure: legal and illegal. The legal 
structure established its links within the administrative 
organizations and created a supporter base for further 
activities. The main area of activity was political, and these 
organizations were under the control of the NSP. Some of them 
were the Akincilar Society (Ak-Der), the Akinci Labor Society 
(AK-IS) , and the Akinci Civil Servants Society (AK-MEM) .121 
The illegal organizations were terrorist groups, trying 
to overthrow the secular government and establish the Islamic 
regime by means of an armed struggle. They fought against the 
government security forces and other opposition groups. These 
groups followed the classic structure of religious terrorist 
groups. The structure was as follows: The leadership of the 
Sheikh, the Shura-i Mesveret (the main committee), the Fatwa 
committee(where the decisions were declared), and regional 
representatives. The major illegal religious terrorist groups 
were the Islamic Liberation Army of Turkey (IKO), the Islamic 
Liberation Front of Turkey (TIKC), The Urgent Mojaheddin of 
Islamic Revolution IDAM), the World Sheriat Liberation Army 
(DSKO), the Universal Brotherhood Front Islamist Revenge 
Platoon (EKC-SIM) , and the Islamist Mojaheddin Army of Turkey 
(TIMO) .122 
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The main illegal sects campaigning against the secular 
structure of the government were the Nurcular, the 
Naqshibendis, the Suleymancilar, and the Isikcilar.123 These 
groups followed the same path to create a supporter base. They 
opened religious schools and used Mosques and religious 
institutions. They infiltered administrative posts and made a 
sustanied effort to infiltrate to the education system, the 
judiciary, and the military forces to gain a supporter base. 
Some of them were also active in Europe. They continued their 
religious propoganda among the Turkish workers and sent 
propoganda materials into Turkey. One of them was Cemalettin 
Kaplan who was following the same path as Khoemeini. He 
established his organization in Germany and constantly 
attacked the secular structure of Turkey and the military. 
The military operation of 1980 hit the extreme religious 
legal and illegal groups. The NSP was dissolved and Necmettin 
Erbakan was tried. The extreme religious terrorists were 
either captured or fled to Europe. 
However, the NSP was renamed and reopened by the former 
politicians of the NSP. The Prosperity Party (RP), which was 
established in 1983, continued to emphasize the political 
struggle for a new order. The PR gradually reestablished its 
supporter base in the late 1980s. Besides the PR, the Nation 
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party (led by Aykut Edibali) and the Reformist Democracy Party 
(led by Mevlut Ilik) were the other parties based on Islamic 
grounds. 
The program of the PR is similar to the IRP of Iran. The 
RP wants to bring "a just economic system", in which there is 
no interest and no tax to remove the oppressor and to protect 
the oppressed. Wages will be based on the partnership footing. 
Foreign capital, except the capital inflow from Moslem states, 
is forbidden. The PR also seeks "a just new order" within 
society; that the individual will be cared for and honoured. 
A just and moral order will be empowered by change in the 
education system. Instead of the EC and NATO, the PR 
emphasizes the establishment of a "Moslem United Nations" 
along with a "Moslem Countries Common Defence Organization", 
a "Moslem Countries Common Market", and a "Moslem Countries 
Cultural Cooperation".124 
When Ozal came to power, the activities of the religious 
groups increased. Ozal was a candidate of the NSP in 1980. He 
had close ties with Erbakan in that era. His brother, Korkut 
Ozal, has close ties with religious groups. When Ozal's mother 
died, she was put next to the famous Sheikh of a sect. 
In his term, the articles 141, 142, and 165 of penalty 
code were removed. Article 141 and 142 were measures against 
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communist activity. Article 161 was against extreme religious 
activity. The religious groups also forced the secular 
structure of the higher education system to be changed. The 
argument in 1989 about the "turban"3 went beyond individual 
rights. The main idea was to penetrate the secular system by 
using the turban as an example. Although President Evren and 
many officials were against it, the turban was allowed in the 
universities in the following years. 
In this era, Saudi financial institutions which were 
proclaiming that they were Islamic institutions and offering 
the Islamic option to investments were granted permission to 
be open their branches. The Al-Baraka Turk and the Faisal Bank 
were the main examples of them. These organizations provided 
a profit share instead of interest which was against Islam. 
Many of the religious groups invested in these instutions 
because they were "Islamic". However their system was the same 
with other banking institutions except the name for interest. 
Besides, some Saudi Islamic organizations, such as the Rabita, 
increased their support to the Islamic groups, including the 
PR. 
s
 It is a scarf that women wear to cover hair. It is used 
along with long clothes instead of a veil. 
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Under these circumstances, it was not suprising to find 
the emergence of the PR. The PR and its followers made 
extensive effords to increase their share of votes. They based 
their campaigns on the example of American presidential 
campaigns. They used one-to-one and mass propoganda at the 
same time. Their activities were financially supported by 
international religious organizations, mainly the Saudis and 
the Egyptians. 
As a result, they won 40 seats in the Assembly in the 
1991 general elections. The PR increased its share to 16.88% 
while the True Path Party (TPP) was 27 %, the Motherland Party 
(MP) 24 %,  and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 20.75 %.  In 
the 1994 local elections, the PR took 19 % of the votes, the 
TPP 22 %, the MP 20 %,  and the SDP 11 %. The PR was so 
succsesful that it won the elections in major cities, such as 
Istanbul, for the first time in Turkish political history.125 
This result may be interpreted as the succses of the 
political struggle of the religious groups. In the next 
general elections, they may do better because the economic 
conditions are worse under the administration of Tansu Ciller 
and the TPP. The SDP lost importance because the left is so 
divided and their policies about the Kurdish issue are very 
distractive for many people. The PR with the banner of "try 
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the one that is not tried before" may come to power 
legitimately as a result of the general elections. Although 
they do not declare that they are openly against Kemalism, 
their program and leadership are against the secular and pro- 
Western structure of Turkey. 
2. The Export of Iranian Revolution 
The Islamic Republican ideologues articulated their 
conception and desire to create anew the moral Islamic man and 
the just Islamic society. This effort was part of an overall 
set of goals that also influenced the establishment of the 
idea of divine rule in Iran, the restoration of Iran's 
independence and that of all other islamic nations, the latter 
through the export of the Islamic Revolution if necessary.126 
The main ideolog of the Islamic Revolution who 
established the base of the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
Khomeini. His ideas about the Islamic Government are 
summarized in his concept of the Velayet-e Faqih. Because 
Khomeini shaped post-revolutionary Iran, this study will refer 
to his ideas about the dynamics of the revolution and the 
export of it. 
Most of the Islamic ideologues have accepted that since 
the days of colonialism, new and alien ideas,  such as 
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socialism, communism, democracy, and nationalism have 
penetrated Muslim society. The agents of these ideas did not 
belong to the masses but to the middle and upper-middle 
classes who were influenced from abroad.127 
Because of this, the influence and sovereignty of Islam 
in society have declined. The notion of Islam has fallen 
victim to division and weakness. The laws of Islam have 
remained in abeyance and been subject to change and 
modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign 
laws and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents 
for the sake of their evil purposes, causing people to be 
infatuated with the West.128 
So, under the leadership of the Ulema, all Muslims had a 
duty to fight against these ideas in order to create pure 
Islamic order in the Muslim society. According to Khomeini, 
The duty of the Ulema is to put an end to this 
injustice and seek to bring happiness to millions 
of people . . . through destroying and eliminating 
the unjust governments and through establishment of 
a sincere and active Muslim government.129 
The Islam that Khomeini interprets is: 
Islam is the religion of militant individuals 
who are committed to truth and justice. It is the 
religion of those who desire freedom and 
independence. It is the school of those who 
struggle against imperialism. 130 
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So, the real Muslims have both the means and reasons to 
open a strugggle against the imperialists and their puppets in 
their society. 
Besides, the imperialists created an unjustice system 
among hundreds of millions of Muslims through the political 
agents that they have placed in power. The unjust economic 
system of these puppet governments divided Muslims into two 
groups: The oppressed and the oppressors. The struggle of 
oppressed Muslims continued but their way was blocked by the 
ruling minorities and the oppressive structures of their 
governments. So, it is the duty of the Islamic Republic to be 
a helper to the oppressed and an enemy to the oppressor.131 
Khomeini continues: 
How can we stay silent and idle today when we 
see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the 
agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the 
wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of 
millions of Muslims-thanks to the support of their 
masters and through the power of the bayonet- 
granting the Muslims not the least right to 
prosperity? It is the duty of Islamic scholars and 
all Muslims to put an end to this system of 
oppression, and, for the sake of the well-being of 
hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow 
these oppressive governments and form an Islamic 
government.132 
In his New Year's Message to the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in 1980, he laid out the purpose of both Islamic revolution 
and the foreign policy of the new Islamic Republic: 
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We must strive to export our Revolution 
throughout the world, and must abandon all idea of 
not doing so, for not only does Islam refuse to 
recognize any difference between Muslim countries, 
it is champion of all oppressed people. Morover, 
all the powers are intent on destroying us, and if 
we remain surrounded in a closed circle, we shall 
certainly bedefeated. We must make plain our stance 
toward the powers and superpowers and demostrate to 
them that despite the arduous problems that burden 
us. Our attitude to the world is dictated by our 
beliefs ,133 
In the same speech, he declared his support for all 
movements and groups that were fighting to gain liberation 
from the superpowers of the left and right.134 
In his address concerning the meaning of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1980, he called on other Muslims of the world to 
revolt with the following statements: 
Muslims the world over who believe in the 
truth of Islam, arise and gather beneath the banner 
of tavhid and the teachings of Islam! Repel the 
treacherous superpowers from your countries and 
your abundant resources. Restore the glory of 
Islam, and abandon your selfish disputes and 
differences, for you possess everything! Rely on 
the culture of Islam, resist Western imitation, and 
stand on your own feet. Attack those intellectuals 
who are infatuated with the West and the East, and 
recover your true identity.135 
Khomeini paid attention to the ethnic differences among 
Muslims, and accepted it as an alien idea which was a result 
of the imperialist propoganda. He mentioned that "one of the 
themes that the planners of disunion among the Muslims have 
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put forward, and their agents are engaged in promoting, is 
that of race and nationalism."136 When the constitution of the 
Islamic Republic was preapared, Khomeini declared that the new 
government accepted no ethno-nationalisna as was mentioned 
before. 
Blessed for you be this government that knows 
no difference of race, whether between black and 
white, or between Turk, Persian, Kurd, and Baluch. 
All are brothers and equal; nobility lies only in 
fear of God, and superioty may be attained by only 
by acquiring virtues and performing good deeds.137 
Khomeini addressed the differences between the Shia and 
Sunni Islam, but claimed that the dissension between the 
Sunnis and Shia was a mischievous propaganda of the 
imperilalists. He insisted that there was no oppression of the 
Sunnis in the Islamic Republic. He asked his Sunni brothers to 
pay no heed to the divisive propoganda of the imperialists and 
to regard the Shia as cherished brothers and thereby frustrate 
the sinister plans of foreigners.138 
So, the united Muslim world would be created against the 
imperialists and enjoy the glory days of Islam. For this 
reason, the protection of the lands of Muslim world against 
the outside or internal attacks of foreigners is the 
responsibility of all Muslims. The legal rulings of the 
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Sheriat, which was compiled by Khomenini, make it a duty to 
Islamic government: 
(2826) If the enemy attacks the lands of the 
Muslims or their borders, it is the duty of all 
Muslims to defend them by any means possible, 
including the sacrificing of one's life and the 
expenditure of one's wealth. With respect to this 
matter, there is no need to seek permission from a 
shari'a judge. 
(2 827) If the Muslims fear that the 
foreigners have drawn up a plan to conquer their 
lands, whether directly or intermediary of their 
agents acting outside or inside the country, it is 
their duty to defend the Islamic lands by any means 
possible. 
(2829) If it is feared that foreigners will 
gain control over the lands of Muslims by expanding 
their political, economic, or commercial influence, 
it is the duty of the Muslims to defend their lands 
by any means possible and to destroy the influence 
of the foreigners as well as their domestic 
agents .139 
In the light of ideology, it is not hard to understand 
the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. 
However, this was only the beginning, the reverberations of 
this policy were felt immediately throughout the Middle East. 
The incident in the holy land, the seizure of the Grand Mosque 
in Mecca, and the following bloody uprising in which more then 
400 people died before it was suppressed, are other examples. 
The Shia workers in the oil rich countries of the Middle 
East began to revolt. In Bahrain, mass demonstrations of the 
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Shia that comprise the majority occurred. Iraq was another 
country in which the Shia staged a ceaseless revolt after the 
Islamic Revolution. In Lebanon, the Shia established terrorist 
organizations which were funded and supported by all means by 
the Islamic government. These organizations opened 
international terrorist campaign against the imperialists. 
They aimed to establish an Islamic regime in Lebanon. 
The Iraq-Iran war stimulated the terrorist campaigns of 
revolutionary groups. Their campaigns focused on the several 
Gulf countries which were opted Iraq in this dispute. In 1981, 
the first international attack was held by an Iraqi Shia 
terrorist group, the al-Dava, in the bombing of the Iraqi 
Embassy in Beirut.140 
A conference which had an aim to promote the creation of 
the Ideal Islamic Government was held in Tehran in 1982. In 
this conference, the represantatives of militant groups from 
several Arab and Islamic countries gathered to discuss the 
means of a movement to advocate worldwide Islamic revolution. 
As addressed above, the codes of Sheriat legitimates the use 
of force by all means, including terrorism. By this 
conferance, the clergy of Iran found a chance to use 
international terrorism as a tool for the foreign policy of 
the Islamic government and to exploit and co-opt the 
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for its revolutionary goals among radical Muslims throughout 
the world.141 
In 1980, Iranian officials became dominant in Amal, the 
Shia terror organization headquarted in Lebanon. Later, the 
split of Amal introduced the Islamic Amal and the Hezbollah 
terrorist groups which were strictly controlled and fully 
supported by Iran. The units of IRGC were deployed at the 
disposal of these groups. In his answer to a related question, 
the Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayeti interpreted 
the existance of revolutionary guards in these organizations 
as "a symbol of the help of Iran to the oppressed".142 
When the U.S. led the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force 
deployed in Lebanon, the Shia terrorist groups violently 
attacked the force. The existance of the force would help the 
Lebanese government to establish its control over Lebanon. 
That would mean the end of the activities of these groups. The 
huge losses of the multi-national force was explained by 
Velayeti as follows: "The United States intervention in 
Lebanon is the main cause of developments that followed. When 
the United States intervenes in another country it should 
expect certain reactions from people."143 What Velayeti called 
"people" included the Revolutionary Guards of Iran which 
numbered between 2,000 and 3,000.144 
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In 1983, the Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks targeted 
Kuwait. Kuwait was a small, defenseless, and geostrategically 
important country with rich resources. However, the existance 
of the Shia population and their poverty stimulated the 
Iranian efforts to export their regime by creating instability 
in Kuwait and promoting a revolt among the Shia community. 
Additionally, Kuwait was sided with Iraq and financially 
supported it in its war efforts. 
The Islamic Jihad, another terrorist organization carried 
out several terrorist actions including two bombings in Turkey 
against the common targets of the Iranian sponsored terrorist 
campaign. The terrorist campaigns of these organizations 
included bombings, kidnappings, and assasinations. It was 
reported that several ex-Shah followers and opposition leaders 
were assasinated in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Turkey 
by these groups and the SÄVAMA (the secret intelligence agency 
of Iran). 
Iran also used the terrorist activities as a blackmail of 
the West to gain its political goals. For example, when the 
Hezbollah hijacked a TWA flight and its 41 American passengers 
in 1985, Iran used its influence for releasing the passengers 
in return for several shipments of U.S. arms. Later, two 
American nationals were freed by terrorist groups after the 
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so-called "arms for hostages" deal between the United States 
and Iran.145 
In 1987, another wave of terrorism occurred after the 
struggle between the hard-line clergy and Rafsancani. Three 
oil installations were bombed by the Revolutionary 
Organization Forces of the Prophet Mohammed just before the 
meeting of the Islamic Conferance Organization in Kuwait. 
Several terrorists were captured with explosives in 
Europe before they attacked their targets. However, others 
were succsesful. They carried out an attack against Arab 
nationals in France, an assasination of two Iranian dissidents 
in London, and an attempt to assasinate an Iraqi diplomat in 
the Southern Greek Republic of Cyprus. As a response to 
arrests, several Europeans were kidnapped by unknown terrorist 
organizations; the Revolutionary Justice Organization, the 
Organization of the Oppressed of the Earth, and the Islamic 
Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. 
Members of the Islamic Jihad were captured by Turkish 
police before they attacked American and Israeli officials in 
Turkey. In Egypt, the Islamic Jihad of Egypt attacked 
Americans, and attempted to assasinate two prominent 
Egyptians. Several terrorist activities occurred in Lebanon by 
previously unknown organizations. Another terrorist activity 
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of a previously unknown group, the Organization for the 
Defense of Free People, occurred in Tunisia as a series of 
bombings. The Saudi arm of Hezbollah blowed up a natural-gas 
pipeline in Saudi Arabia. The offices of Pan Am were bombed by 
the previously unknown Organization for the Liberation of 
Muslims in Kuwait. 
Although, the names of these organizations were 
previously unknown, many of them were used by the Hezbollah to 
cover the Iranian involvement.146 Despite this effort, the 
security forces of related countries gathered enough evidence 
to reveal the Iranian involvement. As a result of these 
findings, some countries, such as Egypt, restricted their 
relations with Iran.147 
The victory of Rafsancani over the hard-line clergy and 
his efforts to establish a moderate foreign policy decreased 
the support of Iran to the Islamic terrorist groups. Despite 
the moderate policies, Iran continues to support radical 
Palestinian terrorist groups, anti-Baathist groups, and some 
other major Islamist terrorist groups, such as the Hezbollah. 
Iran also plays a major role in supporting Sudan's hard-line 
Islamic groups. It was reported that Iran shipped at least $17 
million worth of arms to Sudan in 1991. Additionally, Iran 
continues to support Islamist groups in Algeria, Morocco, 
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Tunisia, and Egypt. The FIS movement of Algeria reportedly 
acquired Iranian support.148 
3. The Effect of the Export of the Regime on the Bilateral Relations of Turkey 
and Iran 
Turkey opted for the West, with its secular structure and 
democratic government. This is not contrary to the fact that 
99 % of its population is Muslim. The secular and democratic 
government of Turkey is not against religion, it fully 
respects its citizens 's moral obligation. However, it is 
against the people who try to use religion as a tool to seize 
power and dictate their will on others by means of force. 
Turkey showed an understanding of the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran. It recognized the Islamic regime immediately. 
Additionally, Turkey refused to enforce the economic sanctions 
of the West in 1979 following the takeover of the U.S. 
Embassy.149 The basic reason for this lays in the foreign 
policy of Ataturk. He respects other countries in their effort 
to find the most suitable regime for themselves unless they 
try to impose it on others. 
Turkey was aware of the danger of the religious 
provocation in Anatolia. It saw examples before, for example, 
the Celali revolts of the Shia Turkomans and the provocations 
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of the Ahonds. Turkey has considerable numbers of Shia within 
its borders, most of them are Alevis. The Alevis usually opted 
for the left in politics. The Sunni majority and the Alevis 
did not enjoy very good relations. Intermarriages between the 
two communities were not accepted by the two communities. An 
important number of the Sunnis preferred the right wing in 
politics. However, there was not any oppression of the Alevis 
or any other religious groups in Turkey. The major problem was 
that the two communities did not establish close links with 
each other. 
Unfortunately, the minor religious difference between the 
two communities always became a tool for outsiders to provoke 
a major crisis. A few months prior to the revolution in Iran, 
Turkey faced the brutal clash of the two communities which had 
both political and the religious overtones. 
Although there were prior outbreaks of Sunni-Alevi 
violence in Anatolia, the turning point in this type of civic 
disorder was the December 1978 massacre in Kahramanmaras. 
Three days of sheer mayhem started with the shooting of two 
Alevi teachers by the NAP forces and ended with more than 111 
dead and more than a thousand wounded, two hundred of them 
were heavily wounded. The city was heavily damaged in this 
event, more than 500 buildings were destroyed. In this event, 
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the right wing agitators (including extreme religious and 
racist groups) and the Marxist agitators added religious and 
ideological meaning to the violence. Heavily armored army 
forces managed to control events in three days. When the army 
took control of the city, more than 800 people were 
arrested.150 
Inter-communal fighting also continued in 1979. This time 
the target of the agititors was Malatya, then Sivas, then 
Corum and finally Yozgat. All of these incidents were brutal 
and destructive to the harmony of the nation. 
It is noteworthy that the inter-communal and religious 
clashes occurred at the time of the Islamic Revolution of 
Iran. As soon as the Revolutionary elements seized power in 
Iran, Iranian propoganda opened a disturbing campaign against 
the secular and democratic government of Turkey, its well 
respected leader and founder, Ataturk, and its military 
forces. Turkey became a target for Iranian subversive 
broadcasting.151 Every day, the Iranian radio was throwing out 
threats and calls for an Islamic revolution and calling 
Ataturk a Jew and Godless.c 
'In my personal interview with one of the supporters of the religious groups, he claimed 
that Ataturk made a reform of clothes and offered modern the hat instead of the Fez because the 
merchants of fabrics and hat importers were Jewish. So, in his view, Ataturk forced the nation to 
change its oriental look to a contemprorary one just to make Jews rich. This shows that the 
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The Iranian attacks to the personality of Ataturk and the 
secular and democratic structure of Turkey were obvious. Iran 
used every opportunity to attack the symbols of the secular 
and democratic structure of Turkey including the agenda of the 
Iranian officials during their visits to Turkey. For example, 
when the Iranian Prime Minister, Mir Hussain Musavi, visited 
Turkey in 1987 he refused to visit the Ataturk mausoleum (the 
Anitkabir) in Ankara-which was "a must" for all visiting 
dignitaries-  and publicly critized Ataturk.152 
In 1988, the Iranian Embassy refused to follow the 
tradition of showing a respect to Ataturk by not lowering its 
flag to half-mast on the 50th anniversary of Ataturk 's death. 
In 1989, Iranian broadcasting insulted President Kenan Evren 
who was also the former Chief of the General Staff by 
comparing him with Salman Rushdie because of his policy 
towards the turban issue. In the same year as a gesture of 
Turkish tolerance towards Iran, Turkey lowered its flag to 
half-mast following the death of Khomeini. Two days after, a 
crowd, which was provoked by the hard-line clergy, attacked 
the Turkish Embassy in Tehran.153 
The political and symbolic overtones of Iranian efforts 
added a militant character when the security forces of Turkey 
Iranian propoganda was succsesfiil enough to have its listeners or even the believers. 
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revealed the operations of the SAVAMA and its connections with 
the militant extreme groups in Turkey. For instance, in 1988, 
the car trunk saga where the SAVAMA attempted to kidnap a 
prominent member of the Iranian opposition and smuggle him 
back to Iran occurred. The evidence showed the involvement of 
the personnel of the Iranian Embassy.154 
In 1989, when the constitutional court ruled against the 
wearing of the turbans by woman students on university 
campuses, the extreme religious groups made mass 
demonstrations in which they clashed with the police. The 
Iranian regime openly supported and provoked these 
demonstrations. The hard-line clergy prepared mass 
demonstrations in Tehran against Turkey. Its ambassador to 
Ankara, Manoushehr Mottaki, gave very provocative speeches on 
this issue, he even declared that Iran was going to put 
economic sanctions on Turkey. As a response to the open 
involvement of Iran in the internal affairs of Turkey, the 
Turkish government led by Evren followed a strong policy and 
restricted its relations with this country. The Turkish 
ambassador to Tehran was recalled.155 
In the early 1990s, the prominent authors and journalists 
of Turkey, such as Cetin Emec, Ugur Mumcu, Behice Ucok, Turan 
Dursun, and Muammer Aksoy who were secularists and strictly 
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loyal to the Kemalism, were assasinated by the extreme 
religious groups. The security forces captured one of the 
suspects and gathered evidence that revealed their connections 
with Iran.156 
In 1993, the provocation of extreme religious groups 
caused another severe and brutal incident in Sivas. When Aziz 
Nesin, who was a leftist and atheist author, visited Sivas and 
participated in a conference which was organized by the 
Alevis, the two communities were provoked by the agititators. 
The clashes between the two communities resulted with setting 
on fire an hotel in which Nesin and the Alevi groups were 
staying. More than thirty people died in the fire, and Nesin 
barely escaped from death.u Calm in the city was established 
by army troops but the death toll was high. The investigation 
of the incident found evidence, based on the pictures and 
confessions, of agititators from outside. 
The covert support of Iran to the extreme religious 
groups consisted of its support via international Islamic 
terrorist groups to the militant groups and its political ties 
"When Ugur Mumcu was killed on January 24, 1993 Nesin declared his stand against 
extreme Islamic groups and vowed to translate Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses. In Iran, the 
radical newspaper, Islamic Republic demanded a fatwa ordering Nesin's death and placed him in 
the assasination list. It is not clear that any fatwa was issued but the external agititators targeted 
Nesin in Sivas and were very close to reach their goals. 
Reference:Conflict over Killings, Hugh Pope, MEI19 February 1993, pg: 12 
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with the mainstream Islamic parties in Turkey. The open 
support of Iran to the extreme religious groups by propaganda 
and political involvement can be seen in the example of the 
turban case. 
In both cases the Iranian involvement acts against the 
secular and democratic structure of Turkey. Additionally, the 
Iranian policy to export its regime became a tool to intervene 
to the internal affairs of Turkey. So, unless Iran gives up 
its policy to export the regime, the problem will continue to 
worsen the relations of both countries as it did in the turban 
case. 
D. THE RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 
1. The Current Situation 
The events in the late 1980s and early 1990s were full of 
suprises for the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union was 
the most important one with its huge impact on global 
politics. One of the results of this event was the emergence 
of new states in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. The Central 
Asian states; Kazahhistan, Kyrgzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan declared their independence in 
1991. Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were established in the 
Caucasus in the same year. 
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The Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan are 
experiencing a transition period. Political restructuring and 
institution-building is necessary for them to build their 
nation states. As soon as the formal break-up of the Soviet 
Union and the declaration of their independences occurred in 
1991, the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan began to look 
for concepts and values by which they might preserve their 
presence and create strong nations. 
The major obstacles for them are the traditions and 
practices inherited from the former regime, the political 
cadres' ignorance and inexperience in the administration of a 
modern state, dependence on the socialist economic and 
political system, and the lack of technology, know-how, 
financial capacity, and a trained work force. 
The main economic problems of these countries stem from 
the production structure imposed on them by the Soviet 
centralism which was based on primary goods and single crops. 
The related problems include the lack of light industry, 
unemployment, inflation, the deterioration of living standard, 
and the vacuum created by the sudden collapse of central 
planning. 
Their infrastructure and economy were dependent on the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union used these countries as a 
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source of raw material and certain agricultural goods. They 
desperately need technology and financial aid to overcome 
their difficulties. Their trade routes, or any kind of links, 
were connected to Russia. They are geographically far away 
from the common markets of the Gulf, the Middle East or 
Europe. Their economy was based on the socialist system. They 
have no experience with free market economy or the 
accumulation of wealth by individuals to invest in the private 
sector. So, their efforts to privatize the economy and 
establish a liberal system face enormous problems. 
The transformation of the economy to a liberal one 
irritated the administrations. It caused high inflation and 
unemployment. In some countries, the administration halted the 
privatization which was necessary to establish liberal 
economy.157 Eliminating the vestiges of a totally different 
regime and mind-set will take time. The severeness of the 
political, structural and economic problems they face, may 
make the transition period last longer. 
Another problem is their ethnic structure and growing 
ethno-nationalism. All of these states had different ethnic 
groups, and even different nationalities. There are millions 
of Russians and some Europeans in these states, especially in 
Kazakhistan.158  The borders of these countries are frigile, 
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because they were arbitraliy drawn by Stalin to implement "a 
divide and rule" principle. Even under the Soviet rule these 
borders were "adjusted" many times.159 For this reason, one may 
find some elements of a tribe in different countries which 
causes ethnic problems. For example, in Tajikistan, 24% of the 
population is Uzbek, on the other hand, Semerkant and Bukara 
are Tajik dominated cities in Uzbekistan.160 
Additionaly, these countries found themselves in a 
dispute with other countries. The clear example of this case 
is Azerbaijan, which faced the invasion of its territories by 
its neighbour, Armenia. 
The Soviet rule could neither change the tribal structure 
in the countryside nor eliminate religion. Although the Soviet 
Union had an antireligious, Marxist ideology, the Soviet Union 
found itself forced to create an official religious clergy as 
early as 1943. The people were aware of religion and kept it 
underground. Some people in the countryside performed as 
clergy parallel to the official clergy.161 
The religious reawakening is backed by the openings of 
mosques, religious schools, and other religious institutions. 
Islam is spreading very fast among the youth. The Islamic 
party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, follows a militant 
flavor and is very active in the region. Despite being banned, 
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the IRP has considerable supporters and opened its branches in 
these states. Besides the IRP, other Islamic groups, such as 
the Adalet (justice) were formed.162 The Islamic groups and the 
IRP are active in the civil war in Tajikistan.163 However, it 
must be noted that these groups are also nationalist by some 
extend. 
The present administrations are led by former leaders of 
the Communist party. They continued to hold their offices in 
the present administrations. However, several opposition 
groups have established parties. The ethno-nationalist 
parties, the religious parties, and other secular parties 
began to rally for power in these states. The power struggle 
in the domestic politics of these countries varies from the 
establishment stage to civil war as seen in Tajikistan and the 
coup d'etat in Azerbaijan. 
The growing ethno-nationalism reveals itself in the 
formation of ethno-nationalist parties, such as the Birlik 
(unity) and the ERK (freedom) of Uzbekistan. National identity 
is prominent among the intellectuels, however, it also became 
influentual among the masses. Evidence of it is the renaming 
of public places and the openings of muesums for the 
historical figures of their nations. The ideal of the Turan 
became attractive. But everyone interprets it differently, for 
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the Uzbeks it is the great Uzbekistan. As a response to the 
Turan, some Persian speaking Tajiks look for a great Khorasan 
state of Persian speaking Tajiks which was advocated by the 
Great Ariana Society.164 
The scarcity of water and the drying up of the Aral Sea 
combined with its environmental impacts pose a great danger to 
the stability of the region. The majority of the water 
resources are in the most mixed and fragile area, the Fergana 
Valley. The control of these resources may cause a dispute 
between already conflicting ethnic groups. 
In the other areas of government,  the presence of 
foreigners is clear. These foreigners, especially Russians, 
continue to preserve their situation in the bureucracy, in the 
economy, and in the industry because of the lack of a trained 
work force in these countries. 
Another concern was the future structure of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States organization which was 
imposed by Russia to continue its control over the Soviet 
empire. The presence of Russian troops and military 
installations is a real instrument of ensuring Russia 
continues to enjoy its control. Contrary to the presence of 
Russian troops, none of these countries- except Azerbaijan had 
a national military power by any means. Even their police 
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force consists of many Russians. Interestingly, Kazakhistan is 
building up a military force on a small scale which recruits 
from the Russian officer corps. However, Uzbekistan is trying 
to establish a small scale military force which will recruit 
mainly Uzbeks.165 
2. The Turkish Efforts of Influence 
Turkey reacted slowly to the transformation of the Soviet 
Empire. The basic reason was the traditional awareness of 
Russian politics. However, when it was clear, Turkey made 
significant changes in its foreign policy. By the end of 1991, 
Turkey opened an immediate and extensive diplomatic campaign 
and established close diplomatic links with all of the former 
states. 
The establishment of independent Central Asian states and 
Azerbaijan was welcomed by the public with great enthusiasm. 
The Turkish people acted as if they had found a long lost 
relative. The media paid heavy coverage to the events in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Many journalists, intellectuals, 
and academicians traveled to these states. 
The administration joined the public in its enthusiasim. 
The very first effort of Turkey was to establish formal ties 
with these countries. Because of the Kemalist ideology which 
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restricts the relations with the Turkish populations in other 
parts of the world to cultural and humanitarian relations, the 
formal ties with these states did not exist before. Another 
reason for the lack of relations was the Soviet threat. 
Turkey became the first country to recognize the 
independence of the Central Asian States and Azerbaijan. On 
November 9, Turkey recognized Azerbaijan, and the next month 
Turkey extended recognition to the all of the former Soviet 
Republics. The establishment of embassies by these countries 
and diplomatic visits of top level officials respectively 
occurred in 1992. Turkey hosted the heads of these states and 
reciprocated the visits by sending first Foreign Minister 
Hikmet Cetin, and later Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. 
President Ozal made his last trip abroad to visit these states 
in 1993. By the beginning of 1993, there were over 140 
bilateral accords signed on different subjets between Turkey 
and these states.166 
The cultural and economic relations were established 
simultaneously with the diplomatic efforts. The Turkish-Azeri 
and Turkish-Uzbek business councils were established as early 
as November, 1991. Many businessmen visited these states 
either with the diplomatic convoys or alone. Turkish 
businessmen were granted several projects including the 
-187- 
operation of oil fields and construction of airports and other 
infrastructure.167 
Turkey was active in the infrastructural development of 
the region. The basic reason was to establish physical links 
with these countries. By 1992, the Turkish Airlines scheduled 
regular flights to the main cities in the region. Turkey also 
sought to develop rail and road links with the region. The 
proposed route of the railroad was via Nahcevan and Iran to 
Azerbaijan and by train-ferry cross of the Caspian sea to the 
Central Asian states.168 
Another important effort was given to the construction of 
several pipelines that will connect the hydrocarbon resources 
of these countries to the world market via Turkey. One of them 
was a 1,060 kilometer pipeline between Turkey and Azerbaijan 
which will carry the Azeri oil to the Mediterrean. This 
pipeline will transit Nahcevan and Iran and will be connected 
to the already existing Turkish-Iraqi pipeline. Turkey made 
several offers to Kazakhistan to carry its oil to the 
Mediterrean via Turkey. Another pipeline project that Turkey 
is trying to accomplish will connect Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan to the Mediterrean. The possible route of this 
pipeline will be either via Iran to the south or across the 
Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia or Armenia to the north. 
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This pipeline will carry natural gas from Turkmenistan and oil 
from Uzbekistan.169 
As a main instrument to establish links with these 
countries, Turkey gave an emphasis to telecommunications. The 
telecommunication industry of Turkey is well-developed and has 
high technology. Turkey is developing a telecommunication 
network for these countries which will supply 2,500-lines to 
each of the five Central Asian states. Later on, the capacity 
of the system will be increased by opening an additional 
10,000-lines for each of the states. The telecommunication 
network will be connected via Turkish supplied earth stations, 
to the Intelsat satellite, which will connect them to the 
Turkish gateway exchange and to the world. The Intelsat will 
be replaced by the next Turksat satellitev which will be a 
Turkish satellite.170 
Additional efforts are being made by the private 
telecommunication companies. The NETAS installed its self- 
designed DMS digital switchboard systems, and made joint 
ventures with local companies to build telecommunication 
devices.17: 
vThe first satellite that was built by the French and would be placed in orbit by their rocket 
was destroyed by the explosion of the rocket in 1993. However, Turkey was determined to have 
one, so the studies for the second Turksat satellite have already begun. 
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In the financial field, Turkey provided $1.2 billion 
with its limited capabilities. Some of this money was aid, 
especially food aid (mostly wheat and sugar) , but most of it 
was credit sales for these countries.172 
Turkey tried hard to establish cultural ties with the 
Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. It encouraged them to 
replace the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin alphabet instead 
of the Arabic. Turkey sent many textbooks and offered to help 
to rewrite existing textbooks with the Latin alphabet and 
according to their cultures. Some Turkish entrepreneurs are 
trying to open private schools in which the Latin alphabet 
will be used. Some scholars joined their collegues to examine 
establishment of a common Turkish language, which will be 
Istanbul Turkish. Turkey also offered 10,000 scholarships, 
including 1,200 at universities, to the Central Asian 
States.173 
Turkish radio and television broadcasts became available 
for these states. The new channel, the Avrasia channel was 
established by the state television broadcasting organization 
in 1992. The Avrasia channel broadcasts seven hours of weekday 
programming and thirteen hours on weekends in Istanbul Turkish 
with subtitles. The main channel of the state television, the 
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TRT-1,  can be watched by some  areas  in  the  Caucasus, 
especially in Azerbaijan. 
These efforts by Turkey aim to provide the Central Asian 
states and Azerbaijan with a model of a nation-state in their 
transformation process. The proposed model of Turkey is an 
independent nation-state based on the secular and democratic 
government structure and a liberal economy. The common factor 
of ethnicity will create harmony and goodwill with these 
states to improve relations among themselves and thus bring 
security to the region. The Turkish model will provide an 
instrument for them to increase the well-being of their 
citizens and guarantee the individual rights of their people. 
3. The Iranian Efforts of Influence 
The Iranian efforts to influence the Muslim population of 
the former Soviet Union began as early as the eraly days of 
the revolution. These efforts were the result of the policy of 
export of the regime. Iran made sustained efforts to reach the 
Muslim population which were suppressed by the Soviet regime. 
One of them was the direct broadcasts from Iran which 
delivered the message of revolution to the oppressed Muslims 
of the Soviet Union. In 1982, Iran asked permission to 
transfer its Consulate in Leningrad to Dushanbe- the capital 
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of Tajikistan, but was refused.174 
The break-up of the Soviet Union promoted challenges and 
opportunities for Iran. On the one hand, Iran's efforts at 
exporting its revolution, although more recently with good- 
neighbourliness rather than militancy, remained a central 
theme for elements within the theocracy as it continues to try 
to serve as a model for others. 
On the other hand, Russia and other CIS countries remain 
as a main sources of sophisticated weapons and technology. 
Although they expect to create an annual $8-10 billions worth 
of trade volume for the Iranian goods with the Central Asian 
states,175 Russia and the Ukraine became important partners in 
trade. Iran signed a trade accord worth up to $7 billion with 
the Ukraine in 1992.176 What Iran is trying to do is walk a 
fine line between establishing its influence in Central Asia 
and enjoying good relations with Russia and the remaining CIS 
countries. 
What so called Iranian model is an Islamic regime by all 
aspects similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is 
trying to emphasize that their model is neither simply 
"Islamic fundemantalist" nor "threatening". In their point of 
view, it is more geopolitik than ideological and both 
practical and pacific.177 They believe that their cultural, 
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ethnic, and religious ties with the Central Asian states and 
Azerbaijan will be useful to export their model. Additionally, 
their model, with its economic, ideological, and political 
tools, will help the recipient states to close the gap between 
rich and poor and establish strong countries. 
To establish its influence over these states, Iran 
resorted to a battery of strategies, mainly by developing 
mutually beneficial bilateral relations with individual 
republics, and championing membership of these states in 
multinational organizations. Another area of interest is 
increasing the cultural and religious ties by offering the 
Arabic alphabet by Iranian letters, printing textbooks for 
these countries, providing scholarships, and supporting 
mosgues and religious institutions. 
To implement these strategies, Iran worked hard to create 
diplomatic ties with these states. It recognized the 
independence of the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan 
quickly, and opened its embassies in these countries. Iran's 
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayeti spent November 1991 in 
these states during his visit to Russia. Everywhere he 
traveled, he committed Iranian aid and assistance, as well as 
stressing Iran's natural willingness to help with religious 
education. 
-193- 
Iran has shown great interest in Tajikistan because the 
Tajiks speak Persian. Iran tried to establish direct air 
links, telecommunication and television broadcasting service. 
The National Bank of Iran planned to open its branch in 
Tajikistan.178 The government officials of Tajikistan visited 
Iran several times,179 and Iran sent teams to seek areas to 
cooperate with Tajikistan.180 
Tajikistan officially adopted the Arabic alphabet with 
Iranian letters. Iran published textbooks in Arabic alphabet 
for Tajikistan. The idea that Tajik is different than Persian 
is rejected and the Russian names of public places are being 
replaced by Persian ones through a "Foundation for the Persian 
Language" .181 
Iran also paid attention to Turkmenistan. Both countries 
share a border and Iran has a considerable amount of Turkomans 
within its territory. Iran offered to build a railroad link 
between Sarakhs and Mashhad. This link will be a part of the 
Silk Route project which will connect China and Iran to the 
West via Turkey. The two countries are also activating their 
ports on the Caspian Sea, in addition to establishing air 
links and building two dams.ie; 
Iran offered its assistance to improve the hydrocarbon 
industry of Turkmenistan. Iran expects to export 6.5 million 
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tons of crude oil annually as a part of a barter deal. Iran is 
going to buy 3 billion cubic meters of gas in order to supply 
its southern provinces.183 In the cultural field, Iran offered 
to open cultural centers in Turkmenistan and exchange radio 
and television programs.184 
Iran  is  improving  its  relations with Kazakhistan. 
Kazakhistan plays a significant role in Iran's transportation 
and communication aspirations.  Iran's Silk Route Project 
involves in part Iran's access to China through Kazakhistan. 
The expansion of Iran's shipping lines in the Caspian Sea 
embraces the ports of Anzali and Now Shahr in Iran and Ektau 
in Kazakhistan. Iran also established an air link between 
Tehran and Alma Ata. Kazakhistan's nuclear capacity also 
deserves  Iranian attention.185 Iran is also proposing a 
pipeline which will carry the Kazakh crude oil from the Tengiz 
oil field via Azerbaijan to the Iranian refinery in Tabriz. 
The refined oil will be transported to the Iranian ports in 
the Gulf.186 
Iran tried to establish banking relations, trade 
exchange, and facilitate joint investments with Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan.187 The exchange of diplomatic envoys including top 
level officials occurred between Iran and the two countries. 
The construction of railway and road links became another area 
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of cooperation between Iran and the two countries.188 Iranian 
radio began its broadcasting in Kyrgyz and Uzbek languages.189 
On the multinational level, Iran established the Caspian 
Sea Cooperation Council (CSCC) with the participation of 
Kazakhistan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Another 
regional cooperation organization, the ECO, which was 
established between Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, accepted the 
memberships of the Central Asian States, Azerbaijan and 
Afghanistan. 
Iran was also determined to be an alternative leader to 
Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. To prove this, Iran offered 
the membership of Azerbaijan to the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) during its Sixth Summit Meeting at 
Dakar in December, 1991. Besides, Iran presented to the summit 
the Azeri Sheikh ul-Islam (Chairman of the Spiritual 
Administration of Caucasian Muslims) and Kazakh Foreign 
Minister. Both officials flew to Dakar in the Iranian plane as 
a members of the Iranian delegation.190 
4. The Impact of the Rivalry on the Relations of the Two Countries 
Although Iranian officials refuse the idea of a rivalry 
between Turkey and Iran, both countries are trying to their 
best to diminish the impact of each other and emphasize their 
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models to the region. The Iranian model and the Turkish one 
are fully contrary to each other. As noted, the Iranian model 
is based on the religious government structure. Turkey 
proposes the secular structure in which religion's role is 
diminished to the moral obligation of the individual. 
The proposed trade routes of the two countries which will 
be based on the transportation links shows the rivalry. 
Turkey, despite the geopolitical disadvantage, proposes to 
connect the trade routes to the Europe via Turkey. However, 
Iran, by using its relative advantage of common borders and 
proximity, offers links with the Gulf. In any case, the 
reality of the geopolitics requires the substantial amount of 
links to be established via Iran.w 
Turkey, keeping this disadvantage in mind, offers to 
establish the communication links between the Central Asian 
states and the world via Turkey. Iran, on the other hand, 
tries to establish the communication links with these 
countries. 
In the cultural field, Turkey empowers the common ethnic 
ground and offers the Latin alphabet as a common alphabet. 
"It must be noted that, Iran and Turkey are not alone in the rivalry in Central Asia. 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and many countries are rallying to get a share of the economic resouces of 
the region. In terms of the trade and communication links, Pakistan also offered an alternative 
routes. 
-197- 
Iran, because of the limits of the ethnic ground, empowers the 
religion, and offers the Arabic alphabet and Persian. 
So, the rivalry includes political influence, trade 
markets, and cultural influence. Whomever could enjoy the 
victory in this rivalry, it would definitely be a regional 
leader that can shape the outcome of the events in this part 
of the world. By using the economic, social, and political 
benefits of this victory, the triumphant nation may use its 
regional position to gain more political leverage in global 
politics. 
If Iran will be surpassed by Turkey, and the Central 
Asian states prefer ethnic ties and secularism instead of the 
Irano-Islamic model, then this will be dangerous for the 
stability of the regime in Iran. The Turkic belt, which will 
surrounder northeast and northwest of Iran, may become 
attractive for the Turkish elements in Iran, such as Azeris 
and Turkomans. The secular structure and the refusal of the 
Irano-Islamic model will also empower the secular opposition 
groups in Iran. 
On the contrary, if the Irano-Islamic model is 
succsesful, then Turkey may forget its economic and political 
hopes. The extreme religious groups will use the defeat as an 
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example and will be more active. Turkey will lose its chance 
to be a regional actor with a global influence. 
E. THE CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS 
The break-up of the Soviet Union led to the establishment 
of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. The long 
dispute and animosity between Azeris and Armenians led to open 
confrontation in Nagorno Karabagh. Nagorno Karabagh is a land 
strip within Azerbaijan which was granted an autonomous 
situation by the Soviets as they seperated Nahcevan from 
Azerbaijan by giving the territory between Azerbeijan and 
Nahcevan to Armenia.191 The dispute between the Azeris and 
Armenians may be a new subject for the Western world which had 
a sympathy for Armenians, however, it is almost two centrury 
long.x 
The problems began with the Russian and British plans to 
weaken the Ottoman Empire and establish their puppet regimes 
in eastern Anatolia.  Their tool was the Armenians.  The 
"Armenian actions against Turks began during the Russian advance to the Eastern 
Caucasus in 1796. The conquest of the region by the Russians was ended with the mass massacres 
of the Turks by Armenians and Russians. To reward the Armenian support, the Russians granted 
them the lands of Turks who were massacred by the Armenians. The Azeris also were among the 
massacred Turkish population. 
For more information: Turks and Armenians: A Manual on The Armenian Question, Justin and 
Carol McCarthy, 1989, pg:22. 
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Armenian irregulars, armed and backed by the Russians, began 
their massacre of the Turkish population in the Caucasus and 
eastern Anatolia as early as 1880s. The population exchange 
occurred under the Russian administrations to establish a 
Christian majority in the Muslim enclaves. The Turkish people 
were either forced to flee or were simply killed, and their 
lands were distributed to Armenians, Georgians, and Russians. 
In 1918, Nagorno Karabagh, Nahcevan, Erevan, and Zangebur 
were the main disputed areas in which Armenian irregulars 
constantly attacked the Azeri populations. In one event, 
between March 30 and April 1 1918, the Armenian irregulars 
killed between 8,000 to 12,000 Azeris in the provinces of Baku 
with the support of the Red Army.192 
The recent dispute between Azeris and Armenians began in 
1989. The movement of the Armenians during the Soviet rule let 
them to concentrate in Nagorno Karabagh. The Armenian armed 
groups began to seek for annexation of Nagorno Karabagh to 
Armenia by using a claim for an independence as a guise. The 
dispute began by with a propaganda campaign by the Armenians 
in 1987 to annex Nagorno Karabagh and Nahcevan to Armenia.1Q? 
The first violence occurred in Sumgait in 1988 with the 
attack of Armenians. The Soviet troops were sent to Sumgait. 
Several Azeris were arrested for anti-Armenian activity and 
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tried in the Soviet courts. However none of the Armenians were 
arrested at the end of the violence which resulted in thirty- 
two deaths among the Armenians and Azeris.194 
In the following months the situation became worse, and 
violent Armenian activities forced the Azeris who were living 
in Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh to flee to Azerbaijan. In 
1988, the predominantly Armenian administration of the 
Autonomous Republic unilaterally declared its independence. 
Although the Supreme Soviet refused the declaration, it acted 
in favor of Armenians, thus angered the Azeris. The Armenians 
openly established armed groups and massacred the Azeri 
population in Nagorno Karabagh. Armenia put an embargo on 
Nahcevan and isolated the region. Armenia unilaterally 
declared the annexation of Nagorno Karabagh in 1989.195 
The dispute and the lack of firmness of the 
administration which became a puppet of the Soviets sped up 
the political and national awareness of the Azeris. The Moscow 
oriented administration refused to establish national defense 
forces and establish strong control over the activities of 
armed groups in the region. The hundreds of thousands of Azeri 
refuges and their increasing death toll, and the increasing 
trend to the participatition of Azerbaijan let the Azeris to 
create an underground nationalist parties,  such as the 
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Azerbaijan People's Front (APF), the Birlik (Unity), the 
Dirilish (Azerbaijan Resurgence Party), the Kizilbash's 
People's Front, and the Social Democratic Organization of 
Azerbaijan.196 
The national awareness of the Azeris might be lost at the 
official level under Soviet rule, however, the people kept it 
in their hearts. Mass demonstrations occurred in Azerbaijan 
and in Nahcevan over the question of Nagorno Karabagh and the 
APF became popular during this era. The calls of the Azeri 
intellectuals to use the Azeri language and adoptation of the 
Latin Alphabet instead of Russian and Cyrillic Aphabet were 
evidence of the growing national awareness. 
Meantime the Azeri people remembered their brothers 
living in Iran. In fact, the Azeris were divided by Russia and 
Iran in 1828. As a result of the 1828 Turkmenchai agreement, 
the Turkic-speaking southern Caucasus was divided and the Aras 
river became a border of Iran and Russia. As much as 12-20 
million Azeris live in Iran, most of them are settled near the 
border.197 
Following the Russian and Iranian occupation, the Azeris 
looked forward to the Ottomans for their independence. The 
nationalist movements established their organizations as early 
as 1906. With the help of the Ottomans, they were able to 
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establish an independent state in 1918. The independent 
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was invaded by the Red Army in 
1920. The Azerbaijan republic was demolished and Azerbaijan 
became another Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union. 
However, the Azeri rebellion continued in the countryside, and 
lasted almost a decade. Nahcevan was invaded in 1920, and the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Nahcevan was created by the 
Soviets. 
The era between 1920-1941 was called a "Great Terror" 
because of the Soviet oppression and asimilation at the 
expense of the wealth of Azerbaijan and the lives of the 
Azeris. Even the ones who worked as agents of the Soviets to 
establish communist rule in Azerbaijan were executed.198 
The agreement with Kemalist Turkey and the Soviet Union 
was signed in Moscow in 1921. The similar agreement was signed 
with the Caucasus Republics in Kars in the same year. In these 
agreements, Nahcevan's separate status and close ties with 
Azerbaijan were confirmed and Nahcevan received protection 
from Kemalist Turkey.199 
By the end of World War Two, Stalin tried to establish 
Soviet rule in northern Iran. For this reason, Azeri 
nationalism was used by Stalin in 1946 to dictate his claims 
to Iran. The establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party 
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(Firqah-i Democrat) was the first step to rally the Azeri 
people of Iran. The party, which was led by Jafar Pishevari, 
was determined to unite all Azeris under Soviet rule. Under 
Soviet tutelage, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party supporters 
overthrew the Iranian provincial government and declared an 
independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in 1945.200 
As soon as the Soviets received extensive oil privileges, 
the Soviet army left northern Iran. Without Soviet support, 
the Azeris could not stand long against the Iranian army. 
Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam granted extensive rights to 
Azeris in the negotiations while the Iranian army were 
gradually recapturing the territory. The independent Azeri 
Republic collapsed in December, 1946.201 
The growing nationalism in Azerbaijan received public 
support by the end of 1980s. An increased number of 
intellectuals addressed their historical, cultural, and ethnic 
ground as a Turk. They published nationalist articles and 
poems regarding to the Azeri culture and heritage. In 
December, 1989, along the Nahcevan borders with Iran and 
Turkey, residents dismantled frontier fortifications, cutting 
barbed wire and burning guard towers. They reclaimed their 
land which was declared a military zone, and wanted to visit 
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cemeteries and shrines in this zone. They asked to visit and 
trade freely with their brothers in Iran. 
The incident in Baku in January, 1990 increased the anger 
of the Azeris and the power of the nationalist movement, 
mainly the APF. The events broke out with the killing of an 
Azeri by an Armenian with an axe in Baku. This event led to 
clashes of the Azeris and Armenians in Baku between 13-14 
January. As usual,only the death toll of Armenians, which was 
32, was counted, but the number of wounded or dead among 
Azeris was not published by the Soviets. 
A week after the incident, the Soviet troops invaded Baku 
while Armenians were attacking Azeri villages in the Lachin 
and Nahcevan area.  Soviet troops opened fire on any civilian 
and moving vehicle on the streets, and any windows where 
lights were burning. On 20 January, they ordered people to 
stay at their homes while wounded Azeris were crying for help 
and dead bodies were lying on the streets. The ages of the 
killed male and female Azeris varied between 13 and 70. The 
number of Azeris dead was between 69 (the Soviet military 
figure including 14 Soviet military personnel) and 200 (the 
APF decleration, which might be true because the Sheikh ul- 
Islam declared that he buried 180 bodies) . The number of 
wounded Azeris was between 700 and 36,000. The arrest of 
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nationalists, especially the APF leaders followed the invasion 
of undefended Baku.202 
Although the Western media was silent, and President Bush 
understood Gorbachev's "need to maintain order", the Supreme 
Soviet labeled the action of Gorbachev "an act of aggression 
against the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR" and "a crime 
against the Azerbaijani people".203 
Following this event, Nahcevan declared its independence 
on 20 January and appealed to the United Nations to recognize 
its right to self determination. In Ganje, the people demanded 
the establishment of national defense forces and the evacution 
of the Soviet troops. Many parties were established, and new 
publications appeared. The APF movement increased its 
supporter base despite the losses in its leadership.204 
The break-up of the Soviet Union led to the declaration 
of the independence of Azerbaijan in 1991. In the first free 
elections in 1992, the APF won the elections, and Abulfez 
Elcibey, the leader of the APF, became President. Under his 
Presidency, Azerbaijan tried to establish a nation state, with 
a national economy and defense. 
The conflict in Nagorno Karabagh escalated to an 
undeclared war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite the 
overt involvement of the Armenian troops, Armenia consistently 
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followed the tactic of Serbia, and claimed that the Armenians 
who were fighting in Nagorno Karabagh were "irregulars" who 
were out of its control. The Armenian forces gradually forced 
the Azeris to retreat and captured Azeri territories. The 
Armenian victories weakened the authority of the APF. 
Azerbaijan understood that Russia was the protector of 
Armenia in this conflict. The APF administration tried to 
remove the Russian influence over Azerbaijan. They refused to 
join to the CIS, and prefered other countries for cooperation. 
They looked for the protection of Turkey in the dispute and 
its economic and political support to establish a strong 
state. 
The relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey rapidly 
increased, and economic, cultural, and diplomatic links were 
established. Visits of high level officials occurred. Turkey 
and Azerbaijan signed many bilateral cooperation agreements. 
One of them was about the construction of the pipeline which 
will carry Azeri and Kazakh oil to the Mediterrean. Azerbaijan 
declared that it will adopt the Latin alphabet. Turkey also 
provided limited military aid and assistance to establish a 
national defense force. 
Azerbaijan is very important for the Turkish foreign 
policy towards Central Asia. Because of the historical, 
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cultural, and ethnic links, Azerbaijan is a friendly state to 
Turkey. However, Armenians with their deep hate against Turks, 
their miserable actions against Turks in history, and their 
territorial claims over eastern Anatolia, it is hard to 
believe that Armenia will follow friendly policies against 
Turkey. 
Most of all, Azerbaijan can provide the door for Turkey 
to Central Asia. The most important resource of the Central 
Asian countries is their hydrocarbon resources. Turkey, if can 
construct pipelines that will carry this resource to the 
Mediterrean via Turkey, may became a middleman in the 
hydrocarbon market. The hard currency that the Central Asian 
states get, will increase their purchasing capacity. Thus, 
Turkish exports will increase. The choice of Turkey, instead 
of Russia and Iran, will increase the political power of 
Turkey. 
However, all of these scenarios depend on how stable 
Azerbaijan is. The Nagorno Karabagh war is not only a war 
between Armenians and Azeris, but also an impetus to dismember 
Azerbaijan and hit the Turkish influence in Central Asia. The 
Armenian victories may cause other ethnic groups in Azerbaijan 
to carry-out similar activities. For example, the Lezghis, a 
Caucasian people whose population  straddles  Russia  and 
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Azerbaijan, are under the pressure of Armenian propoganda to 
revolt against Azerbaijan.205 
Another example is the Caucasian Kurds, who were actively 
fighting along with Armenians. The leader of the Caucasian 
Kurds, Rachman Mustafayev, uniterally declared an independent 
Republic of Kurdistan.206 As noted before, the PKK and Armenian 
alliance, which is evident by the captured Armenians in the 
PKK squads in southern Anatolia, pushes Turkey to be against 
Armenia in the dispute. This also gives another dimension to 
the conflict in the Caucaus. 
This dispute is also probing the capacity of Turkey as a 
candidate for a regional power. If Turkey unilaterally can not 
dictate the outcome of the dispute, and empower the situation 
of Azerbaijan, then its credibility will vanish in the region. 
Iran, on the other hand, is watching the situation 
closely. Although dismembering Azerbaijan will create an 
unstable and uncertain situation in the Caucasus, Iran would 
not enjoy a Pan-Turkist Azerbaijan and the emergence of the 
nationalism among the Azeris. A strong and nationalist 
Azerbaijan, at least, would be an example or a focus of 
attraction for the Azeris who are living in Iran, even if it 
does not seek for the unification of the Azeris. 
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So, Iran followed dual policies to contain the Azeri 
nationalism. On the one hand, Iran seeks for close links with 
Azerbaijan to establish its influence over it. Iran addressed 
the common religion and cultural links with the Azeris based 
on the Shia history.y Iran welcomed the establishment of the 
pro-Iranian Islamic Party of Azerbaijan.207 To gain the hearts 
of public, Iran sent shipments of food, oil, and coal to 
Nahcevan  which  was  under  the  blockade  of  Armenia. 
Additionally, Iran agreed to build a railway link between 
Azerbeijan and Nahcevan via its territory. In the diplomatic 
arena, Iran offered the membership of Azerbaijan to  the OIC. 
Iran enjoyed the participation of Azerbaijan to the Caspian 
Sea  Cooperation Council  which was  established by  its 
initiative. 
These efforts were fruitful and established close links 
with Azerbaijan. Visits of top level officials occurred. 
During these visits, declarations of goodwill and 
neighborliness were given and agreements on bilateral 
cooperation in different fields were signed. 
yOne of the main actors of the Shia was Shah Ismail who 
established the Shia state in Iran. Shah Ismail settled in 
Ardebil which was in Azerbaijan, so he also occupies an important 
place in Azeri history. 
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On the other hand, Iran seeks the establishment of close 
links with Armenia. Iran used Armenia to weaken the APF 
administration, and thus nationalism in Azerbaijan. Also the 
role of Armenia as a buffer between Turkey and the Turks of 
the Caucasus and Central Asia was an important factor in the 
flirt of Iran and Armenia.  Historically,  Armenians and 
Iranians were close to each other. An important number of 
Armenians who were rich and influential lived in Iran for a 
long time. They were granted seats in the Majlis during the 
Pahlavi era and in the Islamic Republic. They were politically 
active in Iran.208 Armenia also looked to Iran for economic 
ties and political support, and these were provided by Iran. 
Iran and Armenia established both economic and political ties, 
and the two countries agreed on the creation of a balance 
(against Turkey-because there is no other powerful actor in 
the area) in the region.209 
The victories of Armenians led to a coup d'etat in 
Azerbaijan, and Elcibey, the APF leader and President, was 
overthrew by Surat Guseynov without any fighting. Geydar 
Aliyev, who was a former Politburo member of CPSU and pro- 
Russian, became President. During his position as a Chairman 
of Parliament of Nahcevan, Aliyev, despite of the Azerbaijan 
protest, signed a border agreement with Armenia on normalizing 
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relations, developing communications, and avoiding armed 
clashes.210 During his Presidency, Aliyev tried to get the 
Russian support instead of active Turkish involvement. 
Many parties offered good offices to parties to solve the 
dispute peacefully including the UN, Kazakhistan, the CIS, 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
Iran, and Turkey. 
Turkey hosted the Armenian and Azeri Presidents, and 
tried to help them to find a peaceful and honourable solution 
to the problem. To improve its position as a mediator, Turkey 
tried to normalize diplomatic relations and establish economic 
links with Armenia. Besides, Turkey actively participated to 
humanitarian efforts and shipped food and medicine to Armenia. 
One of the proposals of Turkey was the exchange of 
territories which would create a pure Armenian state by 
annexing some part of Nagorno Karabagh to Armenia. At the same 
time, this proposal would create a pure Azeri state by 
annexing territory between Nahcevan and Azerbaijan to 
Azerbaijan, thus uniting Nahcevan and Azerbaijan.211 
Turkey also tried to force the parties to find a peaceful 
solution to the problem in the multinational organizations. 
The Security Council issued Resolution 882. The Turkish 
officials prepared another peace plan with the participation 
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of Russia and the support of the U.S. in 1993. While the talks 
were going on, Armenian troops invaded a huge part of the 
territory of Azerbaijan. 
The Turkish reaction was swift. Troops were positioned 
near the Armenian border. Turkish planes began reconnaissance 
and patroling flights in the region. The 1921 agreements were 
addressed, and any attack on Nahcevan was declared as a reason 
for war. Ozal called for outright intervention, however, Prime 
Minister Demirel preferred diplomatic measures rather than 
military intervention.212 So, Turkey did not act militarily. 
In the following months, Armenian attacks continued. This 
time Prime Minister Ciller asked Parliament to authorize her 
to declare war against Armenia in case of necessity. Again, 
Demirel, as President and a veteran politician with a great 
experience, was reluctant to intervene militarily. 
F. THE EXTENSIVE MILITARY BUILD-UP OF IRAN 
Each sovereign country has a right to raise its own 
defense force, and seek for the means of protection for 
itself. However, the nature of its policies, ideologies and 
military power may be defensive or offensive. If the present 
military build-up of Iran is examined, it will be noticed that 
it has more offensive character rather than defensive. This 
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raises the question of the justification of the offensive 
military power, and the question of offensive against whom? 
It was known that during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran suffered 
heavy damage to its military. Iran lost much of its arms that 
it purchased from the People's Republic of China (PCR) and the 
Eastern bloc in the 1988 offensive of Iraq. According to some 
estimates, Iran lost over 40 % of its major weapon systems.213 
Iran began to implement a military build-up program as 
soon as there was a cease-fire and spent $ 9.7 billion between 
1988 and 1991. In the following years, Iran allocated $10 
billion to acquire weapons in a five year period. To date, 
Iran is in the third year of a 5-year billion dollar annual 
purchasing program with Russia. Iran was purchased three Kilo- 
class diesel electric submarines, 28 MIG 27s and 29s, 24 Su-24 
and 27 fighter bombers, 18 fighters and 2 modern Ilyushin-76s 
fitted with aerial reconnaissance and EW equipment, missile 
launchers and long-range guns, 250 T-72 tanks. Iran planned to 
spend $14.5 billion to buy arms, including high-technology 
computers from the United States. Other systems that Iran is 
planning to buy could enable it to interdict the Gulf and 
Strait of Hormuz, wage armored warfare, and construct powerful 
air and air defense systems.214 
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Iran received $ 6.9 billion of arms deliveries during 
1988-1991, included $ 2.1 billion from the Soviet Union, $2.0 
billion from the PRC, $0.3 billion from Western Europe, $1.0 
billion from Eastern Europe, and $1.5 billion from other 
sources. 215 Iran received large numbers of 122mm weapons and 
M-4 6 130mm guns as well as large numbers of rocket 
launchers.216 
According to some Iranian Mojaheddin reports, Russia will 
provide Iran a T-72 assembly plant, 122mm and 130mm guns, 100 
MIG-21 fighters, a MIG-29 assembly plant, 48 MIG-31 air 
defense fighters, 24 Su-24 strike fighters, and 2. IL-76s217. 
Additional reports from the People's Mojaheddin indicate that 
Iran is importing three more batteries of SA-5, an undefined 
number of SA-10 or SA-12 surface-to-air/anti-tactical 
ballistic missile systems, and a next generation warning and 
command and control system including radars from Russia.218 
Iran purchased two or three 27-ton midget submarines from 
North Korea in addition to three Kilo type submarines. Iran 
also increased its anti-ship missile inventory by acquiring 
60-100 C-801 or YF-6 missiles from the PRC. Iran also sought 
more advanced anti-ship missiles from North Korea and the PRC, 
8-12 missile patrol boats, and possibly frigates.219 
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Le Monde reported a deal of 110 planes worth $11 billion 
that includes 12 TU-22Ms, 48 MIG-29s, 24 MIG-31s, a variant of 
the ÄN-72 that serves as a maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 
two IL-7 6 early warning aircrafts, a variety of air defense 
missile batteries (the long-range fixed site SA-5, and the SA- 
11 or SA-13 mobile systems).220 
In addition to Russia, Ukraine also signed a four year 
barter deal with Iran worth about $7 billion. In exchange for 
Iranian oil  and natural gas,  Ukraine will provide an 
unspecified number of weapons and some industrial equipment.221 
Another country that helped Iran in its military build-up 
program was Iraq. Iraq, the long-time enemy of Iran, sent its 
most modern aircraft to Iran during the Desert Storm. Iraq 
hoped to get these aircraft back at the end of the conflict, 
however, Iran preffered to accept them as a payment for the 
war damage. As a result, Iran received 24 Mirage F-ls, 24 the 
SU-24s, 40 the SU-22s, 4 the SU-20s, 7 the SU-25s, 12 the MIG- 
23s, 4 the MIG-29s, 1 ADNAN early warning aircraft, and 33 
civil aircraft.222 
Iran's desire to acquire missiles led it to purchase more 
advanced Silkworm and M-ll missiles from the PRC and Scud 
missiles from North Korea.223 A senior North Korean delegation 
traveled to Tehran to close the deal on November 29, 1990. 
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Iran purchased 20-30 advanced, long-range North Korean 
missiles. Iran and Syria are cooperating with North Korea in 
the development and co-production of Scud Cs and another North 
Korean missile, called the No-Dong-1 with a range of 1,000 
kilometers.224 Besides, Iran is trying to modify these missiles 
capable enough to carry nuclear and chemical warheads with 
increased range and more accuracy.225 
Iran also concentrated on mass destruction weapons, such 
as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. To pursue this 
desire they received assistance from the PRC, North Korea, 
Argentina, Pakistan, India, Kazakhistan, and several undefined 
third parties. Iranians are operating in the same manner the 
Iraqis did in the 1980s; undercover activity, spreading sites, 
concealment of installations, creating a network of agents 
abroad, recruitment of foreign experts, and persuading exiled 
Iranian scientists and technicians to return. Iran's covert 
actions to acquire the neccessary technologies for mass 
destruction weapons led to some success. 
Iran's nuclear program was first initiated by the Shah, 
however the Revolution halted the program. During the 1960s 
Iran purchased a nuclear research reactor from the United 
States. After the 1973 war in the Middle East and 1973 oil 
crises, the Shah began construction of twenty-three nuclear 
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energy plants. Construction began on two plants in Bushehr by 
German companies. Another plant was begun by French companies 
at Darkhouin. Under the same program, Iran sought to acquire 
laser separation and plutonium enrichment technology. Iran 
received four lasers operating in the critical 16 micron 
bands. Iran also purchased important amounts of yellow cake 
from South Africa.226 
The nuclear program of  Iran was halted when the 
Revolution occurred in 1979. Iran continued its nuclear 
efforts  only  after  the  Iran-Iraq war.  In  1983,  Iran 
revitalized its laser isotope seperation program. In 1984, it 
opened a new research center in Isfahan. In 1985, Iran placed 
ads in international newspapers asking Iranian scientists to 
participate in a conference on nuclear research at Bushehr. 
Iran continued the construction of two reactors at Bushehr 
with the help of the Argentina nuclear power agency which 
works closely with West Germany's Kraftwerke Union. Argentina 
also reached an agreement with Iran on the sale of enriched 
uranium.227 Iraqi air raids halted the construction on these 
sites  in 1987.  Iran also signed a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with Pakistan in 1987.228 
Iran also sought nuclear reactors from other sources. 
Iran's approach to the Western countries was refused. However, 
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Iran negotiated with the USSR for two 440 megawatt nuclear 
power plants in 1990. In 1990, Iran signed a broad research 
cooperation agreement with the PRC including the establishment 
of a 27 kilowatt resaerch reactor at Isfahan. It was reported 
that the PRC agreed on the sale of a 300 megawatt power 
reactor. In the same year, Iran approached a Spanish firm to 
conclude the work on the reactor at Bushehr. South Korea also 
showed interest in the project and sent survey teams to 
Bushehr. In 1992, Iran negotiated with India to purchase a 10 
megawatt research reactor.2292 
There are reports that Iran planned to construct a yellow 
cake plant in Yazd, and another uranium enrichment and ore 
processing plant close to its Shaghand uranium mine with 
foreign assistance.230 It is also reported that Iran has an 
uranium processing center at Karaj.231 
Iran also approached the former Soviet Republics to 
acquire nuclear technology, weapons, and to hire nuclear 
scientists. According to some reports of the People's 
Mojaheddin, Iran negaotiated with Kazakhistan to purchase 
nuclear warheads that it can fit to Chinese made Silkworm and 
The involvement of Russia and the PRC in the sale of nuclear reactors was also addressed 
in Ref.:90, pg: 52, and in Ref:95, pg:28-30. The agreements with India and Pakistan were also 
adressed in Ref.:95, pg:24-26 
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other capable missiles. Some unconfirmed reports even suggests 
that Iran has two warheads that were purchased from 
Kazakhistan.232 
Iran also increased its efforts to produce biological 
weapons. Iran's activities in this field date back to 1982. 
Iran tried to produce mycotoxins in 1982, and tried to buy two 
new strains of fungus from Canada and the Netherlands in 1989. 
It is also reported that Iran conducted extensive research on 
more lethal active agents like anthrax and on biotoxins. Some 
reports identified a facility at Damghan and another one near 
Tehran as working on research and production of biological 
weapons. However, little is known about the state of the 
Iranian effort and its capacity.233 
Iran was also very active developing chemical weapons in 
the late 1980s. Iran sought foreign assistance to acquire the 
technology to produce chemical weapons. European firms, such 
as Lurgi, were used to obtain pesticide plants and the needed 
feedstocks. In 1987, Iran received 75 tons of thiodiglycol, a 
key precursor of mustard gas, from the U.S. firm Alcolac 
International. Iran also used the German firms of Colimex and 
Rotexchemie International, the Greek firm of Cy Savas 
Oikonomidis, and the Singaporean firm of Hallet Enterprises in 
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its efforts. By using these firms, Iran obtained 120 tons of 
sodium cyanide.234 
Iran also received South Korean support in building two 
chemical weapon plants which were sold under the cover of 
being pesticide plants. Another poison gas plant was 
constructed with the aid of Bayer and Lurgi at Qazvin. Iran 
has a major poison gas plant at Damghan.235 
Iran began to use its chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq 
war. Iran used mustard gas and blood agents in its attacks and 
delivered them in bombs and artillery shells. Iran also tested 
Scuds with chemical war heads.236 
It is unclear that Iran is capable of producing a nuclear 
weapon. It is also unclear that Iran has extensive offensive 
chemical or biological war capabilities. However, it is very 
certain that Iran is determined to have mass destruction 
weapons including nuclear weapons, chemical and biological war 
heads and delivery systems. 
With regard to the determination of Iran to acquire 
chemical and biological weapons, Rafsancani described them as: 
poor man's atomic bombs (that) can easily be 
produced. We should consider them for our defense. 
Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the 
war taught us that international laws are only 
scraps of paper.237 
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Rafsancani also declared the determination of Iran to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction in another speech: 
With regard to...radiological weapons 
training, it was made very clear during the war 
that the moral teachings of the world are not very 
effective when war reaches a serious stage and the 
world does not respect its own resolutions and 
closes its eyes to the violations and all the 
aggressions which are committed on the battlefield. 
We should fully equip ourselves both in the 
offensive and defensive use of...radiological 
weapons. From now on, you should make use of the 
opportunity and perform this task.238 
Iran accepts that acquiring mass destruction weapons will 
provide added prestige and power in the region. Iran also 
views possesion of mass destruction weapons as a hedge against 
the great powers and as a counter-weight against Israel. 
Iran's Vice  President Ayatollah Mohajerani  states  this 
dimension of the justification of the Iranian nuclear program 
as follows: 
...because of the superiority of nuclear arms, 
every Islamic state should seek to obtain them. In 
other words, the nuclear capabilities of Israel and 
Muslim states must be equalized. If Israel is 
allowed to have a nuclear capacity, then Islamic 
states, too, should be given the same right.::<c 
Iran also acquired the necessary platforms to deliver 
mass destruction weapons. The Iranian purchases of long range 
artillery and missiles are one way to deliver chemical, 
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biological and tactical nuclear war heads. The SU-24s (which 
is equivalent of the F-lll) with its range of 1,600 kilometers 
(LO-HI-LO profile) and the TU-22 Backfires with a range of 
4,000 kilometers can hit any target in the region with mass 
destruction weapons in addition to other fixed-wing Iranian 
aircraft. 
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IV. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES 
A. POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES 
1. Ideologies of The Two Countries 
a. Iran 
As noted before, Iran is an Islamic Republic based on the 
teachings of religion. Iran claims that its ideology is 
generated from the religion, and Islamic Republic of Iran is 
implementing the Shia ideology in the political and social 
life. 
The ideology that was basically shaped by Khomeini has 
several important dimensions. First, it is a tawhidi  concept; 
which means its followers accept only the dominance of God. In 
other words, the word of God is the sole source of the deeds 
of the government. In this concept, because the Book (Quran) 
addressed every need of man, and God delivered the Book to 
believers, human beings are not authorized to create decisions 
on every aspect of the life. Governments are the part of daily 
life of the people, so, governments are also subject to the 
laws of the Book. Only the knowledgeable people (Faqih) on the 
Book may interpret the words of the Book. 
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It is the Western world that opened an ideologic war 
against Islam that created defective and alien ideas, such as 
secularism,  nationalism, communism, and democracy. By using 
their military power, they dictated their terms to the Muslim 
countries. Khomeini explains this as follows: 
...These new groups(imperialists- Western 
powers) began their imperialist penetration of the 
Muslim countries about three hundred years ago, and 
they regarded it as necessary to work for the 
expiration of Islam in order to attain their 
ultimate goals. It was not their aim to alianete 
the people from Islam in order to promote 
Christianity among them, for the imperialists 
really have no religious belief, Christian or 
Islamic. Rather, throughout this long historical 
period, and going back to the Crusades, they felt 
that the major obstacle in the path of their 
materialistic ambitions and the chief threat to 
their political power was nothing but Islam and its 
ordinances, and the belief of people in Islam. They 
therefore plotted and campaigned against Islam by 
various means.240 
Another way to establish their control over the Muslim 
world was to divide the Muslims and weaken them. So, the 
imperialist powers formed a conspiracy to crush the Muslims. 
They sought to create conflict in the Muslim world through 
political conspiracies which aimed to bring about seperation 
among the brothers under various pretexts. They sought to 
control the Muslim countries by their agents and puppets. 
The imperialists created artificial disputes among the 
Muslims. Thus, they were able to divide the Muslim world. 
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These divisions between the Muslims are enabling the 
imperialists to meddle in the internal affairs of the Muslims 
and to keep them in a constant state of disunity. The 
imperialist powers had thus established their supremacy over 
the Muslim world. As a result, they were able to enjoy the 
control of the vast resources of the Muslim countries.241 
For this reason, it is essential to create unity of the 
believers throughout the world. This is explained by the Umma 
(the community of believers) dimension of the ideology. 
Without unity between Muslims revolutions can not succeed. 
Khomeini explained this as follows: 
We see, too, that together, the imperialists 
and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided 
the Islamic homeland.  They have seperated the 
various segments of the Islamic umma from each 
other and artificially created separate nations. 
There once existed the great Ottoman State, and 
that, too, the imperialists divided...Therefore, 
after numerous prior wars, the imperialists at the 
end of World War One divided the Ottoman State, 
creating in its territories about ten or fifteen 
petty states. Then each of these was entrusted to 
one of their servants or a group of their servants. 
...In order to assure the unity of the Islamic 
umma,... in order to attain the unity and freedom 
of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the 
oppressive governments installed by the 
imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic 
government of justice that will be in the service 
of the people. The formation of such a government 
will serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the 
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Muslims; just as Fatimat az-Zahraaa (upon whom be 
peace) said in her address: 'The Imamate exists for 
the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and 
replacing their disunity with unity.'242 
The establishment of such a unity among the Muslims will 
prevent the imperialist powers from dividing the Muslims and 
plundering the wealth of the Muslims. 
Another result of the plundering of the wealth of the 
Muslim world, the rule of tyrannies, and the imperialist's 
control over the Muslims is the division of the Muslims as 
oppressed and oppressor. The Muslim societes thus divided as 
the mostazafeen (oppressed) and the mostekbrin (oppressor) 
according to their possesion of power and wealth. 
The Mostazafeen dimension of the ideology focused on the 
economic exploitation and political oppression of the masses 
of the Muslim world. Khomeini delivers his ideas on this 
dimension of the ideology as follows: 
The scholars of Islam have a duty to struggle 
against all attempts by the oppressors to establish 
a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make 
illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses 
to remain hungry and deprived while plundering 
oppressors usurp the sources of wealth and live in 
opulence. 
...It is the duty of Islamic scholars and all 
Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression 
Tatimat az-Zahra was the daughter of the Prophet and wife of Ali. 
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and, for the sake of the well-being of hundreds of 
millions of human beings, to overthrow these 
governments and form an Islamic government.243 
How the Muslim world could get rid of imperialist 
hegemony and establish an Islamic government is explained by 
the Jihadic dimension of the ideology. The Jihadic dimension 
is a revolutionary one, encouraging both the Muslim masses and 
the Ulema to engage in political action. 
It accepts that the people are the most important source 
of political power and they should arise with alertness, 
attention and curtail those corrupts hands which seek to put 
Islamic states under the domination of the great powers. 
Before the people, the powers, no matter how great they may 
be, can accomplish nothing because it is impossible to impose 
something upon people. The people who want to resist against 
the great powers seek to have no compromise with them and also 
intend to neither eastern nor western and wish to follow the 
right path of humanity and Islam, should preapare themselves 
for everything. The people must sacrifice themselves for this 
struggle.244 
This can only be understood by knowing the concept of the 
Shahadet (martyrdom). The Shahadet is a sacred act in the path 
of God, it shows the power of the blood over the sword. 
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Combined with the Shia doctrine, it is the way to unfold the 
power of Islam over tyranny as Imam Husayn did in Karbela. 
As quoted before, the Islam that Khomeini understands is, 
Islam is the religion of militant individuals 
who are committed to truth and justice. It is the 
religion of those who desire freedom and 
independence. It is the school of those who 
struggle against imperialism.245 
In other words, all Muslims must train to be 
revolutionaries that they can become the catalysts of change 
in their non-Islamic societies. 
The leaders of the Jihad are the Ulema, who should " 
...put an end to this injustice and to seek to bring happiness 
to millions of people... through destroying and eliminating 
the unjust governments and through establishing a sincere and 
active Muslim government."246 
The Islamic government is a prerequisite to establish 
these dimensions of the ideology. The ideologues of the 
thought address the form of Islamic government in the times of 
the Prophet and its first Caliphs(or Imams) when the law of 
Islam, divine command, had absolute authority over 
individuals, and the government. Under the leadership of the 
Prophet or Imams, Islamic government was ruled according to 
the Book that has been revealed by God. 
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Islamic government has the sense of adherence to law, 
which is the Sheriat. It is the law of the Book that will 
rule over society. So, it is the main aim of Islamic 
government to establish the just rule over the society based 
on the laws of the Book. Islamic government is not an end of 
the ideology, it is a tool to establish unity, happiness and 
security of the believers in the just society. 
Islamic government will adjust the society and remove the 
oppressors by controlling the concentration of wealth through 
the implementation of the Islamic tax systems. This would not 
only narrow the gap between the rich and the poor but would 
also ensure that wealth was not acquired by the exploitation. 
The jurists,  through parliament and judiciary, will 
supervise such work and ensure that the executive efficiently 
carries out its responsibilities and does not exceed its 
powers. The jurists also should check the executive that the 
executive does not exploit the resources of the ruled and 
acquire wealth which would lead to the corruption.  The 
judiciary that consist of the jurists whose knowledge of the 
law are essential factor in their role will oversee the work 
of the legislature and the executive. 
The Parliament had to be elected by the people. However, 
such an election is subject to certain limitations. Besides, 
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the role of the Parliament and the legislature are different 
from their meanings in the West. The Parliament does not 
engage in the legislation, on the contrary, it acts as a 
conflict management arena and creates necessary programs for 
the implementation of the Islamic laws. In Islamic government 
no one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed 
except the law of the Divine Legislator(God). 
The ideologues of the thought use the verses of the Quran 
to empower the idea. Such as "obey the Messenger" (Quran 
4:59), and "obey the holders of the authority among you" 
(Quran, 4:59) were used to explain that, it is the duty of all 
Muslims to obey the Prophet and the leaders of the Islamic 
government. 
On the other hand, it is the duty of the most 
knowledgeable to ensure that these organs of the Islamic 
government are functioning properly. What it means that the 
institutions of the Islamic government and government itself 
are obeying the rules of the Book. 
This is another important idea that Khomeini introduced 
as the concept of the Velayet-e Faqih (religious 
jurisprudent). The Faqih should be the most knowledgeable 
person on the laws of God, because Islamic government is the 
rule of the laws. He is also trustworthy, excellent in his 
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belief and morals, and just. Khomeini addresses several 
reasons to indicate the neccessity of a ruler. For example, 
Khomeini explains: 
...One is that men have been set upon a 
certain well-defined path and commanded not to 
stray from it, nor to transgress against the 
established limits and norms, for if they were to 
stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men 
would not be able to keep to their ordained path 
and to enact God's laws unless a trustworthy and 
protective individual (or power) were appointed 
over them with responsibility for this matter, to 
prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of 
the licit and transgressing against the rights of 
others. If no such restraining individual or power 
were appointed, nobody would voluntarily abandon 
any pleasure or interest of his own that might 
result in harm or corruption to the others; 
everybody would engage in oppressing and harming 
others for the sake of their own pleasures and 
interests.247 
According to Khomeini, the Faqih is over the all of the 
institutions of the government, he is the one who will guide 
the rulers of the government to act according to Islam. If the 
rulers of the government adheres to Islam, they must 
necessarily submit to the Faqih, asking him about the laws and 
ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. 
Another reason of the necessity of the Faqih is the 
absence of the Imam according to Khomeini. Because the twelfth 
Imam is in the occultation, and Islam and the Imamate must be 
protected, a guardian is necessary. In the absence of Imam, it 
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is the duty of the Faqih to be guardian of Islam by the name 
of Imam. The Faqih will perform the duties of the Imam and his 
authority should be equal to the same authority that the 
Prophet and the Imams had, not in terms of status but in terms 
of function.248 
b. Turkey 
The foundation of the ideology in Turkey is established 
by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk was a great soldier, 
statesman, reformist, idealogue, and leader. He was strongly 
nationalist, and devoted his life to the Turkish nation. He 
had a great vision on the politics and on the society. In his 
youth, he studied many Western authors and ideologues. He also 
had a great knowledge on the history and literature of both 
the Western world, and on the Turkish world. 
At the final days of the Ottoman Empire, there were three 
main ideas among the intellectuals, the Pan Ottomanism, the 
Pan Turkism, and the Pan Islamism. As addressed before, the 
Pan Ottomanism was based on the concept of gathering different 
nationals of the Empire under the same flag by allowing them 
to be a part of the system. The Pan Islamism, on the other 
hand, was concantrated on the concept of gathering all of the 
Muslim world under the flag of the Caliph by creating more 
developed Islamist structure in the Empire. 
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Both ideas were experienced during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. The Pan Ottomanism was tested 
by the leaders of Tanzimat movement and Young Turks during the 
First and Second Meshrutiyet(Constitutional) periods. (1876- 
1877, 1908-1918). Contrary to the expectations of the Young 
Turks, it did not work. None of the Christian nationals of the 
Empire devoted themselves to the well-being of the Empire. As 
a response, Abdulhamit dissolved the Parliament and tried to 
implement the Pan Islamism. As noted before, none of the 
Moslem nationals favored the idea. 
The remaining option, the Pan Turkism, had. different 
interpretations. In one school of thought, it was the idea of 
gathering all of the Turkish people in the world under the 
same flag and establishing "Turan", a great Turkish Empire of 
the times. One of its supporters, Enver, followed this idea, 
and spent his life without any succses. Besides, his ambitions 
caused the disintegration of the Empire. 
On the other hand, according to Ataturk, the Pan Turkism 
was a nationalist movement in which the creation of a nation 
state based on the national boundries was accepted as an 
ultimate goal. The boundries of this nation state were defined 
as "Misak-i Milli", instead of Turan. So, instead of running 
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unrealistic goals, Ataturk was determined to follow more 
reachable goals in his policies. 
Ataturk set twin goals for his ideology: creation of 
independent self-preservation within the national boundries, 
and modernization of the society. These goals put a 
fundemantal imprint on the future course of Turkey. 
Externally, they implied distant but peaceful relations with 
foreign powers. Internally, they were interpreted as a search 
for development along the lines of the contemporary 
civilization of the West. 
Ataturk transformed Turkish nation from being undeveloped 
and forgotten soldiers of the Ottoman Empire to the 
contemporary nation with a democratic administration. Thus, 
Ataturk instilled a new sense of pride and honor among the 
demorilized Turkish nation. He created the Republic of Turkey, 
a nation state with democratic institutions, from the debris 
of history. 
The establishment of a nation state was managed by 
several reforms. These reforms were based on the ideological 
foundation called "Kemalism". Its main points were popularly 
known as the Six Arrows. These are republicanism, nationalism, 
populism, etatism, secularism, and reformism. 
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The principle of republicanism declares that the regime 
of Turkey is a republic. The representative system of 
republics allow the people to shape their futures. It is the 
most honorable solution to the dispute between the ruler and 
the ruled. In the republics, the people itself is the ruler 
and ruled. It is the best form of regime that allows people to 
increase their well-being. In the republics, the people will 
find solutions to their problems by discussion, thus the 
harmony in the nation will increase. The republics is the form 
of regime in which democracy can work. Ataturk believed that 
the people has a right to determine their future. 
Even in 1923, when the National Grand Assembly was first 
established, it was written in the Assembly that "sovereignity 
is vested in the nation without any restrictions". This is the 
just explanation of the Ataturk* s republicanism. It is the 
nation that has sovereignity, neither dynasties nor clergy. 
Ataturk also emphasized the nationalism in order to 
create strong nation state. To establish a common will of the 
nation to protect and develop the country, the nationalism is 
a right tool.  The nationalism also will increase the harmony, 
cooperation, and respect among the citizens of the nation. 
Ataturk replaced the universalism of the Ottoman Empire 
with a realistic version of the nationalism. He encorouged the 
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studies on the Turkish identity of the people, especially on 
the pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic eras of the Turkish history. 
One of his mottos was "Turk: pride, work, trust". In his 
motto, he told the Turkish nation that there are many things 
to be proud of as a Turk. But we must work hard to catch up 
the contemprorary civilization. After then, we can trust on 
ourselves and our future. 
The nationalism that Ataturk interprets is neither racist 
nor unrealistic. He accepted that there may be minorities or 
different ethnic grounds in Turkey. The crucial thing is not 
to be purely, ethnically Turk,it is a feeling oneself as a 
Turk, as a member of this great nation. It is to share same 
happiness or same pain with others. It is to share the common 
will of developing and protecting the country.bb Another motto, 
"Happy is the one who calls himself as a Turk.", may explain 
the anti-racist form of the Ataturk's nationalism. 
As mentioned, the Ataturk's nationalism is not seeking 
for the creation of great Turkish Empire, or Turan, in which 
all of the Turks in the world would gather. The relations with 
bbAn example of the patriotism in the United States will be helpful to many readers. As it is 
observed, the vast majority of the citizens in the United States are proud of being American, 
although there are no ethnically American people, except the native Americans. So, instead of 
looking for pure ethnic Turk, Ataturk emphaized a common feeling of being a member of Turkish 
nation. 
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other Turkish peoples living in other parts of the world is 
encouraged because of existing close ties. However, the 
approach to the Turks in abroad is limited with cultural, 
linguistic, and social relations. To rally for such an idea 
(Turan) would destroy all of the resources of Turkey. In this 
case, Turkey would spend all of its energy to reach an 
unrealistic goal. Turkey must use its resources and energy to 
increase the well-being of its citizens and catch up with the 
contemporary civilization. 
With the principle of populism, Ataturk removed the bases 
for class struggle among the citizens. Populism ensured that 
each citizen has the same rights and duties under the law. The 
citizens of Turkey are equal. The sovereignty can not be given 
to any class, group, or person. The discrimination based on 
the class, wealth, race or any means are removed. Each citizen 
has basic and fundamental rights which can not be abolished 
and transferred.  The rights of citizens are under the 
protection of the law.  Populism is not a socialism, it is an 
equal and just treatment of the citizens. Populism also 
requires that the administration must work for the well-being 
of its citizens and the country. So, it is the principle of 
being "for the people, by the people". 
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Etatism emphasized the central role of the state in 
directing the nation's economic activities. Ataturk understood 
that independence is not only being independent as a 
sovereignty, it requires being independent on every aspects of 
life, in the economic field, in the justice, and so on. If a 
nation is under the foreign influence on any area, then we can 
not speak about independence. To achieve full independence, 
Turkey has to remove foreign influence on every field. 
As a witness of the burden of capitulations, Ataturk gave 
great importance to economic development. Etatism is a 
principle to guide the economic development of Turkey. It is 
a mixed system, both the private sector and the state are 
active in the development of economy. 
To understand better, one should know the situation of 
Anatolia, and newly born Turkey in the 1920s. There were no 
industrial complex, no accumulated wealth, no infrastructure, 
and no know-how to establish national economy and industry. 
The people was hit by the ongoing wars of decades. The 
invasion of Anatolia, especially the well-implemented Greek 
efforts, destroyed what was on hand. The country needed 
everything, hospitals, roads, energy, food, and so on. The 
small amount of the existed industries were under the foreign 
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control. The primitive industry and home based production were 
not capable of producing the needs of the country. 
Besides, there are some areas that although not 
profitable for the private sector, the country needs 
desperately, such as, infrastructure. In some areas, the 
investment is essential to establish national industry, such 
as strategic minerals. The first goal of the economic 
activities is to reach the self-reliant status to remove the 
influence of foreigners .cc 
So, the state assumed the duty of establishing national 
industry and regulating the economy. The first industrial 
complexes were build in the 1930s. From then on, etatism 
became a guideline for the Turkish economy. The state planned 
the economic activities and invested on those areas that 
private sectors either is not capable or not willing to do so. 
Thus, the state enterprises were established. Under the 
guideliness of etatism, Turkey achieved rapid development. 
Ataturk believed that the seperation of church from state 
allowed rationalism and science to emerge as leading planks of 
Western civilization. As addressed before, the corruption of 
"It should be noted that, Ataturk is not against foreign investment if and only if it is 
beneficial to Turkey. What Ataturk is strongly opposing is the dominance of foreigners or the 
dependency on foreign powers. 
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clergy and their dominance on the administration of the 
Ottoman Empire led to the underdevelopment of the Empire in 
science and technolgy.dd The resistence of the clergy 
undermined many reform movements.ee As a result the 
overwhelming superiority of the West which was accumulated 
basically after the seperation of church and state eventually 
led to the participation of the Empire. 
So, Ataturk seperated clergy and state in the modern 
Turkey that aimed to catch up the Western civilization. 
Ataturk sought to disengage religion from the condition of 
being political instrument. Ataturk did not attacked the 
religion, or oppressed individuals because of the religion. It 
was the dominance of the corrupted clergy that he demolished. 
Besides, secularism granted more freedom to the 
individual. The individual is free in his religion, it is his 
ddThe clergy resisted everything from the West even it was a technological innovation. 
This resulted in the lack of modern technology. For example, the first press came to the Empire 
two centuries after its establishment in the West. The reason was very clear, because the clergy 
established their hegemony on the knowledge of the book, if the press were accepted, many 
people would have an acces to the Book. The hattats (people who were writing books by hand) 
and clergy refused the press because it would decrease the cost of books and could produce more. 
This would increase the education level of the people and could argue what the clergy was saying. 
"One of the events was the revolt of the 31 March 1909 in which clergy and Abdulhamit 
were encoruaged a revolt against the Parliament and tried to demolish the constitutional regime. 
Ataturk was one of the staff officers of the army, called the liberation army, that established the 
constitutional regime after the revolt. 
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decision to believe in any religion or not. Nobody can be 
forced to express his religious beliefes or to accept a 
certain one. Secularism removed the discrimination among the 
people based on the religion. It also removed the clergy that 
interrupts the relation between the individual and God. The 
role of religion was reduced to the individual, and the role 
of the clergy is defined as a guide to the needed. This role 
is the sole responsibility of clergy, not to interfere the 
politics of state. Secularism, by this means, established more 
tolerant and positive acceptence of religion, thus increased 
the harmony among the citizens. 
The  final principle of reformism gives  a dynamic 
structure to the ideology. Ataturk was against dogmatic ideas. 
If the ideology is static and persistent, then will eventually 
be obsolete. Because, the situations are constantly changing, 
so are the forces that shape the interaction of the people 
within the society. Globally speaking, the power balances are 
constantly changing. Under dynamic change of nature, the 
future is always unclear and uncertain. In order to cope with 
the uncertainity, to  answer the challenges of the future, 
Ataturk came up with reformism. Reformism allows future 
generations to adjust the tools of the ideology according to 
the situations. What is suitable today to achieve the goals of 
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the ideology may not be suitable for tomorrow. Reformism 
dictates constant improvement of the policies or tools of the 
ideology in order to lead the Turkish nation to the 
contemporary civilization. 
These principles are fundamental and unchanging 
principles of modern Turkey. Even so, these principles were 
written in each constitution (the 1961 and the 1982). In the 
1982 Constitution, the type of the regime and its 
specifications are based on these principles. 
Such as, the very first Article of the Constitution says: 
"The State of Turkey is a Republic". In the second Article, 
"The Republic of Turkey, is a democratic, secular, law- 
abiding, and social republic that is respectful to human 
rights, based on harmony of the society, the national unity, 
and justice, which is loyal to Ataturk's nationalism and its 
principles." 
In the third Article it is stated that the State of 
Turkey is undividible with its nation and its territoriy. The 
fourth Article declares that the regime(Article one), and its 
specifications (Article two and three) can not be changed, or 
even be proposed to be changed. 
Article six declares the same motto that was written in 
the  first  Grand National  Assembly which  explains  the 
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republicanism;  "The sovereignity is vested on the nation 
without any restrictions". 
Article ten is the decleration of populism: "Everybody, 
without a dicrimination based on the language, race, color, 
sex, political idea, philosophic belief, religion, sect, and 
etc. are equal... No privileges can be given to any body, any 
family, any group or any class within the society." 
Article twenty-four is the explanation of secularism: 
"Every body has a freedom of conscience, religion and 
conviction... No body can be forced to worship, to participate 
in religious prayers and ceremonies, to be forced to express 
religious belief and convictions, and be blamed or 
punished. "249 
To transfer the society from its east-orientation to the 
contemprorary one, Ataturk implemented several reforms. His 
reforms were basically aimed to replace traditional value 
systems, modes of behaviour and their institutional and 
organizational manifestations with their modern counterparts 
through the application of western rationality, science and 
technology. 
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2. Political Structure of the Two Countries 
In this  section,  the examination of the political 
structures of the two countries will be based on the main 
elements of the political structure. These main elements 
consist  of  structure  of  the  government,  political 
institutions- basically political parties,  and political 
opposition groups. 
a. Iran 
The government structure of Iran is based on the 1980 
Constitution and has been in the process of consolidation 
since then.  The Constitution later revised in 1989. As 
addressed before, the structure is shaped by the Islamic 
ideology. The rulers of the government claim that they govern 
the Muslim people of Iran as the representatives of the divine 
being and successors of the Imams. 
The Faqih is the ultimate decision maker at the top of 
the structure. The role of the Faqih is to be a policy guide, 
an arbiter, and a guardian of the faith. The Faqih is the 
just and pious jurist and most knowledgeable on the Book. The 
Faqih should also be accepted as best qualified to lead the 
nation. 
The Faqih controls the administration. He appoints the 
jurists to the Council of Guardians, the chief judges of the 
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judicial branch, the chief of staff of the armed forces, the 
commander of the Pasdaran, members of the Supreme Defense 
Council, and the commanders of the army, air force, and navy. 
The Faqih approves the candidates for presidential elections, 
dismisses a president who has been impeached by the Majlis or 
found by the Supreme Court to be negligent in his duties. 
Articles five and 107 of the Constitution provide 
procedures for succession of Faqih and revised in 1989. The 
Faqih will be selected as the most expert jurist. If a single 
religious leader can not be found, then religious experts 
elected by the people are to choose from among themselves 
three to five equally distinguished jurists who then will 
constitute a collective Faqih, or Leadership Council.250 
The head of the administration is the President who has 
the highest official power next to the office of the Faqih. 
The President must be a Shia Muslim and man of political and 
religious distinction. The President is elected for a four- 
year term on the basis of absolute majority vote of the 
electorate. He may be reelected for one additional term. 
The President deals with the policies of the State. He 
establishes his cabinet which is subject to the approval of 
the Majlis. He signs laws to enforce. Following the amendments 
of 198 9, the President became sole power that controls the 
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executive branch.  He shapes the economic and political 
decisions of the administration. 
The legislative branch of the government is the Majlis. 
It is also an arena for the debates on the policies of the 
executive branch. The Majlis not only approves the cabinet, 
but also questions their performance. The Majlis can question 
any individual minister or any member of the government on the 
policies of the administration. 
The Majlis consists of 270 deputies. Each deputy 
represents a geographic constituency and is elected for a 
four-year term. Every one who is older than fifteen years of 
age may participate in the elections. Five of the seats of the 
Majlis are reserved for non-Muslims, one each for Assyrian 
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, and two for Armenians. The 
Majlis has its speaker, deputy speakers and committees. 
The Council of Guardians are responsible to examine the 
laws that passed by the Majlis to ensure that they are 
consistent with Islamic laws. The six members of the Council 
are selected by the Faqih or the Leadership Council among the 
just and pious Ulema. Another six members are chosen among 
the Muslim lawyers who were nominated by the High Council of 
the Justice and approved by a majority vote of the Majlis. The 
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members of the Council serve six-year terms, with half of them 
being changed every three years. 
The highest office of the Judiciary is the High Council 
of Justice. Its five members serve five-year terms and may be 
reelected. The Council consist of the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court, the attorney general, and three other clergy 
chosen by religious jurists. All of them must be distinguished 
in their religious interpretations. The Council is responsible 
of establishing appropriate departments within the Ministry of 
Justice to deal with civil and criminal offenses, preaparing 
draft bills related to the judiciary, and supervising the 
appointment of judges. 
The Minister of Justice is chosen by the Priesident among 
the candidates that recommanded by the High Council of 
Justice. The Minister of Justice is responsible for all courts 
throughout the country. 
Other important office of the judiciary is the Supreme 
Court which reviews the decisions of the lower courts to 
ensure the conformity and uniformity of them with existing 
judicial policies. 
The administration of the country is also divided into 
twenty-three provinces. Each of them also subdivided into 
several counties, and so on. These provinces headed by the 
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governor-in-general who was appointed by the Minister of 
Interior. Besides the governors, the represantatives of the 
Faqih, called as Imam Jomehs,     share the political authority. 
The  most  important  political  institution  of  the 
revolution was the IRP. This party was established in 1964. 
Although Khoemeini was not a party official, this party had 
close connections with him. This privilege increased its 
popularity and dominated the early years of the post- 
revolution era. Either by using the prestige of the effective 
clergy or using the intimidation tactics and terror, the IRP 
became the main actor of the revolution. 
The IRP consolidated its power in the 1980s and dominated 
the Majlis. The gangs, called Hezbollahis, that were organized 
by the IRP suppressed the opposition by terror. A good example 
of this was the challenge of Bani Sadr. Bani Sadr challenged 
the Majlis which was dominated by the IRP and its Prime 
Minister Racai. At the end, Bani Sadr left the Presidency and 
escaped from being killed by fleeing to abroad. Following this 
event, the IRP suppressed the political and religious 
opposition. 
However, the IRP could not be a party of masses. It was 
a tool of the revolution and the Ulema to establish their 
goals. At both national and local level, the official of the 
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IRP perceived themselves as responsible for enforcing uniform 
Islamic behaviour and thought. The IRP lost its functionality 
in the late 1980s because of debates on the power distribution 
and economic policies. As a result, its leadership decided to 
dissolve the party in 1987. Khomeini approved the decision, 
thus closed the era of the IRP. No other party was established 
after the dissolvement of the IRP. 
Despite the fact that there are eighteen licensed 
parties, none of them is comparable with the former IRP. The 
existing major parties are Tehran Militant Clergy Association 
(TMCA),  led by Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-Kani, and Militant 
Clerics Association(MCA), led by Mehdi Mahdavi-Karubi and 
Mohammed Asqar Musavi-Khoiniha. The son(Ahmad Khoemeini) and 
daughter(Zahra Mostafavi) of Khoemeini also supported the MCA. 
The two parties are rival each other and they represent 
moderate and radical groups. The 1992 elections marked this 
rivalry. Rafsancani elected again in 1992, however, the MCA 
gained important position in the Majlis. The MCA critized the 
policies  of  Rafsancani  by  calling  it  as  "Islami-ye 
sarmayehdari(capitalist Islam)", as opposed to their version, 
"Islami-ye Nabi-ye Mohammedi(pure  Islam of  the  Prophet 
Mohammed)". The MCA also questioned the Khamenehi's legitimacy 
as  Faqih.  However,  the  coalition  of  pragmatic  and 
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conservatives against radicals enabled Rafsancani to pass the 
bills neccessary to implement his policies. 
Other important political groups are: the Hezbollah, 
Hojjatiyeh Society, Mojaheddin of the Islamic Revolution (not 
the same of Mojaheddin-e Khalq), Muslim Students Following the 
Line of the Imam. 
The Islamic Republic did not satisfy many groups in Iran 
and they continued to resist the Islamic government. The most 
important of them was the Mojaheddin. The Mojaheddin has more 
liberal or sometimes radical interpretation of the Shiism. The 
Mojaheddin began as a radical party, supporting a Marxist 
religious ideology in the 1960s. 
The ideological conflict of the two parties increased 
because of the refusal of the idea of the Velayet-e Faqih by 
the Mojahaddin. The IRP attacked this party as it did to other 
groups. However, the Mojaheddin proved its determination and 
continued its power struggle by violent armed struggle. The 
Mojaheddin supported Bani Sadr, and following his impeachment, 
rose in armed rebellion against the IRP dominated government. 
Some of the opposition parties, the Paykar (a pre- 
revolutionary Marxist splinter from the Mojaheddin), and the 
Fadayan Minority(a splinter from the Fadayan after the 
majority of the Fadayan voted to support the government). The 
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IRP, by using its advantage of controlling the government 
resources, was able to suppress the rebellion. Most of the 
members of the rebel parties were killed or arrested. 
Mojaheddin managed to survive by transferring its leadership 
to abroad and reorganizing. 
Even though communist Tudeh and Marxist Fadayan were 
supported the IRP in this struggle, the IRP also attacked 
these parties because of their Marxist and communist 
doctrines. Besides, the leaders of the IRP were suspicious of 
the Soviet connections of these parties. In any case, in a 
sudden operation, most of the leaders of the Tudeh and Fadayan 
were arrested in 1982. The remainders of these parties were 
either killed or arrested during their armed resistance in the 
countryside. 
The remaining opposition party was a non-religious the 
IFM. Its prominent members included the former prime minister, 
Bazargan, and the foreign minister, Ibrahim Yazdi. The IFM 
opposed the IRP and criticized its excesses. The IRP-backed 
gangs also attacked the IFM, including its leadership. 
Bazargan was not allowed to be a candidate for the Presidency 
in 1985 and 1992. In the following years, the IFM was forced 
to be a silent opposition. 
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As a result of the dominance of the IRP, the opposition 
parties transferred their organizations to abroad. There are 
four categories of the political opposition groups: 
Monarchists, Secular-Democratic groups, Islamic groups, and 
Marxists. 
The monarchists are rallying for the restoration of the 
monarchy in Iran. Although the future concept of the monarchy 
varies among the monarchist parties, they accept that Reza 
Cyrus Pahlavi, the eldest son of the last shah, as legitimate 
ruler of Iran. The most active party of this line is the 
Paris-based National Resistance Movement, led by the former 
royalist prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar. However, Bakhtiar 
was assasinated in 1991. It is very hard for the monarchists 
to seize the power in Iran without significant leadership. 
Although these groups are not very active politically and 
militarily, less known cells are launching terrorist 
activities within Iran. For example, the Babak Khorramdin 
(BKO), whose name derives from an Iranian who fought against 
the Arab invaders in the 6th century, attacks Iranian 
officials and clergy. The BKO even attempted to assasinate 
Rafsancani in February, 1993. The motorcade of Rafsancani was 
ambushed at a crossroads in Tehran by members of the BKO. They 
used rockets and machine guns, however, the presidential 
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guards were able to capture them. A couple days later, the BKO 
assasinated five Revolutionary guard officials as a 
retaliation for the savage assasination.251 
The secular-democratic groups support one form of the 
republic. Main parties of this group are National Democratic 
Front, led by Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, and National Front, 
led by Karim Sancabi. Both parties are headquarted in Paris 
and have little political activities in Iran. Some of the 
parties of this group joined the Mojaheddin-dominated National 
Council of Resistance. 
The Islamic opposition groups basically differ from the 
administration because of their different interpratations of 
the ideology. They basically refuse the concept of Velayet-e 
Faqih. Some of them also insipired from Marxist ideology. The 
main element of this group is the Mojaheddin-e Khalq(People's 
struggle).  The party was  actively participated in the 
Revolution, however, the ideologic rivalry with the IRP let 
the armed struggle of the Mojaheddin. Its leader, Rajavi 
reorganized the Mojaheddin in France. He and Bani Sadr 
established the National Council of Resistance, which was open 
to non-monarchist parties. The Mojaheddin opened dialogue with 
Iraq, and established its bases in Iraq. Thus, the Mojahedin 
was able to launch offenses against the Pasdaran units in 
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Iran. In 1987, the Mojaheddin declared the establishment of 
the National Army of Liberation. 
The Mojaheddin is the politically and militarily most 
active opposition group. It constantly attacked to the 
administration and launched terrorist actions within Iran. The 
Mojaheddin blow up oil pipelines in southern Iran in May, 
1993.252 It attacked the Iranian government offices, officials 
and clergy.253 
The Mojaheddin tried to gather the attention of 
international organizations to the human rights issue in Iran. 
The Mojaheddin also became a source of intelligence for the 
world regarding the covert activities of Iran. It has 
supporters among different sections of the society. 
The Marxist groups are also active in Iran, however, they 
lost the initial momentum. The main organization of this group 
is the communist Tudeh. The Tudeh reorganized in the late 
198 0s. Its headquarters were established in East Germany in 
1983. The Tudeh was able to organize its cells in Iran, but 
suffers from a lack of broad support. Another Marxist group, 
the Fadayan Majority joined to the Tudeh because of the losses 
of the party after the government operations. The Marxsist 
Fadayan Minority joined to the Mojaheddin and established its 
offices in abroad. The Paykar, another Marxist organization, 
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was also largely destroyed. However, the Paykar was able to 
organize secret cells in Iran. 
b. Turkey 
The  Republic  of  Turkey  is  a  representative, 
parliamentary,  democratic,  and  secular  republic.  Its 
organizations  and balance  of  power  are  based  on  the 
Constitution that serves as a main guide and protector of the 
Kemalist ideology. 
According to the Constitution, the exercise of the 
executive power is vested in the President and the Council of 
Ministers. The President is the head of State, he represents 
the Republic of Turkey and the Unity of the Turkish nation. 
The President oversees the workings of the Constitution and 
ensures that the organs of the state function in an orderly 
and harmonious manner. He is elected for a seven-year term 
among the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA) or among the Turkish citizens who are over 4 0 years of 
age and eligible to be a member of the TGNA. 
The President can veto laws that the TGNA proposed. The 
President decides renewal of parliamentary elections, appoints 
the Prime Minister or accepts his or her resignation, appoints 
or removes Ministers upon the recommendation of Prime 
Minister.  The  President  also  ratifies  international 
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agreements, appoints accredited envoys to represent the 
Turkish State in foreign countries, and receives the 
represantatives of foreign states to the Republic of Turkey. 
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish armed 
forces, and decides upon the use of the Turkish armed forces. 
In other words, he has the authority to perform such 
Presidential duties in order to ensure the well-being of the 
Turkish nation. 
The President is over-parties, he is non-aligned with any 
party or group in order to perform his duties objectively. The 
President is not the source of policies, but has to oversee 
these policies regarding their accommodition to the principles 
of the Constitution. 
The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are the 
policy-makers. The Prime Minister is selected by the 
President, and the Prime Minister selects the Ministers. 
However, they must be approved by the President. To form an 
administration, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet must get 
the vote of confidence from the Parliament. Any time, the 
Parliament may vote for the confidence for an individual 
Minister or for the Cabinet as a whole. 
The Prime Minister is responsible to ensure that his or 
her Cabinet  is performing in a harmonious manner  and 
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implementing the policies he or she declared as a program of 
his or her administration. The Ministers are responsible to 
the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister may ask from the 
President to dismiss any of his Ministers. The Council of 
Ministers bear collective responsibility for the general 
policies of the administration and also individually 
responsible for action within the domain of their 
jurisdictions and for the acts of their subordinates. 
The legislative branch of the Turkey is the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly. The TGNA performs this function on behalf 
of the Turkish nation. TGNA represents the people. So, the 
power of legislation of the TGNA may not be delegated, or 
transferred to any individual, class, or group. 
The TGNA is responsible to enact, amend, and abrogate 
laws, to monitor the actions of the Council of Ministers and 
Ministers, and to delegate to the Council of Ministers the 
authority to issue "Decrees with power of Law". The TGNA has 
an authority to ratify international agreements and the 
declaration of war. The TGNA debates the Budget and the Bills 
for Final Accounts. 
The TGNA exercises its parliamentary control functions by 
means of parliamentery questions, investigations, general 
debates, ministerial questioning and inquiries. The Assembly 
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takes its decision by the absolute majority of those present 
which may not be less than one fourth. The TGNA has its own 
speaker, deputy speakers, and other administrative officials. 
Judicial power is exercised by independent courts 
functioning on behalf of the Turkish nation. Judges, who are 
independent in discharging their duties, rule on the basis of 
the provisions of the Constitution, the laws, jurisprudence 
and their personal convictions. No organ, office, authority, 
and individual may attempt to intimidate, instruct or order, 
make suggestions or recommeditions to any judge concerning how 
they should exercise  their powers  in the  courts.  The 
legislative and executive organs and the administration must 
comply with the rulings of the courts, and they may not change 
or delay the application of these rulings. 
The Constitution provides safeguards for Judicial system. 
The Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors wields the sole 
authority to make decisions related to the careers of judges 
and the public prosecutors of the administrative and criminal 
courts. 
The Judiciary consists of Judicial, Military, and 
Administrative courts. These courts render their verdicts in 
the first instance, and if neccessary, the superior courts 
examine  their decisions.  The  superior  courts  are:  the 
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Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeals, the Council of 
State, the Military Tribunal of Appeals, the Supreme Military 
Administrative Court, the Court of Jurisdictional Dispute, the 
Court of Accounts, and the Supreme Council of Judges and 
Public Prosecutor. 
The administration of country based on the centralized as 
well as local administration concepts. The country is divided 
into provinces which are also subdivided among themselves into 
smaller fractions.  These provinces are administrated by 
governors appointed by the Council of Ministers with the 
approval of the President. The governors function as the 
principal agents of the central government and reports to the 
Ministry of Interior. The civil servants in the province 
reports to the governor. The governor is supported by the 
provincial assembly. The members of the provincial assemblies 
are elected by the local people. 
To ensure the local development of districts, local 
administrations, headed by the mayors, are established. 
Municipal administrations are public corporate entities that 
are aimed to provide the common regional and civic needs of 
the people in their areas. The mayor is supported by the 
municipal councils. All of the members of the local 
administrations are elected by the people for a five-year 
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term. 
All citizens of Turkey, with the exception of civil 
servants and members of the Armed Forces who are over twenty 
years of age may form and become members of political parties 
provided that they conform with and meet the related 
procedures in this regard. Prior permission for the formation 
of a political party is not required. The parties are allowed 
to function freely in accordance with the provisions of the 
related laws and the Constitution. In the democratic system of 
Turkey, the political parties are consisdered to be major and 
indispensable political instution of the system. 
The lates general elections were held in October 1991 in 
which six political party and 63 independent candidates 
contested. After the general election, some alliances were 
disintegrated, some new parties were established, and some 
deputies resigned from their parties. At the end of 1993, the 
party presentations in the Parliament were as follows: The 
True Path Party (182), the Motherland Party (94), the Social 
Democratic Populist Party (52), the Prosperity Party (40), the 
Republican People's Party (21), the People's Work Party (18), 
the Nationalist Labour Party (13), the Great Unity Party (7), 
the Democratic Left Party (3), the Nation Party (2), and 
independents (18) . 
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It must be noted that to ensure the efficiency of the 
administration, the Constitution puts a barrier of ten percent 
of the valid votes of the whole and local levels to get a seat 
in the Parliament. So, some parties which could not get more 
than ten percent of the total votes could not get a seat in 
the Parliament. 
The ruling administration of Tansu Ciller is composed of 
the two parties, the Truth Path Party (DYP) and the Social 
Democratic Populist Party (SHP) .• 
The Truth Path Party was established in 1983. Because of 
the ban on the political activities of the former political 
leadership of the Justice Party, the first leader of the party 
was Husamettin Cindoruk. As soon as the ban was lifted, 
Suleyman Demirel became its leader. The leadership of the 
party was assumed by Tansu Ciller when Demirel was elected as 
President. 
The party has a pro-Western ideology and represents broad 
spectrum of the right-wing electorate. According to the party 
program, the economic system must achieve the goal of 
strengthening the liberal democratic regime enabling the 
individual to prosper in freedom. In the foreign policy area, 
the party follows a foreign policy that will be conducting on 
the basis of securing continous security for the country 
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through peaceful coexistence, contributing to world peace, 
developing foreign relations in line with the general 
principles of the United Nations Charter. The foreign policy 
should ensure equality of rights and treatment and a balance 
of interests in bilateral relations and develop economic and 
social relations with Turkey's immediate neighbours in 
particular. 
The party lost some of its votes in the local elections 
after the 1993 because of its inability to cope with the 
economic problems of the country. Although the party received 
highest percentage of the votes (22 %) in recent local 
elections, there was a slight difference with the following 
parties. 
Another member of the coalition, the Social Democratic 
Populist Party is a merger of two parties in the mid 1980s. 
The two left-of-center parties, the Social Democracy Party and 
the Populist Party, merged to form a single party in 1985. The 
leadership of the party held by Erdal Inonu until 1994. In 
1994, Erdal Inonu declared his retirement, and former mayor of 
Ankara, Murat Karayalcin, became the new leader of the SDPP. 
The party believes that the economic and social 
development of the country should be achieved through a 
democratic and planned approach. Liberal economic policies 
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that increase the gap between the poor and rich should be 
replaced by planned economic policies. 
In the foreign policy area, the party believes that 
whilst national security must be placed on sound foundations, 
the Ataturk's principle of "peace at home, peace in the 
world". Despite extreme socialists, the party favors the role 
of the NATO and the membership efforts of Turkey into the 
European Community. The party considers essential protection 
of the basic rights and freedoms within a state where rule of 
law prevails. The party favors a national, democratic, secular 
and social country. 
Despite its high percentages in the mid 1980s, the party 
is losing credit because of its lack of inititative. In the 
recent municipal elections, the SDDP votes dropped to less 
then fourteen percentage. 
The dominant party of the 1980s was the Motherland Party 
(ANAP) . It was founded under the leadership of Turgut Ozal in 
1983. Turgut Ozal was a high level bureaucrat of Demirel who 
had shaped the economic policies of the Demirel administration 
of 1980. Ozal was also former NSP candidate in the elections. 
Following the 1980 operation, Ozal became Deputy Prime 
Minister in charge of economic affairs in the Bulent Ulusu 
cabinet. 
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The MP tried to gather votes of the center-right, center- 
left, Islamic and nationalist electorate. The MP had members 
of the JP, the RPP, the NSP, and the NAP. The succes of the MP 
to gather these groups was because of its dynamic economic and 
social policies. This also attracted many supporters, and the 
MP won the elections from 1983 to 1991. Ozal became Prime 
Minister in 1983. He kept this post until 1989. In 1989, he 
was elected as President. Mesut Yilmaz, former Foreign 
Minister of the MP administration, assumed the leadership of 
the party. 
The MP represented the strongest commitment to liberal 
economy and opened the boundries of the economy for 
entrepreneurs. The MP believed that entrepreneurial iniatives 
of individuals form the basis of development. State 
intervention and restrictions should be minimized so as to set 
up a free market economy dominated by competition. In the MP 
era, Turkey launched a huge drive of exporting and 
privatization. 
In the foreign policy area, the party runs dual policies. 
In the Western world, it favors the membership of the NATO and 
the EC. Besides the West, the MP looks for close relations 
with the Middle Eastern and Moslem states. 
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The MP lost its momentum in the mid 1980s. In this 
period, economic and social problems of Turkey increased. 
Ozal's reluctance to counter fundamentalist Islamic groups was 
another factor. Besides, his family and close associates were 
critized heavily because of misbehaviour and certain 
privileges. In 1991, the MP lost the elections. In the recent 
municipal elections, the MP received twenty percent of the 
total votes and became second party. 
Another interesting event of the early 1990s was the 
emerge of the Prosperity Party (RP). The PR was established in 
1983. Its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was also the leader of 
the NSP. Both parties are Islamic parties and share same 
ideology. The PR is against the pro-Western concepts. As 
addressed before, the PR runs a campaign that is similar to 
other fundementalist Islamic groups. Although it does not 
attack directly to the principles of Ataturk and secular and 
democratic structure of Turkey, it follows an ideology that 
refuses these principles. 
The PR's political life began with attracting few 
percentages of the total votes in 1984. In the 1991 elections, 
the PR attracted 17 percent of the total votes. In the 1994 
municipal elections, they hit the nineteen percentage. This 
shows a major increase, because there is only two percent 
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difference with the leading TPP. Besides, they managed to win 
the elections in the important cities, such as Istanbul and 
Ankara. 
Besides these four major parties, there are total of 
twenty-two parties in Turkey. These parties represent wide 
spectrum. For example, there are four socialist parties that 
represent ultra-left wing. There are equal number of parties 
that represent ultra-right or fundementalist Islamic 
electorate. Turkey also has its enviromentalist party, the 
Greens Party of Turkey. 
The basic political pressure groups are students, 
workers, businessmen, professionals, farmers, and religious 
groups. Each of these groups are organized in one form or 
another. 
The student groups were became active by the beginning of 
the 1960s. In the 1970s, the student activities became 
increasingly violent. The 1980 operation suspended any student 
activity. Although the student groups lost their momentum of 
the 1970s, they are still active. 
The labor organized as unions that represent different 
political ideologies. For example, the Revolutionary Trade 
Unions of Turkey (DISK) represents the left-wing ideology. The 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) represents 
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politically moderate center. The confederation of HAK labour 
unios (HAK-IS) has more Islamic favor in its political 
ideology. 
The main organizations of businessmen, industrialists, 
, and merchants are the National Union of Chambers of Commerce, 
Chambers of Industry, and Commodities Exchanges (TOB), the 
Turkish Confederation of Employers (TISK), and the Turkish 
Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association. These 
organizations have different political viewpoints concerning 
the interests of businessmen, industrialist, and merchants. 
Many of the professionals in Turkey joined in one of the 
professional organizations. These organizations aimed to 
increase the well-being of their members. In addition to their 
activities in their fields, these organizations are also 
active to gather public attention on certain problems, and are 
able to put political pressure to the administration. 
The farmers established several cooperatives that aimed 
to protect their rights and increase their productivity. These 
organizations are established by farmers who are producing 
same crops. These organizations try to influence the 
administration on the agricultural policies. However, most of 
the farmers are not member of big scale organization capable 
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enough to shape the agricultural policies of the administration. 
The religious groups, especially sects became 
increasingly active in the last decades. As adressed before, 
the multi-party system led the relaxation in the strict 
secular policies of the government. The resurgence of 
voluntary religious organizations increased their political 
power. The parties were enthusiastic to these organizations 
because of their vote power. Several sects also increased 
their activities in this period. 
The opposition groups in Turkey can be classified as 
divisive elements, destructive elements, extreme religious 
elements and extreme racist elements. The attention to 
divisive elements will be given in the following sections. 
The destructive elements are basically communist and 
Marxist groups which aim to destroy the democratic structure 
of Turkey by revolution in order to create a supremacy of one 
class over others. These groups were established in the late 
1950s and were very active in the 1970s. 
There are two groups in the destructive movements: First 
group established its strategy to gain political power by 
means of present political free structure. Some of the present 
socialist parties can be classified in this group. Second 
group, on the other hand, has a strategy to reach the goal by 
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people's war. For this reason, destructive organizations in 
the second group use terrorism as a main tactic. 
There are forty destructive organizations which are the 
fractions  of  five  main  organizations.  The  five  main 
organizations are the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), the 
People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO), the Front of 
People's Liberation Party of Turkey (THKP/C) , the Marxsist- 
Leninist  Communist  Party  of  Turkey  (TKP/M-L) ,  the 
Revolutionary Worker-Peasent Party of Turkey (TIIKP). All of 
them once supported by the Soviet Union, and other Eastern 
countries. Now, they have contact with Russia, Syria, Greece 
and Bulgaria. The 1980 operation crushed these groups, and 
destroyed all of them. However, because of the weakness of 
following administrations, they found enough time to rebuild 
their organizations. The Dev-Sol and Dev-yol were among the 
ones that were reorganized and launched terrorist campaign in 
the late 1980s. They made robberies, assassinations, and 
attacked government offices. Despite their actions, their 
capabilities are far away from causing a threat to the state. 
As addressed before, the excessive religious elements are 
threat for secular structure of Turkey. They want to have a 
regime where it is governed according to the religious rules. 
They want to apply all of the rules of religion to the society 
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and instituties of government. Their strategy is gaining power 
by using all of the opportunities, of present political 
structure, and then making revolution. As a first step, they 
want to get the control of the present government. Later they 
want to establish an religious state where all of the Muslims 
get together. 
There are three main groups and many subgroups of 
excessive religious movement. The 1980 operation hit these 
groups and destroyed their capabilities. However, they were 
able to gather their supporter base and to reorganize. The 
best known organization of this group is the Hezbollah of 
Turkey. The Hezbollah is active in southeastern part of 
Turkey,  especially in Batman and Nusaybin. It has been 
reported that the Hezbollah assasinated people in this area. 
Another unknown group or groups assasinated several prominent 
figures of secularism. However, there is not much evidence 
about these cases. 
The racist movement has an ideology to get all of the Turks 
in one empire. They based their propoganda to the banner of 
anti-communist ideology. They want to establish a totaliter 
government and to change the concept of citizen of Ataturk 
that accepts everyone who identifies himself as a Turkish 
citizen. 
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The 1980 operation destroyed their organizations. 
However, the increse of the Kurdish divisive movements that 
caused many victims among the Turks besides Kurds, let them to 
establish their organizations as a response to the Kurdish 
divisive movement. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
establishment of Turkish states in Central Asia also increased 
their potential. However, there is no active group that can be 
threat to the State. 
3. Leadership of the Two Countries 
a. Iran 
The charismatic leader of the Islamic Revolution was 
Khomeini. He dominated all of the institutions and process of 
decision-making in his era. He was the only real revolutionry 
among the elements of the Revolution. He was the one who held 
the pieces of the revolution together. He acted as mediator to 
settle disputes among the parties. He did not favor any party 
for a length of time and tried to keep the internal balances 
of the Revolution. 
On the other hand, the ideological discrepancies among 
the elements of the Revolution affected the leadership. The 
ideological discrepancies were enhanced as various elements 
within the  leadership were  reacted differently to  the 
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experience of governing and dealing with the outside world. 
Despite the leadership of Khomeini, these discrepancies were 
increased over the time. 
In broad terms, the main schools of thought can be 
categorized as the moderates and the radicals. It is certain 
that the split within the leadership sometimes had overtunes 
of both moderation and radicalism and the paradigm of the 
moderatism or radicalism is not enough to explain the 
situation. Nevertheless, in its essentials, the moderate- 
radical rivalry explains the division within the leadership. 
The moderates,  led by predominant figures such as 
Rafsancani, have more traditional interpretation of Islam. 
They favor a free enterprise economic system, stressing 
Islam's sanctioning of private property. Although committed to 
maintaining the character of the Revolution, they are more 
flexible and soft policy of enforcing it. In foreign affairs, 
they favor the balance with both Eastern and Western bloc. 
They are suspicious about Russia because of its uncertain 
future policies and the proximity of it to Iran. They are 
willing to establish closer ties with the West and to open the 
dialogue with the United States. The moderates seem as if they 
are pragmatic and ready to adapt to new realities. They also 
prefer the national interests of Iran versus vague ideological 
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aspirations. The moderates are strongly supported by the 
bazaar, middle classes, professionals, and the bureaucracy. 
On the other hand, the radicals, also known as the line 
of Imam, have more ideological interpretation of Islam. They 
are led by Hodjat-al-Islam Mohtashami and Ayetollah Sadeq 
Khalkali. The radicals emphazise the egalitarian dimensions 
and admonitions of Islam against the undue accumulation of 
wealth. They favor a centralized and statist economy, massive 
land reforms, and large-scale control of foreign trade. They 
insist on the strict application of the Islamic code. In 
foreign affairs, the radicals are against any reapproachment 
to the West and especially to the United States. They are more 
tolerant against Russia, North Kore, and the PRC. 
The death of Khomeini caused a change in the leadership. 
According to the constitution the new religious leader will be 
elected by the Assembly of Experts among its members. The 
amendments of 1989 in the Constitution changed the 
qualifications of the members of the Assembly of Experts. 
Thus, some of the candidates, such as Ayetollah Mehdi Karubi 
and Ayetollah Sadeq Khalkhali, were lost their chance. The 
disqualification of radical leaders for the membership of the 
Assembly of Experts let the election of Ayetollah Khameni. 
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The new Faqih, Ayetollah Khameni, assumed more religious 
leadership then the role of ruling the government. He is 
accepted as a moderate person, however his position as a 
guardian of the Revolution forces him to act in between of the 
two ends. Khamenei and Rafsancani established cooperation in 
the affairs of Iran. 
President Rafsancani was elected this post first in 1989. 
In 1989, the amendments to the Constitution empowered the 
office of the President by appointing him as a head of 
executive.  Rafsancani consolidated his authority and his list 
of cabinet was accepted by the Parliament in the early 1990s. 
The commitment of Rafsancani to follow more pragmatic approach 
can be understood from his cabinet. Among the twenty-two 
members of his cabinet, twelve of them were known as their 
moderate policies and who were educated in the West. The 
Parliament's endorsement of his cabinet was in reality an 
effective mandate for Rafsancani to pursue his pragmatist 
policies. Thus, Rafsancani was able to purge the former 
Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashami, a  radicalist, from 
the administration. 
Rafsancani established close links with several pressure 
groups of the society, such as merchants and bureaucrats, to 
ensure a broad support base for his policies. He also secured 
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the support of Khamenei by compromising. Since then, the 
moderates  gradually  developed  their  internal  political 
position through carefully constructed alliances with other 
religious and political leaders. As a result of these efforts, 
Rafsancani was elected again to this post in 1993. 
Despite the success of the moderates, the radicals hold 
significant influence over the politics of Iran. The radicals 
frequently criticized the policies of the Rafsancani and even 
slowed down many of the government's reform measures. The 130 
radical deputies of the Parliament interrupts the progress of 
the administration. However, the growing weakness of the 
radicals in the institutional level and insulation from 
crucial organs of the system, their lack of control over armed 
forces and reduced influence over the Revolutionary Guards 
significantly reduce their ability to seize the power. 
The clerical rivalries also became a source of 
inconsistency in the leadership. The most likely contenders 
for power within the clerical establishment are two extremes 
of radical hard-liners and conservatives if the moderates 
fails. However, the sudden change in the internal balances of 
the clergy seems as if impossible. 
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b.  Turkey 
Most colorful leader of Turkey in the 1980s and early 
1990s was Turgut Ozal. His background as a high level 
bureuacrat, an engineer, and economist enabled him to 
implement economic and social reforms for development easily. 
Under his leadership, the MP administration implemented 
several economic and social measures which affected the 
Turkish economic and social structure deeply. 
His liberal economic policies shifted the structure of 
the economy to more liberal one. He forced producers to 
compete with the Western counterparts by lowering the duty 
rates and removing restrictions on imports. The Turkish Lira 
was declared as convertible. He removed restrictions on the 
foreign currency. The state enterprises were accepted as a 
burden on the economy, and the privatization movement gained 
momentum. 
In foreign affairs he accepted the policy what can be 
called as the neo-Ottomanism. He moved outside the limits of 
the Kemalist ideology by actively supporting the coalition in 
the Gulf Crises. He accepted that Turkey's area of influence 
should be the boundries of the Ottoman Empire. He was looking 
for a way to be a member of the EC. Besides, he tried to 
empower the position of Turkey in the Muslim world. 
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In the social policies, he was reluctant to growing 
extreme religious movement. He also opened the pandora's box 
by demanding radical changes in the policy of Turkey towards 
the Kurdish problem. He insisted on the more liberal role of 
government. To ensure this, he lifted the ban on the communist 
and extreme religious movements. He also lifted the ban on 
speaking Kurdish in Turkey. 
He challenged the role of the armed forces as a protector 
of the Kemalist Turkey by attacking its traditional 
mechanisms. His attempts to diminish the role of military in 
the decision-making process were less succsesful then his 
interruptions to the top positions of the armed forces. 
Despite the initial success of the economic reforms, 
Turkey could not enjoyed the economic recovery. His attempts 
to follow a leading role in the regional politics were limited 
by the scarcity of resources. 
Another important figure of the politics in Turkey was 
Suleyman Demirel. Demirel became Prime Minister of Turkey 
seven times. Demirel became President after the death of Ozal 
in 1993. His political career began with the JP in the 1960s. 
He was ousted from office twice because of military 
operations. Maybe because of this, he approved stricter 
measures against terrorism then Ozal. 
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He is very experienced in the affairs of the 
administration. He follows the pro-Western policy in foreign 
affairs. Demirel is more conservative then being reformist in 
his policies. He favors a realistic approach to the problems 
because of the scarcity of resources of Turkey. 
Tansu Ciller is the first female Prime Minister of 
Turkey. She is a scholar of economy prior to her leadership of 
the TPP. She was elected as a party leader after the Demirel's 
Presidency. Tansu Ciller favors a liberal economy, swifter 
privatization, and less state control of the economy. In 
foreign policy, she is willing to implement more active 
policy. Ciller favors the pro-Western foreign policy. 
Ciller has a support of the scholars and Istanbul media 
who prefer the leadership of younger generation versus 
discredited old-style politicians. However, she was not very 
successful in handling the economic and social problems of 
Turkey. Because of her lack of experience with the party 
politics, she does not have much room for maneuver. The party 
is only a few points ahead of its closest rival, the 
Motherland Party. Also, the limited success of the Truth Path 
Party in the municipal elections and a crisis in the economy 
reduced her control over the party. 
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The proposed tax reform is the example of her weakness. 
The Ciller's tax reform, which was going to reduce the tax 
burden of fixed-salary personel and poor by increasing the 
taxes on the rich, was changed heavily. The resulting package 
was not a tax reform, but a replica of the old system. The 
involvement of the pressure groups of the businessmen and 
industrialists forced the party to modify the package of Prime 
Minister. 
Ciller is going to face a challenge in the party congress 
in November. Besides, if her measures to correct the economic 
situation in Turkey fail, she may be forced to early general 
elections. It is believed that she may survive in the party 
congress, but the expectations about the result of the next 
general elections are not so positive for Ciller. 
The growing possibility of the PR victory in the 
elections, which means the grasp of the power by the extreme 
religious groups within the democratic system, may force the 
alliance of the two center-of-right parties, the MP and the 
TPP, in the future. 
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B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES 
1. Economy -Overview 
a. Iran 
Iran's economy is a mixture of central planning, state 
ownership of oil and large enterprises, village agriculture, 
and small scale private trading and service ventures. The 
economy of the post-revolutionary Iran has expreinced four 
cycles: a deep recession immediately after the revolution, a 
strong revival between 1981 and 1986, a mild recession between 
1987 and 1989, and a respectable recovery since the cease-fire 
with Iraq.254 
The  analysis  of  several  economic  indicators  and 
statistics explains the shortcomings of the Iranian economy 
after the Revolution. Iran's gross domestic product (GDP) at 
constant prices declined by some 1.5 percent a year on average 
between 1978 and 1989. In the postwar period of 1989-1991, the 
GDP registered average of the 7.2 percent annual growth. Real 
output at the end of decade was still below that of 1978. The 
rapid increase of the population affected the situation 
adversely. Private per capita consumption in real terms 
dropped from 153,000 rials to 125,000 rials in 1991. The share 
of aggregate consumption in GDP rose from 62 percent in 1978 
to 77 percent in 1991 while that of total investment fell from 
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33 percent to 12 percent during the same period, with public 
investment outlays down to seven percent from eighteen percent 
of GDP.255 
The central government has experienced a budget deficit 
every year since the revolution. The gap ranged from a maximum 
of fifteen percent of GDP in 1981 to three percent of GDP in 
1992, with an average of about seven percent. Since the 
deficit was compansated by credit from the central bank, the 
money supply was increased ten times in this period. So, the 
increase in the inflation was unresistable. According to 
official statistics, the consumer price index rose by 637.5 
percent, or at an average annual rate of eighteen percent in 
this period. It is obvious that unofficial figures are much 
higher then this; some sources claim a figure between annual 
of 50-60 percent.256 
The affect of economic burden on the people was huge. 
According to some indicators, the fixed-salary personel 
received an increase of 142 percent in their salaries and 
bonuses in this period. Thus, more than 90 percent of public 
servants's income became under the poverty line. This 
situation was common for the rest of the population. In one 
study, it was stated that in 1972 some 44 percent of the 
population were living under the substistence poverty line. 
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The absolute poverty increased by 4 3 percent during the 197 9- 
1985 period. At the end of 1988, the absolute poverty 
increased to 65-75 percent of the population.257 
The gap between rich and poor also increased in this 
period. Rafsancani was quoted as saying that twenty percent 
of the population controls 50 percent of the country's wealth. 
However, some sources indicates much higher figure of the ten 
percent of the population controlling 75 percent of the 
wealth.258 
During 1990 and 1991, Iran accrued $12 billion in short- 
term foreign debt to pay for its imports. In 1991, the 
consumer products imports were placed at $21 billion, and $6 
billion worth of weapon was received from Russia. The central 
bank of Iran had signed aggreements for the amount of $10.6 
billion of foreign debt, but it secured only $1.5 billion of 
it. In order to implement the second five-year plan, Iran 
needs a figure between $26 billion to $40 billion additional 
foreign financing.259 
Although Iran did never experienced a famine, it can not 
produce enough food to feed its population. Despite the 
government efforts to Increase the performance of agriculture, 
the dependence on imported food items increased. Imports of 
cereals and grains, which amounted to less than 2.7 million 
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tons in 1978, increased to 8.2 million tons in 1990. The 
imports of other food items also increased.260 
The unsatisfactory socio-economic situation resulted with 
a mass demonstrations in Iran. In May and June 1992, the mass 
demonstrations in Arak, Tehran, Khoramabad, Shiraz and Mashhad 
resulted with clashes with the police. The response of the 
Islamic Iran was swift: the administration hung four people in 
Mashhad, and  another four was hung in Shiraz. Another five 
people was condemned to death. Ayetollah Khamenei charactized 
the riots as the work of "bullies and ruffians", "riff-raff" 
who should be dealt with in a revolutionary way and pulled up 
and thrown away "like weeds".261 
The collapse of the economy was due to some internal and 
external factors. Its assets abroad was freezed and Iran faced 
a trade embargo just after the revolution. The Iraq-Iran war 
destroyed many cities and put a great burden on Iran. A total 
of 52 cities have been damaged. Many industrial complexes also 
hit by Iraq. Total of 4,000 villages were destroyed. Total 
damage of the war to the economy is estimated to amount to 
$592 billion.2f: 
The massive exodus of experienced businessmen and 
managers, and professionals just after the Revolution. The 
capital flight was followed the exodus. The reign of terror of 
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the early years resulted with a chaos in the economy. The 
regime's economic policies which were shaped by the ideology 
caused malfunction of the economic system. The choice of 
statist economy led the administration to resort to public 
ownership, price control, extensive subsidies, industrial 
regulation, and overall economic regimentation designed to 
produce an elusive self-sufficiency. 
The administration used the war as an excuse to economic 
problems and increase the government control. The 
administration's ambitious foreign policy put an extra burden 
on the economy. 
In a major shift, Rafsancani changed the economic policy 
to a more moderate one that encourages the private sector to 
participate in the economic activities. The new strategy of 
economic adjustment and reforms aims at the establishment of 
a market mechanism for determining the prices of goods, 
foreign exchange, and money. In addition to these goals, 
Rafsancani emphasized the privatization of non-strategic 
industries, deregulation of bureucratic rules, reorganization 
of state machinery in the service of marketization. Rafsancani 
administration began to adjust the tax laws, import-export 
regulations,  accounting procedures,  exchange system,  and 
monetary and banking guidelines. 
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Despite the commitment of Rafsancani to correct the 
economic system, the success of his program requires peaceful 
resolution of internal and external conflicts thus improving 
the image of Iran. This is crucuial for the success of the 
reform because of the need to attract and encourage internal 
enterprenuars and foreign investors and financial institutions 
to participate in the reform. 
b. Turkey 
Turkey showed a great success in changing its mixed 
economic structure to greatly liberal one since 1981. Many 
regulations changed and the role of government reduced.State 
intervention in the prices of goods and services was reduced. 
A realistic and flexible exchange rate policy taking into 
consideration of supply and demand in foreign exchange markets 
was implemented. Imports were liberalized to great extent and 
export-promoting incentives were introduced. A certain amount 
of freedom was accorded to the State Economic Enterprises in 
their decisions about pricing and production. Some of the 
state controlled enterprises privatized. 
The economic reforms were supported with the 
administrative reforms. The level of bureaucracy was reduced. 
The regulations and bureucratic proceses were simplified. 
Radical amendments were made to the legislation on the 
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protection of Turkish Lira as well as the foreign exchange 
system. As a result of these amendments, Turkish Lira became 
convertible. The tax system was changed to achieve efficiency 
and full coverage. 
Turkey also improved its infrastructure during this era. 
Many big-ticket items were financeed by the "build-operate- 
turn  over"  formula  in  which  investor  builds  up  the 
infrastructure. The state grants him a term to operate the 
facility or the infrastructure. At the end of this term, the 
state assumes the ownership of the facility or infrastructure. 
Turkey is building up twenty two dams which are the essential 
parts of the Souteastern Anatolia Project (GAP). The project 
aimed to irrigate the vast plains of southeastern Anatolia and 
produce electricity. When the project is completed, Turkey 
will boost its agriculture production. 
However, the impressive stream of benefits from the 
economic reforms that Turkey launched in 1980 have begun to 
peter out. Although its annual growth rate has oscillated 
between six and eight percent-which is the highest rate for 
any member of the OECD, recent economic performance has fallen 
substantially.-''3 
The main problems are high inflation, high interest 
rates, and large budget deficit. The inflation rate was ranged 
-287- 
between 65% to 80% in the last five years. Especially 1994 was 
a big hit for the Turkish economy, for the first time in its 
economic history, some of large companies suspended their 
activities and sent their labor force on vacation. Sudden 
increases in the prices caused some socio-economic problems. 
The middle class of the society hit heavily during last five 
years. The fixed salary earners, especially civil servants, 
received a wage increases that were well below the inflation. 
High inflation pushes the interest rates up in Turkey. On 
the other hand, higher interest rates mean higher cost of 
credit. The prohibitively high cost of credit- 150-200 percent 
a year, as well as the intrinsic weakness of the national 
investment capital, among other factors, limits productive 
investments. One of the side effects of this is the creation 
of fewer jobs in the economy. However, the steady increase in 
the population raises the rate of unemployment which can not 
be paced with the new job fields in the economy. The crucial 
problem of unemployment, the loss of purchasing power of the 
wage earners and the erosion of the currency caused deep 
socio-economic problems in Turkey. 
The chronic and constantly increasing budget deficit, 
which is over the 14 percent of the GDP, and the foreign trade 
deficit forces the administration to borrow money.  The 
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implementation of several large-scale projects are another 
factor in this process. Nevertheless, Turkey became the eighth 
largest debtor nation in the world with its national debt of 
$60 billion. 
The Gulf war and following sanctions to Iraq also caused 
a burden to Turkish economy. Despite the expectations of Ozal, 
Turkey was forgotten in the postwar era and received 
unimportant amount of an economic and military aid. The 
limited trade level with Iraq and the loss of income from the 
pipeline put a barrier to the economic recovery program of 
Ciller. Ciller already has begun to force the West to smooth 
or lift the economic sanctions against Iraq. As explained, the 
sanctions against Iraq also punishing Turkey by not 
subsidizing its losses. 
2. Industry and Technology 
a. Iran 
The main industries of Iran are petroleum, 
petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction 
materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and 
vegetable oil production), metal fabricating (steel and 
copper) industries. All of these industries were affected 
adversely in the post revolution period. 
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The political climate of the post-revolutionary era 
caused a massive exodus. Most of industrial entrepreneurs, 
managers, technicians, and skilled labor were among the people 
who fled the country. The freezing of Iranian assets abroad, 
Western economic sanctions, and negative government policies 
toward multinational corporations resulted in the departure of 
foreign specialists. 
The nationalization of the industrial complexes, 
including the privately owned ones, also became a negative 
factor. Inexperienced new managers, labor disputes and 
disruptive meddling by members of revolutionary committees 
further reduced output. The rapidly increasing state control 
and lack of cooperation among government ministries and 
agencies halted any recovery in the industry. The devastating 
affect of the war on the existing facilities was another 
factor. 
Reductions in the oil revenues and economic chaos sharply 
cut into the import of industrial parts, raw materials, and 
processed goods. Uncertainty of the policies, the limited 
profitability of short-term commercial transactions 
discouraged new long-term investment. As a result of combined 
effects of these factors, in six of the thirteen years in the 
post-revolutionary period, the industrial sector experienced 
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negative growth. Capacity utilization was below 40 percent in 
many industries during the war.264 As a result, the Iranian 
industry was far away from supplying domestic demand and 
supporting the economy with a significant export 
opportunities. 
The Rafsancani administration emphasized a need to reform 
in industry. The reform plan based on the privatization of the 
non-strategic industries offered an important number of 
incentives. Although the plan did not cause a significant boom 
in the industry, it increased the capacity utilization of the 
sector. 
The administration gave top priority to industrial 
expansion, the effective exploitation and utilization of the 
country's mineral resources and power generation. The steel 
industry, because of its strategic importance, is another 
major area of development. The copper and aluminium industries 
are the other areas of interest. 
Iran also signed joint ventures with foreign corporations 
which show the change in the policy. Recently, Iran and French 
car maker Peugeot reached a ten-year agreement to produce 
cars, buses, and vans. Iran also negotiating with Renault and 
Italy's Fiat. Negotiations with Fiat have included the 
production of trucks, tractors, road-building machinery and 
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passenger cars. Cement, sugar, and paper products are other 
favored areas of industrial activity. Brazil and Finland are 
favored partners in the latter two sectors.265 
The sanctions of the West decreased the technological 
capabilities of Iran. The exodus of scientists, technicians, 
and elite academicians halted many technological development 
plans of the post-revolutionary Iran. The ideological reform 
in the high level educational institutions, such as 
universities, affected the technological developments 
adversely. The lack of high technology is much evident in the 
industrial areas. 
The reform movement of Rafsancani also increased the 
activities in this field. The responsibility to oversee 
research and development programs in the country was given to 
the National Research Council. The Industrial and Scientific 
Research Organization is the principal technological 
organization in Iran. The main aim of the development program 
is to gain technological self-sufficiency. 
Despite of these reforms in the industry and technology, 
Iran has huge problems to overcome which will definitely need 
time, harmony and stability in the nation, and resources. 
Besides, Iran has to seek for foreign cooperation to improve 
its situation. The success of these reforms depend on the 
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availability of technological and financial support of the 
West, the commitment of the regime on these policies, and 
internal and external harmony. 
b. Turkey 
Turkey has a variety of industrial sectors: textiles, 
food processing, mining(coal, chromite, copper, boron 
minerals), petroleum, petrochemicals, chemicals, cement, 
construction, lumber, paper, manufacturing; consumer gods, 
intermediate goods, and investment goods. Besides these areas, 
some industries that require high technology, such as aircraft 
industry, communications and electronics are developing 
rapidly. 
The state controlled enterprises dominated the early 
period of Turkish industry. The large-scale and strategic 
industries were handled with the state controlled enterprises, 
while the light industry was received private investment. 
However, the private sector was depended at large on the goods 
that the state controlled enterprises were producing. 
Along with the liberal reform program of the 1980s, 
Turkey shifted towards more liberal industry. The essential 
goals of the new policy can be explained as upgrading the role 
of market signals in decision-making, increasing manufacturing 
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exports, enlarging private sector share in manufacturing, and 
reducing inefficiency in the state controlled enterprises.266 
The administration implemented several measures to change 
the structure of the industry and reach these goals. Such as, 
sharp currency devalution, introduction of export subsidies 
and reductions in export formalities;  thus forcing the 
industry into competition and efficiency, the administration 
removed import quotas and liberalized imports.  Finally, 
foreign investment and the transfer of technology encouraged. 
As a result of the reform package, Turkey experienced 
huge increase in the industrial production qualitatively and 
quantatively. Both the private sector and the state controlled 
enterprises improved the quality of their products and reduced 
inefficiency. This let them also increase their production 
with existing plants. 
Industrial production increased at an avarage of seven 
percent. Industry grew 30 percent of the GDP. The share of 
industrial products in the exports increased significantly. It 
quadrupled, and now constitute 80 percent of total exports, 
compared to 35 percent ten years ago. The manufacturing 
industry production, which consist of consumer goods, 
intermediary goods, and investment goods, showed a growth of 
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seven percent during 1991-1993. The manufacturing industry 
exports grew 8.6 percent during the same period.267 
Another positive indicator is the shift to investment 
goods in the manufacturing industry. The investment goods 
(metalware, machinery, measuring instruments, electronics, 
road vehicles, railway rolling stock, ship building, and 
aircraft manufacture) increased its share in the total 
manufacturing industry production and export.268 
Turkey increased its technological capabilities during 
this period. Many institutions, including universities, 
government agencies, and private sector invested on research 
and development. The transfer of the know-how is encouraged, 
and results are clear: Turkey achieved the production of 
modern aircraft, equipment, and machinary. Its electronic 
industry can compete globally. The exports of communication 
equipment is an example of this proggress. The 
telecommunication system of Turkey is superior to those in 
Eastern and Central Europe, and the Middle East. Another 
example is the Ataturk dam. It is the largest of its class in 
Turkey and one of the largest dams of the world, and has been 
constructed with Turkish technology and work force. 
However, industry reached the capacity utilization of 80 
percent. Henceforth,' Turkey needs to increase investment in 
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order to maintain high growth in the industry. Besides, the 
technological improvement in the industry requires a large 
scale investment on the research and development. On the other 
hand, the high cost of capital in Turkey limits the ability of 
the private sector to invest. In 1994, economic crisis hit the 
industry at large. 
3. Natural Resources 
a. Iran 
The most important natural resources of Iran are its oil 
and natural gas reserves. Its crude oil reserves of 48.5 
billion barrels ranked behind only those of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. The petroleum industry of Iran, which dated from 1908, 
is one of the oldest in the world. Iran made strides in the 
development of the gas industry as well, with efforts dating 
back to the 1960s. This industry was bolstered by the 
discovery of several natural gas fields in 1973.Reserves of 
natural gas amounted 13.8 trillion cubic meters, which makes 
Iran second in the world.269 
Performance and growth in the oil and gas sector were 
severely affected by the war. Many petroleum complexes were 
hit by Iraq. Crude oil production fell to low of 1.46 million 
barrels a day (b/d) in 1981 compared to 5.6 million b/d in 
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1976. the production ranged between 2.2-2.9 million b/d for 
the rest of decade. After the cease-fire, the production 
increased to some 3.2-3.4 million b/d. As a result the share 
of the oil sector in GDP declined from 30-40 percent to 9-17 
percent.270 
Several diverse factors affected this decline in the oil 
production, exports, and revenues: the initial chaos of the 
revolution, damage suffered from the war, gyrations in world 
prices of crude oil, and poor maintenance of oil wells because 
of capital, skilled personel, and other shortages. 
Although Iran tried to increase the weight of non-oil 
industry in its economy, the oil industry is still the main 
industry of Iran. The fluctations in the production, export, 
and revenues of the oil industry have devastating impact on 
the economy. Oil income accounts for about 90 percent of total 
foreign exchange receipts each year. 
The Rafsancani administration understood the need to 
recovery of the petroleum industry. Despite its occasional 
rhetoric, they understood that Iran relies heavily on oil 
income. So, the administration tried to implement a 
rehabilition program which includes the attraction of foreign 
technology and capital. It has been reported that Iran is once 
again negotiating with Western oil companies about investing 
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on the petroleum industry of Iran. The new plan, outlined by 
Oil Minister Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, was stunning in the sense 
that it meant the Rafsancani administration was changing the 
ideological course of the economy to a moderate one.The 
government's basic priority has been to rebuild and repair 
Iran's major oil terminals and facilities. At the same time, 
the government is committed to replacing oil with gas in the 
domestic consumption.271 
Remaining natural resources of Iran besides oil and gas 
includes choromite, lead, zinc, copper, coal, gold, iron, tin, 
manganese, ferrous oxide, and tungsten. Commercial extraction 
of significant reserves of turquoise, fireclay, and kaolin is 
also possible. Iran also discovered uranium deposits in 
1986.272 
Industrialization increased the need for steel, which in 
turn boosted demand for coal, iron ore, and limestone. Copper 
industry also received the attention of the government 
policies which aimed to make it rival to the oil industry. 
Iranian copper deposits are among the world's largest. The 
reserves of chromite are on a large scale. 
The same problems that affected overall industry and 
economy had also hit the mining industry. The efforts of the 
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Rafsancani  administration  did  not  produce  significant 
recovery, but was a right step to recovery. 
b. Turkey 
Turkey's most important mineral products are chrome, 
boron, iron, lignite, copper, manganese,  zinc, antimony, 
bauxite, asbestos, pyrites, sulfur, mercury, and magnasite. 
The production of barite, natural graphite, meerschaum, salt, 
cement, clay, pebbles, marble, onyx are also important. The 
limited reserves of oil, natural gas, uranium, thorium, and 
gold were found in Turkey. 
The most important source of energy is hydrolelectric 
energy. Turkey is trying to optimize its hydroelectric 
potential by constructing new dams and improving the capacity 
of the existing ones. The hydroelectric production of Turkey 
increased from 13,426 gigawatt-hours (Gwh) in 1984 to 28,928 
Gwh in 1988. It is planned to reach 34,500 Gwh in 1994.273 
Turkey's estimated petroleum stocks are amount to sixteen 
million tons, and the enhanced oil-recovery techniques might 
allow extraction of another 30 million tons. The petroleum 
reserves of Turkey are only equivalent to three years of 
consumption. Proven reserves of natural gas are about 12.4 
billion cubic meters.274 
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Turkey's oil fields are mostly located in southeastern 
Anatolia. It is also estimated that the Agean shelf contained 
a considerable amount of oil reserves, however, the dispute 
with Greece restricts the exploration of these reserves. The 
reserves of natural gas were found in Thrace in the 1980s. 
Oil production is held by the state oil company (the 
Turkish Petroleum Corporation), Shell and Mobil. The 
production reached the peak of 3.6 million tons in the 1970s, 
but declined to 2.1 million tons in the late 1980s.275 
Lignite is the second important potential source of 
energy. Turkey has a large amount of lignite reserves. 
However, Turkish lignite, containing high amounts of water and 
sulfur, is hard to burn and causes air pollution. The lignite 
production increased rapidly, from 7.9 million tons in the 
1970s to 34 million ton in 1988. It was planned to reach 66.3 
million ton in 1994.276 
Despite the efforts of the administration to improve the 
natural resources and their share in the GDP, Turkey could not 
improve significantly. Mining contributed only two percent of 
GDP in the 1980s. The exports of minerals accounted an average 
of four percent of the total exports in this era. 
The structure of the sector also did not change 
significatly. The state enterprises still dominate the mining 
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sector. Private-sector mining enterprises were generally small 
scale. Although the administration provided incentives for 
private and foreign investors, there was not any important 
change in the structure. The incentives of 1,365 billion 
Turkish Lira were granted during 1989-1991 to the sector. 
However, this amount represents the 3.5 percent of the total 
incentives that were granted by the government.277 
The inefficiency of the operations of the state 
enterprises did not decrease significantly. For example, the 
hard coal production decreased from 6.5 million tons in 1976 
to 3.8 million tons in the 1980s. The government-owned Turkish 
Coal Company came close to the bankruptcy in the 1990s. The 
poor management and outmoded technology became main factors of 
the collapse. As a result, the unit cost of coal that was 
produced exceeded the cost of imported coal. 
C. SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES 
1. Demographic Structure 
a. Iran 
The recent national census, which was conducted in July, 
1992, showed a total population of 61,183,138. This number 
shows a 27 percent increase in the population since 1986. The 
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official growth rate is 3.5 percent. It is estimated that the 
population will reach 100 million in the early 2000s. 
The population increase is a compound result of increase 
in the birth rate, decrease in the death rate and infant 
mortality rate, and increase in the life expectancy at birth 
and fertility rates. The ideology and change in the government 
policies also major factors of the rapid increase in the 
population. 
In 1976, Iran had a population of 33,704,744 that was 
growing at an avarage of 2.7 percent. The birth rate was 45 
per 1,000 in 1975. It reached the peak of 63 in the early 
years of the revolution, and oscillated around 50 births per 
1,000. The birth rate was 44 per 1,000 in 1992. The infant 
mortality rate was 112 per 1,000 births in 1976. It dropped to 
64 deaths per 1,000 births in 1992. The life expectancy at 
birth was  55.1  and 56.3  years  for males  and  females 
respectively. The life expectancy at birth increased to 64 
years for male,  and 66 years for females in 1992. The 
fertility  level  was  5  births  per  woman  during  their 
reproductive period. This was increased to 6.5 in 1992-8 
The already high population growth forced the Shah to 
implement and encourage the family programming. The government 
established  many  family  centers  in  which  the  family 
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Controlling was explained and neccessary aid was provided. 
However, the Islamic Republic totally abandoned this policy 
because of ideological factors. Besides, the marriages were 
encouraged. The formalities of marriage were reduced and a ban 
on the early marriage was lifted. The younger generation was 
encouraged to marry and establish families in their early age. 
Marriage, specifically early marriage was promoted as part of 
the revitalization of Islamic society and abolishment of the 
Western life style. The Islamic republic considered marriage 
as both an alternative and a barrier to the sexual needs of 
human beings. 
The age structure of the population is also important. In 
1986, the median age of the population was 16.5 years. In the 
same year, the government declared that 50 percent of the 
population was below fifteen years of age, 45 percent was 
between 15- 59 year of age, and only five percent was over 60 
years of age.279 The same structure was existent in 1992. 
The major social problems occurred as a result of 
demographic trends. The unemployment rate was 30 percent in 
1992. The need for at least 500,000 new jobs each year was not 
consistent with the economic growth of Iran. The migration to 
the cities increased in the post-revolutionary Iran. Although 
the process  of  rural-urban migration  is  not  a  recent 
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development, however, the policies of the government caused an 
increase in this trend. Despite the promise of improvement of 
the situation of poor, the poor became poorer in the post- 
revolutionary period. The conditions in the slums of cities 
did not improve or the number of the slums did not decrease. 
This much population also need more food, more cloths, 
and more housing. However, the resources of Iran are not 
enough to satisfy increasing demand of the population. The 
dissatisfaction of the poor increased and this let the 
Rafsancani administration to reactive family control programs 
silently. 
b.  Turkey 
The recent national census, which was conducted in 1990, 
showed a total population of 59,640,143. This number shows a 
16 percent increase in the population since 1985. The official 
growth rate is 2.1 percent. It is estimated that the 
population will reach 100 million in the 2025s. 
Although the population increase is a compound result of 
increase in the birth rate, decrease in the death rate and 
infant mortality rate, and increase in the life expectancy at 
birth and fertility rates, it is offsetted by voluntary family 
planning. 
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The birth rate was 27 per 1,000 in 1992. The infant 
mortality was 55 deaths per 1,000 births in 1992. The life 
expectancy at birth was 68 and 72 years for males and females 
respectively in 1990. These results were achieved by progress 
in the social conditions including better living conditions 
and medical services. 
On the other hand, the fertility level stood at 3.4 birth 
per woman during their reproductive period in 1990. The 
willingness of society to implement family planning is very 
high in the cities. The rural areas are also becoming more 
willing to implement family planning. However, it is not 
accepted by all sections of the population. 
Turkey began to implement and encourage family planning 
since 1965. The government established the Family Planning 
Division within the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance 
in 1965. Abortion was liberalized to a large extent. New 
clinics opened in the country to provide the family planning 
service. In the mid-1980s, more than 200 clinics besides other 
health institutions were providing family planning service.280 
The age structure of the population is also important. In 
1985, it has been reported that 35 percent of the population 
was below fifteen years of age, 29 percent was between 15-29 
years of age, 31 percent was between 30-64 years of age, and 
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only five percent was over 65 years of age.281 The same 
structure was existent in 199o. 
One of the major social problems of Turkey is rural-urban 
migration. Beginning of the 1960s,  Turkey experienced a 
migration of labor force to the cities. The industrialization 
of the country, and the emerge of cities as a economic and 
industrial centers sped up this movement. During 1960-1980, 
the urban population increased by 7.2 percent while the annual 
population increase was a little more than 2 percent. In other 
words, the share of urban population in the total population 
was jumped from 22 percent to 44 percent. During 1980-1990, 
the rapid increase of the movement was reduced, but the 
increase continued. The portion of urban population in the 
total population increased from 44 percent in 1980 to 59 
percent in 1990.282 
This let the establishment of Gecekondu (night-shift) 
population centers around the cities(slums). The government 
could not cope with the huge increase in the city populations. 
The growth of cities showed all kind of problems of the 
unplanned growth. The people who came to seek for jobs became 
dissatissfied because of the scarcity of resources that were 
available for them. The housing drive of the Ozal 
administration in the mid-1980s could not produce satisfactory 
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results. 
The economy also showed a lack of capacity to cope with 
moderate population growth. The unemployment causes a 
significant problem. The recent official information, which 
was declared by Ciller herself, on the umeployment shows the 
10 percent unemployment rate.283 The unofficial employment rate 
is fifteen percent of the total population. It is estimated 
that the decrease in the investments in the economy will push 
the unemployment rate to higher levels in a few years. 
2. Religious Groups 
a. Iran 
The overwhelming majority of Iranians are Muslims who 
adhere to Shia Islam. The 90 percent of the population are 
Shia. Of the several Shia sects, the believers of Twelve Imam- 
or Twelver are dominant. The Shia established deeply its 
organization over all of the society. 
Beside Twelver Shia, the Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, 
has a long tradition in Iran. Sufis generally renounced 
materialism, which they believed supported and perpetuated 
political tyranny. The Shia clergy accepted Sufism as deviant. 
However, the Sufi brotherhoods, such as Nimatollahi, Dhahabi, 
Kharksar, established their supporter base in the society. 
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Besides these brotherhoods, the Naqshbandi and Qadiri 
brotherhoods are existed in Kordestan province. There is no 
evidence of persecution of Sufis in the post-revolutionary 
era, but the brotherhoods are regarded suspiciously and 
generally keep a low profile.284 
Other Shia sects that the Twelver Shia clergy regard as 
heretical are exists in Iran. One of them is the Ismaili, a 
sect that has believers in Iran and abroad. 
The Ismailis are also known as the Seveners. The name was 
derivated from the disagreement with other Shia over the 
identity of the seventh Imam. The Ismailis trace their origins 
to the son of Ismail who predeceased his father, the Sixth 
Imam. They are known in the history as the assassins because 
of their practice of killing political opponents. There are 
several thousands of believers in Iran but the majority of the 
several million Ismailis live outside Iran. Another Shia sect 
is the Ahl-e Haqq. The origins of the Ahl-e Haqq are believed 
to lie in one of the Sufi orders. There are few thousand 
followers of this sect. Both groups have been persecuted 
sporadically by Shias. After the Revolution, some of the sect 
leaders were imprisoned by the charge of religious deviance.285 
Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 8 percent of the 
total  population.  A majority  of  Kurds,  Baluchis,  and 
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Turkomans, and a minority of Arabs are Sunnis. The Sunnis are 
accepted as half-believers and non-Tawhidi by Shia. There is 
a constant effort of Sha clergy to convert Sunni Muslims to 
Shia. Tensions between the Sunnis and Shias existed both 
before and after Revolution, and recentlyled to large scale 
protests, riots against government suppression in Meshed and 
other towns in eastern Iran. 286 
There are non-Muslim minorities in Iran which consist of 
one percent of the population. They were accepted as an 
official minorities and granted political rights with the 
exception of the Bahais despite of the fact that the largest 
non-Muslim minority is the Bahais. 
The Bahaism is a religion that originated in Iran during 
the nineteen century as a reformist movement within Shia 
Islam. The emigration of Bahais because of oppression began in 
the nineteenth century.  The Bahai leader,  who fled to 
Palestine in this period,  continued to eleborate Bahai 
doctrines by incorporating beliefs from other religions. The 
situation of the remaining Bahais improved during the Pahlavi 
era.  The Revolution removed the  rights  of Bahais  and 
persecuted them. More than 700 of their religious leaders were 
arrested and several of them were executed.287 
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However, Christians and Jews, as "peoples of the Book", 
were tolerated both under the Pahlavi and post-revolutionary 
era. The small minority of Christians consist of 250,000 
Armenians, some 32,000 Assyrians, and an unimportant number of 
Catholic, Angelican, and Protestant Iranians who were 
converted by missioneries in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
Christians are entitled to elect their own 
representatives to Majlis, and are permitted to follow their 
religious laws. The Armenians are achieved a relatively high 
standard of living and maintained a large number of schools, 
hospitals, and other community organizations. Both Armenians 
and Assyrians are urbanized.288 
Among the other non-Muslim communities, Jews are also 
recognized as a minority and granted with political 
participatition and tolerance. There were an estimated 50,000 
Jews in Iran in 1986. As usual, Jews of Iran are an wealthy 
minority, dealing with small-scale trading, financial 
activities, and jewelry. The overwhelming majority of Jews 
live in cities.289 
Another non-Muslim group in Iran is Zoroastians. The 
Zoroastions, who were estimated as numbered 32,000. The 
religion is based on the struggle between the forces of Good 
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led by Ahura Mazda and the forces of evil. It was first 
preached by Zarathustra in the sixth century in Iran. Later, 
it became the official religion of the Sassanid Empire. The 
Zoroastrians are recognized as minority and granted with a 
seat in the Majlis.290 
a. Turkey 
The  overwhelming  majority  of  the  population  are 
Muslim (99.8 percent of the total population).  The vast 
majority of Muslims in Turkey are Sunni. The predominant 
religious school of law and ritual in Turkey is Hanafi, 
founded by Abu Hanifa in the ninth century. 
There are several sects among the Sunni population. 
Especially, Sufism established a supporter base in Turkey. 
Some of the Sufi brotherhoods, such as the Mevlevi dervishood 
and the Bektashi dervishood received limited acceptance and 
tolerance. However, some of the Sufi brotherhoods, such as the 
Ticanis, the Naqshbandi and Qadiri brotherhoods were deemed to 
be dangerous for the regime and subject to suspicion. Other 
clandestine sects,  such as Suleymancilar,  Nurcular,  and 
Fettullahcilar are also subject to suspicion because of their 
attacks against the regime. None of these sects could not 
establish vast base of supporters. However, the Bektashi had 
a important position among the elite. 
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There are Shia Muslims in Turkey. They are called as 
Kizilbaslar or Alevis, although there are minor differences. 
The Kizilbaslar are the Turkomans who accepted Shia and living 
in Turkey. Alevis are also Shia Turks, who accepted mostly the 
Sevener branch of Shia Islam. 
There are significant differences between the Twelver 
Shia and Sevener Shia. A Sunni believer asserts that "Mohammed 
is his Prophet(God)". A Twelver Shia add the phrase "and Ali 
is the Friend of God". An Alevi recite the phrase and says 
"Ali is my God". It has been said that because of this, they 
have been called as "Ali-Ilahis"(the belivers of Ali as God) 
or simply "Alevis". 
Besides, the Alevis reject four of five pillars. They 
accept Ali as a dominant figure, not Mohammed. They reject a 
five-times daily pray, and pray twice a year. Instead of 
thirty days of fasting in Ramadan, they accept twelve days for 
fasting in Moharram. They refuse the pilar of pilgrimage. In 
addition to emphasis on Ali, the Alevi belief idolizes Hasan 
and Husayn, sons and successors of Ali.291 The Alevis also do 
not follow the traditions of Islam regarding the family life. 
Alevi communities of varying size are located in most 
major cities, and significantly in southeastern Anotolia. Some 
of the Kurds are also Alevis. Because of the religious 
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discrepancies, there is a tension between Sunni Muslims and 
Alevis, as well as between the Twelver Shia and Alevis. For 
this reason, they are highly secretive about the tenets of 
their belief and their identities. Although it is impossible 
to have any valid data regarding the size of the Alevi 
community in Turkey, there are estimates varying from 4.5 
million to 18 million.292 The most plausible estimation is 
somewhere between five to seven million. 
There are non-Muslim communities in Turkey, however they 
consist only small percent (0.2) of the total population. 
Among the non-Muslim communities of Turkey, there are 
Christians and Jews. The Christian community of Turkey consist 
of Greek Orthodox, Armenian orthodox, Catholic, Assyrian, and 
Protestant communities. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Istanbul is the central church authority for Greek Orthodox 
Christians. 
These communities have been accepted as a part of Turkish 
nation and treated equally. There is no discrimination based 
on religion in Turkey. These communities have established 
their churches, schools, hospitals, and other community 
organizations. They are completely free to practise their 
religious beliefs. There is no privilege or certain political 
right that is granted to any religious groups in Turkey. 
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3. Ethnic Groups 
a. Iran 
Iran is composed of several ethnic groups who speak 
Persian as a common language besides their own language. The 
linguistic division is follows: Persian and its dialects 
account to 58 percent, Turkic and its dialects account to 26 
percent, Kurdish nine percent, Luri two percent, Baluch one 
percent, Arabic one percent, Turkish one percent, and others 
two percent. 
The Persian-speaking Iranians consist of 51 percent of 
the total population. They predominate in the major urban 
areas of central and eastern Iran. Both in the Pahlavi era and 
in the post-revolutionary era, Persian-speaking Iranians have 
filled the majority of government and clerical positions. Most 
of Persian-speaking Iranians are Shia, but a few of them 
believe in the Bahaism and Zoroastranism.293 
The second largest ethnic group is the Azeris which 
consists 25 percent of the population. The Azeris are also the 
largest Turkic-speaking group in Iran. Most of the Azeris are 
concentrated in northwestern Iran, where they form the 
majority population in an area between the Caspian Sea and 
Lake Urmia and from the Azeri border south to the latitude of 
Tehran. Most of the Azeris are urban. Major Azeri cities are 
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Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabi1, Zanjan, Khoy, and Maragdeh. There are 
important number of Azeris in Tehran, Hamadan, Karaj, and 
Qazvin. The majority of Azeris are Shia Muslims.294 
The third sizable ethnic group in Iran are.the Kurds. The 
Kurds account for nine percent of the total population. They 
speak a variety of dialects of Kirmanji. The Kurds are 
concentrated in the Zagros Mountain area along the western 
frontiers with Turkey and Iraq. The Kurdish area of Iran 
includes some part of West Azerbaijan, all of Kordestan, much 
of Bakhtaran and Ham, and parts of Lorestan. The Kurds are 
both urban and rural. Important Kurdish cities are Bakhtaran, 
Sanandaj, and Mahabad. They are mostly Sunni Muslim.295 
The clandestine Kurdish groups are struggling against the 
regime to gain an authonomy for the Kurdish areas of Iran. The 
ethnic opposition parties of Kurds includes the KOMALA, the 
KDPI, and the split of the KDPI, the KDPI-RL. 
The Bakhtiaris and the Lurs, who live in the central and 
southern Zagros, account to important percent (together 10 
percent) of the total population. Both groups are closely 
associated to each other, however, they are considered both 
separate political and tribal entities. Both groups speak 
Luri, a language which is classified as a member of Indo- 
Iranian languages family. 
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The Bakhtiaris established a strong role in the politics 
of Iran prior to the Pahlavi era. During the 1900-1920s, they 
dominated the Iranian politics. Their resistence to the 
central authority was gradually broken by the Pahlavi Shahs in 
the following years. The central government forced them to 
settle which weakened their tribal structure and power. As a 
result, in the 1990s the Bakhtiaris became both rural and 
urban. The Bakhtiaris are Shia Muslims.296 
On the other hand, the Lurs live in the Zagros to the 
northwest, west, and southeast of the Bakhtiaris. The Lurs 
were considered fiercest of tribes and their resistence to the 
central authority were finally broken in the 1940s. They were 
forced to settle down in urban areas and to give up their 
nomadic character. As a result, the Lurs were settled in 
villages, small towns and in Khorramabad, the provincial 
capital of Loreastan. The Lurs are Shia Muslims.297 
The Baluchis are another group that speak an Indo-Iranian 
language that is close to Pashtu, one of the major languages 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are also part of the 
Baluchis who are living in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
The Baluchis account to one percent of the total 
population. They are concentrated in the Makran highlands, an 
area that stretches eastward along the Gulf of Oman coast to 
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the Pakistan border. This area is the most desolate part of 
Iran for several reasons. Equal part of the Baluchis are 
seminomadic, nomadic, and settled farmers and townsmen. The 
Baluchis kept their tribal organizations and the control of 
the central authority is weak. They are Sunni Muslims and 
there is a constant tension between the Baluchis and Persian- 
speaking Iranians.298 
The Qashqais are the second largest Turkic group in 
Iran. They live at the higher elevations of the Zagros south 
of Shiraz and at the low elevations north Shiraz. They speak 
a dialect of Turkish. The Qashqai confederation emerged in the 
eighteenth century and kept its organization until 1930s. The 
Qashais resisted central authority and revolted several times 
because of the forcibly settlement policy of the government. 
In the post-revolutionary era, the control of the central 
government was also weak. The important part of Qashqais are 
Shia Muslims. 
Other Turkic groups are consist of the Ilsavan 
confederation, the Qajars, the Turkoman confederation, the 
Afshars, the Qarapakhs and Uzbeks. Most of these tribes are 
nomadic or seminomadic. These groups are scattered throughout 
Iran, but mainly northern tier of provinces. Many of the 
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Turkic tribes are Sunni. The Turkic groups together account to 
two percent of the total population.299 
There are important number of Arabs living in Iran which 
account for one percent of total population. A majority of the 
Arabs live in Khuzestan, but some of them scattered along the 
Persian Gulf coastal plains, central and eastern Iran. The 
urban Arabs are concentrated in the cities of Abadan, Ahvaz, 
and Khorramshahr. Other half of the Arabs kept their tribal 
structure and became rural and seminomadic. While the 
Khuzestan Arabs are Shia Muslims, remaining of the Arabs are 
Sunni.300 
Despite of the intermingling of Arabs with other groups, 
the Arabs tend to regard themselves as separate than others. 
This resulted with opposition and revolts of the Arabs against 
regime. During the post-revolutionary era, the Khuzestan Arabs 
revolted against the regime. However, the Arabs did not opt 
with Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war despite the expectations 
and claims of the Iraqis. 
b.  Turkey 
Turkey is much homogeneous than Iran ethnically and 
linguistically. Obviously, one may observe different customs, 
dress, dialectal particularities in different parts of Turkey. 
However, none of the differences among the people indicate 
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ethnic differences. These differences are reflections of 
variations in historical and ecological .circumstances. 
Besides, it must be noted that the Turkic groups form one of 
the largest ethnic groups in history. 
In the modern Turkey, the Turks account to 89 percent of 
the population. Some of the major Turkish groups are, Yoruks, 
Turkomans, Anatolian Turks, and Rumelian Turks. There are 
other Caucasus Turks: Circassians, Lazs, Azeris. Besides, 
there are some number of Central Asian Turks: Crimean Tatars, 
Abazahs, Chechens, Uzbeks,Krygyz, Kazakhs." Most of them are 
Sunni Muslim with the exception of the Turkomans. The sizeble 
number of the Turkomans are Shia Muslims. 
If the unsettled argument on the ethnic roots of Kurds is 
left out of the subject of this section,*» the Kurds account 
for ten percent of the population. Some of them are 
concentrated in southeastern Anatolia. However, many Kurds 
scattered throughout Turkey. The sizable Kurdish people may be 
found in the major cities of Turkey who were migrated to these 
It must be repeated that, these classifications do not show any seperation or division of 
these groups as ethnic groups. The classification is made to explain that the minor differences are 
because of different historical background and ecological environment of these groups. 
"It is the view of the author that the Kurds are indispensable part of the Turkish ethnic 
family. 
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cities because of the economic reasons as were addressed 
before. 
The separatist and divisive movement established its 
roots among the Kurdish population after the 1970s. As 
addressed before, the major divisive group is the PKK. It has 
a goal of dividing the Turkish nation and establishing a 
Kurdish state on the territories of Turkey, specifically, in 
southeastern Anatolia. Besides the clandestine terrorist 
group, one of the legal political parties that is represented 
in the Parliament is advocating divisive propoganda among the 
Kurds. Instead of operating for the well-being of the Kurds 
who are the part of the Turkish nation in the parliamentary 
system, the HEP (or with the new name of the DEP) is paying 
lip service to the PKK. 
Another group is Arab speaking people who were preferred 
to stay in Hatay during its joining to Turkey. Later on, some 
of them moved to other parts of Turkey. The Arabs are both 
rural and urban. They are Sunni Muslims. The Arab population 
in Turkey adopted themselves quickly and became members of the 
Turkish nation. 
The Arabs, Greeks, Armenians and Jews account for total 
of one percent of the population. Each of these groups are 
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living   in  a  peace   and harmony with  others   as  members   of   the 
Turkish nation. 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES OF THE TWO 
COUNTRIES 
1. Foreign Relations 
a. Iran 
The foreign policy of Iran showed changes in the post- 
revolutionary era. The major policy change of recent times was 
due to shift in the internal politic balances. As it has 
affected other areas, the victory of the moderate 
administration made major shift in foreign affairs. 
Among the fundamental factors that shaped the foreign 
policy of Iran,  two of them seem more important:  its 
geostrategic position as an arena for great power rivalry, and 
the control of the country by foreign actors for centuries. 
Both experiences have affected the self-image of Iran and 
their perception of the outside world. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran changed the foreign policies 
of Iran. It accepted the ideological framework in the foreign 
policy. As addressed before, the spread of the revolution and 
safeguarding the regime in Iran were main objectives of this 
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era. The export of revolution also would have a side effect of 
safeguarding the regime against hostile movements. 
As a tool for foreign policy, the administration accepted 
"people-to-people" approach rather than government-to- 
government. This approach was derived from the ideology that 
declares either Muslim or non-Muslim governments as an 
illegitimate or hostile. With close approach to the people of 
different nations, Islamic Republic could explain its 
ideology. This policy derives from a naive faith in the 
superiority of the Revoluition's ideas and the belief that 
they would be embraced by others if they could be adequately 
exposed to them. 
Besides, the imperialist powers of East(the Soviet Union) 
and the West(western countries and the United States) who were 
attacking against Islam require awareness of the Islamic 
Republic. So, Iran followed so called "neither East nor West" 
that required non-alignment with any power. The United States 
was labeled as "Great Satan" and the Soviet Union was "Lesser 
Satan" by Khoemeini. 
The continution of the war and Iran's inability to reach 
a settlement either by means of force or by negotiating forced 
Iran to develop better foreign policies. The absence of the 
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international support for Iran during the war with Iraq forced 
it to establish better connections in the international arena. 
The people-to-people approach was abandoned gradually in 
1984. Khoemeini made a speech and encouraged the 
administration to establish government-to-government relations 
besides the people-to-people approach. Iran began to follow 
so-called "open-door policy" in its foreign relations after 
this speech. Iranian leaders visited Japan, China, East Asia, 
Africa, East and Southwest European countries301 
The confrontation with the United States Navy had an 
important impact on the policy makers. The loss of important 
part of their Navy and downing of a civilian airliner of Iran 
showed them that Iran was not ready by any means to confront 
a super power in a open confrontation. 
One of the major decisions of Iran was the acceptance of 
the U.N. Security Council Resolution 598. This let to 
declaration of the cease-fire with Iraq. The decision also 
showed a major split with early radical foreign policy 
orientation of Iran. The radicals, who were asking of 
continuation of war with Iraq untill Iraq became Islamic 
Republic, were dissatisfied. 
The death of Khoemeini led to change in the leadership. 
The Rafsancani government accepted a need of change in the 
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foreign policy. The pragmatic approach of the Rafsancani 
government gave up most of the ideological policies. The 
administration accepted the realities of the global arena as 
an important factors of decision-process. Besides, Iran 
pursued a policy of opening up toward the West. Although there 
were major obstacles in the rapprochement policy of Iran, Iran 
tried to open dialogue with other countries including "Great 
and Lesser Satans", the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave a chance to Iran to 
obtain their demands from Iraq that were refused before. Iraq 
accepted all of the demands of Iran and the two countries 
signed a peace. The following defeat of Iraq also relieved a 
pressure on Iran. The regional balance of power had shifted 
significantly, and the new situation provided an opportunity 
for Iran to reassert its influence. 
Another significant event was the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. For centuries, the northern border of Iran was 
controlled by a strong, centralized state that was alternately 
hostile and friendly, but always a threat. Now, this threat 
was relieved, and was replaced by several relatively small 
and weak states. 
In their assesment of the situation in the north and 
south,  the Rafsancani administration concluded that the 
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national security of the country in the 1990s would depend 
crucially on the maintenance of political stability and 
cooperation in these two surrounding areas:the Persian Gulf 
and Central Asia. 
Both of these areas are problematic for Iran. In the 
north, the problem in the Caucasus, the Azeri nationalism, and 
the civil war in Turkmenistan and in Afghanistan are some of 
the concerns of Iran. In the south, the power balance with 
Iraq, the security of shipping in Persian Gulf, and the 
vulnerability of important facilities of the country from the 
south are among the major concerns of Iran. 
In order to secure the well being and stability of Iran, 
the administration understood a need to contain the 
instability of region. So, the Rafsancani administration 
emphasized the diplomacy in order to broadening and 
strenghthening of cooperative relations in the foreign 
relations. 
The declarations of goodwill and good neighbourliness are 
aimed to change the image of Iran. For example, Rafsancani 
declared that the main precept of the foreign policy of Iran 
is "respect for territorial integrity as well as social and 
religious values of other peoples." Rafsancani stated that: 
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We should all coorperate to build our region. 
The Persian Gulf area should become like an area 
around a home, like a common farmland.302 
Iran's most vital security interests are focused on the 
Persian Gulf, a waterway that lets Iran to transit all of its 
oil exports and majority of imports through it. It is thus 
essential for Iran that no hostile power controls access to 
it. The negative affect of restrictions on the shipping in the 
Gulf have been observed during the Iran-Iraq war. Even the 
limited Iraqi attacks were enough to cause big damage on the 
oil exports and imports of Iran. Besides, during these 
attacks, Iran learned the extensive vulnerability of its major 
facilities in the region. 
Since Iran has the longest coastline of the eight 
countries bordering the Persian Gulf, it is well positioned to 
project its own power. However,  the existence of other 
countries and strategic importance of the region requires the 
cooperation of Iran with these powers in order to create 
security in the region. On the other hand, the relations with 
other Gulf countries can be better characterized by conflict 
rather than cooperation. The establishment of the GCC and the 
participation of Syria and Egypt in the operations of the GCC 
are aimed to create balance against Iran or Iraq and to secure 
the region. The rejection of Iranian participation to the 
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organization is due to the acceptance of Iran as a threat 
rather than an ally. 
Iran saw the GCC as a tool for other powers to control 
the region. The intensification of the United States and the 
GCC relations portended a semi-permanent American military 
presence in the Gulf. So, one of the important goals of 
Iranian policy to diminish the influence of the GCC in the 
region. In order to achieve this goal, Iran increased its 
efforts to increase bilateral relations with the member states 
while ignoring the GCC as a regional organization. Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, do their best to counter the 
activities of Iran to influence other relatively small Gulf 
countries. Yet, Iran has pursued a naval build-up in the Gulf 
and continues new provocations over Tumbs and Abu Musa, 
driving the UAE and GCC into the arms of the U.S. 
Besides Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Iraq is another rival of 
Iran. The contest for regional power and influence has been 
especially intense with Iraq for a long time. The Rafsancani 
administration gave the top priority to maintaining a balance 
with Iraq and to pursue the containment of Iraq. Following the 
Iran-Iraq war, and the peace treaty, the present situation 
still may be defined as a state of "no peace no war". So, the 
principal objective of Iran's security policy in the south is 
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the containment of Iraq. The continuing concerns about Iraq's 
power have prompted Iran to provide covert assistance to 
regional anti-government forces. The covert efforts of Iran 
are aimed to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and 
establish a friendly regime in Iraq. 
The Rafsancani government accepted the north (the 
Caucasus and Central Asia) as secondary strategic area where 
political instability threatens Iran's security. The fragile 
situation in Central Asia, the war in the Caucasus, and the 
chaos in Afghanistan and Tajikistan receive the attention of 
Iran. 
The chaos in Afghanistan preoccupied Iran for a long 
time. The existence of 2.5 million refugees in Iran and the 
presence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan were the main 
factors in the Iranian involvement. The export of ideology and 
establishing a similar regime in Afghanistan by using the 
resistance groups were other goals. In any case, Iran assumed 
that the existence of the Shia population in Afghanistan may 
let Iran to exercise its influence in the post-war era. 
Throughout the nine-year Soviet occupation, Iran backed 
the mojaheddin(resistence) groups. Iran tried to gather the 
Shia groups under one organization, but failed. Iran supported 
the Jamathi Island, an organization modelled on a combination 
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of the IRP and Tudeh, in the early stages of the problem. 
However, the radicals supported the Hizb-i Island leader 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.  After the evacuation of the Soviets in 
1989, and the fall of the Najibullah administration in Kabul 
in 1992, Iran swicthhed sides again. Iran supported Ahmad Shah 
Masoood, the charismatic and popular Tajik leader, after the 
fall of Kabul.303  One of the reasons of this might be the 
influence of Masood on the Tajiks and his moderate policies. 
As addressed before,  the containment of the Azeri 
nationalism and prevention of the spillover of the Armenian- 
Azeri conflict shaped the policies of Iran towards the 
Caucasus. Tehran fears that the escalating tension in the 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh 
may result with foreign intervention and prompt a major 
refugee flow to Iran. Other concern of Iran is the change in 
the balance of power in the region.  One of the possible 
results of this kind of change is the attempts of the Azeris 
to establish a Great Azerbaijan. This is a potential threat to 
the security of northern Iran and also a threat to Iran's 
territorial integrity. 
The civil war in Tajikistan also a concern of Iran. 
Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia that Iran can 
establish its influence by using common linguistic ties. There 
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are also only a few Twelver Shias in Tajikistan. However, the 
ongoing war between groups halts any advance of the Iranian 
effords. Besides, a fragile ethnic and political structure of 
Central Asia may cause a threat to stability of the region. 
The Rafsancani administration understood that the north 
presents not only potential threats, but also potential 
opportunities. In order to contain the instability in the 
region, Iran increased its diplomatic efforts both on the 
bilateral and multinational level. The regional organizations, 
such as the ECO, became important platforms for Iran to pursue 
its policies. The Caspian Sea grouping is another incentive 
that Iran is aiming to increase the cooperation in the region. 
As a result, the Rafsancani administration removed the 
radical interpretations of ideology from the foreign policy 
area. Once a popular motto of "Neither East nor West" became 
"Both South and North" for the foreign policy of Iran. 
b.  Turkey 
Historically, Turkish security concerns have been focused 
on the perceived threat from the north- from the Slavs under 
the form of Tzarist Russia or the Soviet Union. After the 
Second World War, the threat of the Soviet Union and communism 
dominated the foreign policy and security arrengements of 
Turkey. The perceived threat of the Soviet Union led to Turkey 
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to abandon its non-aligned policies and opted with the West. 
Turkey joined the NATO and later attempted to enter the 
European Community. 
The end of the cold war and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union have radically changed the security policies of 
Turkey. Turkey faced new opportunities and challenges of the 
uncertainity in the region. The Turkish approach to the 
peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia is a result of a 
drive to create a regional cooperation and security. Turkey 
adopted a cautious policy towards the CIS countries, balancing 
its relations with Slav and Turkish nations, and concentrating 
on building economic and cultural ties with the Turkish 
nations. The sympathy of the people in Turkey towards the 
Turkish nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia is in common, 
but the idea of Pan-Turanism is a only distant dream of the 
few ultranationalists in Turkey. 
Many foreign policy makers in Turkey accept that the 
future course of Turkey will be towards the West. The 
emergence of Europe as a power center in the future is clear. 
Turkey decided to be a part of European political and economic 
system as a necessary step to catch up with the contemporary 
civilization. Turkey views the economic and political 
integration with the West as crucial to protect the national 
-331- 
interests of Turkey. The willingness of Turkey for the full 
status membership of the EC has an aim to secure the unity 
with the West. To achieve a full status membership of the EC 
is one of the major goals of the Turkish foreign policy. 
So-called the "new order" in the global politics proved 
itself to be a disorder. The shift to regional sub-systems in 
the global politics is a result of the end of cold war. In 
this era, Turkey faced challenges from unexpected actors. The 
security dimension shifted from the north to the Balkans, the 
Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia; besides the 
north. The response of Turkey to the conflicts is based on the 
principle  of  the  priority  of  regional  security  and 
cooperation. In any case, Turkey tried to come up with 
regional solutions to the regional problems which was a 
guideline of Ataturk.  The initiatatives of establishing 
regional organizations that will increase the cooperation and 
stability is because of this policy. Following Kemalist 
principles,  Turkey  participated  actively  in  regional 
organizations, such as the Balkan Pacts, the Sa'dabad Pact, 
CENTO,  RCD,  ECO.  The  Black  Sea  Economic  Cooperation 
organization is also an example of this principle. 
The conflict and potential of new conflicts in the 
Balkans required Turkey to react. The conflict in the former 
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Yugoslavia has a threat to the stability of the Balkans. This 
conflict has its roots in the history and it is proven by the 
history that any change in the balance of power in the Balkans 
will result with a greater conflict that involves remaining 
actors of the region. 
For this reason, Turkey offered a solution to the problem 
based on the regional solution. Turkey proposed to the 
protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all 
parties, negotiations on the new structure, and removal of the 
arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzevegonia. Turkey is declared that 
any form of aggression must be stopped by the parties. Turkey 
favored the establishment of a power balance between the 
parties which will keep them out of each other's territories. 
Turkey also concantrated its efforts to create an open 
diplomacy with other Balkan countries. 
Another problematic area is the Caucasus. Turkey can ill 
afford the defeat of Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia. 
The possible results of the conflict on Nagorno-Karabagh 
consist of a regional war which may involve Turkey, Iran, 
Russia besides Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish efforts to 
solve the problem before it reaches the level of a threat to 
region itself included offering good offices to the parties 
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and mediating with the parties to solve the problem peacefully. 
The Middle East also occupied an important place in the 
Turkish foreign policy. The disputes with Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran because of different reasons, and extensive military 
build up of these countries under the aggressive and sometimes 
hostile leaderships require Turkey to take necessary 
precautions. The preservation of the balance and increasing 
the cooperation in the region became a major goal of the 
Turkish foreign policy. 
On the other hand, the opportunities of a good relations 
with the Middle Eastern countries and a need to improve the 
situation of Turkey in the international arena forced Turkey 
to establish close ties with the Middle eastern countries. The 
economic opportunities in a stable Middle East is high for 
Turkey. The Gulf crises proved Turkey's strategic importance, 
and Ankara attempted to play an important role in helping to 
build a more stable, prosperous and secure region. 
2. Military Capabilities of the Two Countries 
a. Iran 
Iran's current military capabilities are heavily 
influenced by its demographics. It is the most heavily 
populated of the Gulf states which gives a major potential 
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advantage in building its military forces. However, Iran's 
ability to transform it into effective military power is 
severely limited by economic problems and its image which 
limits access to arms imports. 
The defense structure of Iran consists of regular and 
revolutionary units under the new single General Staff.hh The 
total of its active forces numbered 473,000 men. This includes 
the professionals and conscripts. The reserves are numbered 
350,000. The regular armed forces consist of three branches: 
army, navy, and air force. The revolutionary groups has mainly 
ground forces but also have naval forces and marine units.304 
The army has a total strength of 320,000 men of which 
250,000 are conscripts. It is estimated that the army have 
three army headquarters. It has four armored divisions each 
with a strength of three brigades of nine armored and eighteen 
mechanized battalions, seven infantry divisions, one airborne 
brigade, and one special forces division with three to four 
brigades. 305'i:L 
In the Rafsancani Administration,the same person was 
appointed as the head of the armed forces and the General Staff 
in order to combine two different structures under the single 
leadership. 
"The data on the military arsenal in this section are generally taken from the Military 
Balance 1993-1994 edition. 
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Iran has a total of 1000 main battle tanks consisting of 
T-72, T-62, T-54/55, Ch T-59, Chieftain Mk 3/5, M-47/48, and 
M-60A1. Iran has roughly 1100 light tanks and personel 
carriers consisting of 40 Scorpions, 200 BMP-1, 700 BTR-50/60, 
250 M-113, 130 EE-9 Cascaval and some Urutu personel carriers. 
The anti-tank systems are consist of TOW, Dragon, and AT-3 
Sagger systems. 
Iran is heavily dependent on Russian, the PRC, and North 
Korean artillery. It has a total of 2,500 artillery pieces. 
Iran has M-107 self-propelled 175mm guns, M-101 105mm 
howitzers, Oto Melara 105mm howitzers, M-109A1 155mm 
howitzers, M-110 203mm howitzers. Iran has a total of 1,200 
mortars including 81mm,107mm, and 120mm mortars. 
Iran has 40 Chinese-made Type-63 12x107mm multiple rocket 
launchers and 65 Russian made BM-21 40x122mm multiple rocket 
launchers. It has 230 mm Oghab, 333mm Shahin 2, 355mm Nazeat, 
and  Iran-130  rockets.  Iran's  surface-to-surface missile 
inventory consists of Frog-7, Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. 
The air defense weapons of Iran total 1,500 ZU-23 23mm 
towed, ZSU-23-4 23mm self-propelled, 35mm towed, 37mm towed, 
and ZSU-57-2 57mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. It has 
SA-7, and HN-5 surface-to-air missile systems. 
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The Iranian army has 100 AH-IJ Cobra attack, 31 CH-47C 
heavy transport, 100 Bell 214A, 20 AB-205A, 50 AB-206 light 
helicopters. It also has total of 40 light aircraft for 
different purposes. 
The Iranian navy was the strongest navy in the Gulf 
during the Shah era. However, the war and the confrontation 
with the United States caused very heavy damage. The Iranian 
navy has 18,000 men and is headquarted at Bandar Abbas. Other 
bases are located at Bushehr, Kharg, Bandar-e Anzelli(on the 
Caspian Sea), Bandar-e Khoemeini, and Chah Bahar(on the 
Arabian Sea). 
The Iranian navy has eight principal surface combatants 
including 3 destroyers (UK Battle and US Sumner classes) and 
five frigates (UK Vosper Mk 5 and US PF-103 classes). Iran has 
ten Kaman (Fr Combattante II class) missile ships loaded with 
Harpoon SSM, 23 patrol inshore boats, and 13 hovercraft. It 
has five mine warfare ships. Its amphibious inventory 
includes ten LSTs, three LCTs, twelve LCUs, and fifty small 
patrol craft. Iran can deploy about 800 to 1,200 troops and 
25-30 tanks in an amphibious assault.306 Iran has total of 22 
support ships of different size and type. Iran has two Kilo 
type submarines. 
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The Iranian navy has two P-3F Orion aircraft, twelve 
Sikorsky SH-3D ASW helicopters, two RH-53D mine laying 
helicopters, seven Augusta-Bell AB-212 helicopters. The navy 
adapted Hercules C-130 and Fokker Friendship aircraft for mine 
laying and patrol missions. 
The Iranian air force had 85,000 men and 447 highly 
modern combat aircraft during the Shah era. Although it is 
hard to estimate current power of the Iranian airforce, it is 
well below of that level. The Iranian air bases are located at 
Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Ghaleh-Marghi, Isfahan, Kharg, Khatami, 
Mehrabad, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Tehran. These bases have 
excellent shelters and air defense. It has 15,000 men, 8 to 12 
squadrons and total of 293 combat aircraft. This number does 
not include the Iraqi deliveries. 
Iran has nine squadron for fighter and ground attack 
which include four squadrons with 60 F-4 D/E, one squadron 
with 20 Su-24, four squadrons with 60 F-5 E/F. It has seven 
squadrons for fighter interception which include four 
squadrons with 60 F-14, one squadron with 25 F-7, two 
squadrons with 30 MIG-29. Iran uses five RF-5 and three RF-4 
for air reconnaissance. It has also four Boeing-707 tanker 
aircraft. The Iranian airforce has nine Boeing 747F, eleven 
Boeing 707, one Boeing 727, twenty C-130 E/H, three Commander 
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690, fifteen F-27, five Falcon 20 in its five transportation 
squadrons. 
The Iranian airforce has total of 4 6 helicopters consist 
of 2 AB-206A, 39 Bell 214C, and five CH-47. It has 26 Beech F- 
33, ten EMB-312, 45 PC-7, seven T-33, five MIG-29B, five FT-7, 
and twenty F-5B in its training squadrons. 
The Iranian airforce has AGM-65A Maverick, AS-10, AS-11 
air-to-ground missiles, AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder, AIM- 
54 Phoenix, AA-10, and AA-11 air-to-air missiles. Its air 
defense forces have twelve battalions with 150 Improved Hawk, 
five squadrons with 30 Rapier, 15 Tigercat, 45 HQ-2J, and SA-5 
surface-to-air missile systems. 
The Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were established 
after the revolution as a counter-balance to the armed forces. 
The Iran-Iraq war let the government to increase the strenght 
of this paramilitary organization and establish similar ones. 
The IRGC had 300,000-500,000 men, organized into eleven 
regional commands. The IRGC had eight divisions and many 
independent regiments and brigades. The IRGC was organized 
into border, infantry, armored, special forces, and partatroop 
units. Besides, the IRGC had its own engineering, artillery, 
air defense support units. However, the strength of the IRGC 
was reduced after the cease-fire to 100,000 men in its ground 
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forces,  and 20,000 men in its naval units and largely 
integrated into the regular forces. 
The IRGC was supported by the popular mobilization army 
(Basij) units. The Basij units were organized into 500 lighly 
equipped battalions which had an effective strength of 
130,000. The strength of Basij units were reduced to 30,000 
men after the cease-fire.  Iran has 45,000 men in its 
gendarmerie, and 12,000 in an Iranian-trained and funded 
Kurdish Democratic Party militia. The internal security forces 
were reorganized as the Security Force (Niru-ye entezami) .307 
The Iranian armed forces have major problems that reduce 
its war capabilities. Most of the Western arsenal is not fully 
operative both qualitatively and quantatively. The lack of 
spare parts,  technicians  and  facilities  caused  lesser 
maintenance and limited overhaul repairs. The western embargo 
forced Iran to acquire weapons from the third world countries 
and the Eastern bloc. As a result, the military arsenal became 
strange combination of weapons. This caused logistic and 
operational problems. The relatively low capacity of these 
weapons are also generally accepted. 
The lack of training also reduced the readiness of the 
armed forces. It is also generally accepted that the training 
level of the professional groups are below than their 
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counterparts in the western armies. Besides, several large- 
scale purges amoung the professional units of the armed forces 
during the postrevolutionary era resulted with the lack of 
skills in the command. The Iranian armed forces have less 
skill in the so-called C3 systems (command-control- 
communications) which limits their military capabilities. 
The military build-up program of Iran has aimed to 
recover the situation. The program, with a huge acquisition of 
the equipment and weapons, may improve the qualitive side of 
the problem. 
b. Turkey 
The fighting qualities of the Turkish soldiers are 
legendary, as history testify. In terms of size, modern Turkey 
has the second largest armed forces in NATO, after the United 
States. The total men power of the armed forces amount to 
480,000 of which 390,000 are conscripts. Its reserves total 
1,104,000 men.308 However, the Turkish armed foces suffer from 
the lack of modern arsenal and equipment.33 
The Turkish army is by far the largest and most developed 
of the three service components. Its active strength total 
370,000 men of which 320,000 are conscripts. The army consist 
■"The data on the military arsenal in this section are generally taken from the Military 
Balance 1993-1994 edition. 
-341- 
of four army headquarters and nine corps. The major tactical 
units  of the  army include one  infantry division,  one 
mechanized division, fifteen armored brigades (each of them 
formed by two armored, two mechanized infantry, and two 
artillery battalions), eighteen mechanized brigades (each of 
them are formed by one armored, two mechanized infantry, and 
one artillery battalions and one reconnaissance squadron), 
nine infantry brigades (each of them are formed by four 
infantry and one artillery battalions),  three commando 
brigades (each of them are formed by three commando and one 
artillery battalions), one Presidential Guard regiment, five 
coastal defense regiments and ten coastal defense battalions. 
The First Army,  with headquarters in Istanbul,  is 
stationed in Thrace. It was organized for mobile operations in 
the rolling terrain near the Bulgarian border and along the 
coast of the Black Sea. Its mission is to protect Turkey, 
specifically the Turkish Straits, against a threat from the 
North. The Second Army, with headquarters in Malatya, was 
deployed in southeastern Anatolia with a defensive mission 
facing Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Third Army,  headquarted at 
Erzincan, covered the Transcaucasian border and the historical 
invasion routes from the east with a defensive mission. The 
Aegean Army, headquarted at Izmir, was established as a 
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response to the threat from Greece. The Aegean Army has a 
defensive mission with a sector of responsibility strecthing 
from the Canakkale Strait in the north, to the south edge of 
the Aegean coast of Turkey. 
The Turkish army has some 4,000 main battle tanks 
consisting of 748 M-48A2C, 2,303 M-48T5/AST1/AST2, 706 M-60, 
and 312 Leopard 1A3. It has 2,896 armored personel carriers 
consist of 125 IAPC, 2,412 M-113/A1/A2, 300 BTR-60 and 59 UR- 
416. The Turkish artillery total 4,571 pieces of which 1,788 
are towed artillery, 696 self-propelled artillery, and 2,035 
mortars. There are 32 multirocket launchers and 20 240mm guns 
that are used as coastal artillery. 
The towed artillery is consist of 810 105mm M-101A1, 128 
150mm Skoda, 517 155mm M-114A1/A2, 171 M-59, 162 203mm M-115. 
The self-propelled artillery is consist of 364 105mm M-52A1, 
26 M-108, 168 155mm M-44, 36 175mm M-107, 9 203mm M-55 and 93 
M-110. The mortars include 1,457 107mm M-30, M-106 SP, 578 
120mm mortars. Besides, there are 1,500 81mm semi-propelled 
mortars. The army has 20 227mm MLRS and 12 RA-7040 40-tube 
towed multi rocket launchers. 
The army has 182 Cobra, 300 SS-11, 365 TOW self-propelled 
and 392 Milan anti-tank missiles. Its air defense guns are 577 
20mm GAI-DOl, 224 35mm GDF-003, 877 40mm L60/70, and 192 40mm 
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M-42A1. The army has 12 Rapier, 108 Stinger, and 789 Redeye 
surface-to-air missiles. 
The army has 538 helicopters that are consist of 40 S- 
70A, 21 AH-1W/P, 214 AB-204, 64 AB-205, 20 AB-212, 29 H-300C, 
30 OH-13H, 3 OH-58, 70 TH-55, 45 UH-1D/H. It has 269 different 
type light aircraft. 
The Turkish Navy is responsible for the defense of the 
country against a seaborne attack, for safeguarding the 
Turkish Straits, for protecting the Turkish shipping, and for 
patrol and coast guard functions along the extensive coastline 
of Turkey. The navy has headquarters in Ankara, Istanbul, 
Izmir, Mersin, and Eregli. It has 50,000 men including 40,000 
conscripts. 
The Turkish Navy has 15 submarines including six Atilay 
(Turkish-build Ge Type 209/1200), seven Canakkale (US Guppy), 
and 2 Hizirreis (US Tang) classes. The navy has 19 principal 
surface combatants including eleven destroyers and eight 
frigates. The destroyers are consist of 8 Yucetepe (US 
Gearing-ASW/ASUW) , 2 Alcitepe (US Carpenter), one Zafer (US 
Sumner) classes. The frigates are consist of four Yavuz 
(Turkish-build Ge MEKO 200 ASW/OTHT/ASUW), two Gelibolu (Ge T- 
120 Köln), two Berk classes. 
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The Turkish navy has total of 45 patrol and coastal 
combatants including 16 missile, 29 patrol, 7 coastal craft. 
The missile craft consist of eight Dogan (Ge Lurssen) with 
Harpoon SSM, and eight Kartal (Ge Jaguar) with Penguin 2 SSM. 
The navy also has 22 inshore boats. The navy has four 
minelayers, and 32 mine countermeasures crafts for mine 
warfare missions. The navy has 27 support ships. 
Turkey has one of the largest amphibious fleets of the 
world. The navy has seven LST, 35 LCT, 2 LCU, 22 LCM. The navy 
landed 30,000 troops in two days to Cyprus (65 miles of 
waterway) in the 1974 crises. The LSTs alone can land 2,800 
troops and 100 tanks. The marine troops total 4,000 men and 
have artillery. 
The operations of the navy are supported by 21 S-2a/e/ts- 
2a Tracker aircraft and 3 AB-204AS, 12 AB-212 ASW helicopters. 
The Turkish air force is the youngest of the three 
branches of the armed forces. The air force has 60,000 men 
including 30,000 conscripts. It is headquarted in Ankara, and 
includes two tactical air forces, one transportation, and one 
air training command. The First Tactical Air Force, with its 
headquarters in Eskisehir, has a responsibility to defend the 
west of the 35th longtitude. It will support the operations of 
the First and Aegean Armies. The Second Tactical Air Force, 
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with its headquarters in Diyarbakir, has a responsibility to 
defend the east of the 35th longtitude. It will support the 
missions of the Third and Second Armies. 
The air force has 19 squadrons for fighter and ground 
attack missions, two squadrons for fighter interception, six 
squadrons for transportation, three squadrons for training and 
some reconnaissance units. Its fighter and ground attack 
squadrons are composed of three squadrons with F-5 A/B, eight 
squadrons with F-4E, six squadrons with F-16, and two 
squadrons with F/TF-104. Its fighter interception squadrons 
are deployed with F/TF-104. 
It has total of 539 combat aircraft and 174 reserve 
combat aircraft. The combat aircraft inventory includes 126 F- 
16 C/D, 137 F-5 (44 more in store), 155 F-4E (30 more in 
store), 88 F-104 G/TF-104/F-104S (100 more in store). Its 
reconnaissance squadrons are deployed with 20 RF-5A and 20 RF- 
4. The air force has 13 C-130, 19 C-160, 25 C-47, four 
Citation-11, four CN-235, and one Viscount aircraft in the 
transportation squadrons. It has 75 T-33, 16 T-34, 63 T-37, 27 
T-38, 28 T-41, and 21 SF-260D aircraft in the training 
squadrons. The air force has 128 Nike Hercules and 24 Rapier 
surface-to-air missiles. It has 21 UH-1H helicopters. 
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Turkey has paramilitary organizations operating under the 
authority of the Ministry of Interior in peace time. However, 
these organizations are cooperating closely with the armed 
forces and in the case of war, they will be under the command 
of the Ministry of Defense. These organizations are the 
gendarmerie and the coast guard. The gendarmerie has 70,000 
active and 50,000 reserve men. The coast guard has 1,100 men 
and 36 patrol boats. 
The Turkish defense arrangements still consider Russia as 
a main threat. However, the emerge of new conflict sources 
forced Turkey to reevaluate its security policies. The Gulf 
war also provided an example to Turkey a need to have a force 
that is highly mobile, well armored, projecting high fire 
power, able to operate day and night and has well developed C3 
and electronic warfare systems, and reconnaissance capability. 
As can be seen from the inventory, the Turkish armed 
forces have technologically backward sytems with the exception 
of a few. Most of the weapon systems of Turkey are the surplus 
of the NATO countries. Besides, the armed forces do not have 
a long-range power projection capability. Turkey is even 
behind of the capacities of its Middle Eastern neighbours. 
Neither it is ready to counter surface-to-surface missile 
threat that all of its southeastern neighbours may pose. Nor 
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it is ready to counter any long-lasting chemical or biological 
attack. 
The modernization efforts began in the 1970s were 
constrained by the availability of funds and technologies. It 
has now gained in significance, and the administrations gave 
a high prioity. Under the reorganization program, the armed 
forces reduced the quantity in order to increase quality of 
the forces. Many of the divisions were reorganized as 
brigades. The national industry was improved. The training 
became most important activity. Thus, the armed forces were 
able to increase its level of readiness and reaction 
capabilities. 
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V. SPECATULATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Both countries have a unique culture derivated from their 
long histories. The two nations are existing for thosuands of 
years. The part of Turkish nation has been living in Anatolia 
since 1071 while the Iranian nation has been residing in its 
homeland since the end of the second millenium. Throughout 
their history, the Turks are known to be established sixteen 
states or empires and have always lived as an independent 
nation. The Iranians also established great empires or 
regional states during the history. When the Iranians did live 
under the control of other nations, they always found ways and 
means to protect their national identity and culture. 
Acceptance of Islam and its culture has not affected this 
result much. It was while under the Arab's rule that the 
Iranians widely adopted Islam. Although the conquerors of Iran 
tended to stress the primacy of Arabs, the Iranians were able 
to protect their culture and share the administrative posts. 
Later, they sided with the branch of the Shia who were 
struggling against the Umayyad dynasty. This was another way 
they found to protect their indentity. The Shia let them keep 
their uniqueness among the Muslims of the world. By doing so, 
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they were able to seperate themselves from other Muslims, and 
keep their heritage alive. 
The Turks, on the other hand, voluntarily accepted Islam. 
The Turks found many similarities between Islam and their own 
values and so did not view Islamic culture a threat to their 
national identity. 
The Turkish domination of Iran lasted from 1055 to 1258. 
By 1639, the balance of power was finally established between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire and remained 
virtually unchanged. The frontiers that wer set by the Treaty 
of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639 were not changed except for some 
minor exchange of territory. 
The basic factors influencing the balance were dictated 
by the external and internal situations affecting both 
countries. The Ottomans always looked towards the West as a 
major Ghazi state. They did not focus much attention on the 
territories of Iran. The major threat to the Ottomans always 
came from the West and Russia. Internal weakness within the 
Empire was a main reason the Ottomans could not reduce the 
threat from the West. Numereous foreign interventions, 
especially by Russia, Britain, France and to some extent 
Austria-Hungary, constituted the major threat to stability of 
the Empire. During the same time, foreigners, especially 
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Britain and Russia, dominated the politics of Iran. Russia 
soon became powerful enough to pose a major threat to both the 
Ottoman Empire and Iran. To cope with the threat of Russia 
both the Ottomans and the Iranians began to play off the 
intense rivalries between the great powers. Internal control 
and administrations of the two countries showed similar 
development and common problems. Thus it is clear that the 
balance of power between the two Ottomans and Safavids was 
dictated by the external and internal environment of the two 
countries, not their bilateral disputes regarding territory, 
ideology, or religion. 
When the Shia posed a challenge for the two countries' 
bilateral relations, the Ottomans favored internal measures to 
cope with the threat. Propaganda of the Shia did not cause a 
war between the two countries. 
Analysis of their modern history shows that their first 
priority was given to achieving full independence. Turkey 
continued its struggle to achieve economic and technological 
progress in order to remove its dependency on foreign powers. 
Iran also tried to remove the influence of Britain and the 
Soviet Union by a implementing several reforms to improve its 
economy. 
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Under the threat of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran 
opted to side with the West, especially the United States, 
during the cold war. Turkey followed a more independent 
relationship in its alliance with the United States, whereas, 
the Shah became more dependent on the United States to protect 
his dynasty against external and internal threats. 
Turkey was able to transform its structure to a more 
modern society. The Westernization of the country enabled it 
to become a democratic, secular, and contemprorary state. On 
the other hand, the Shah was unable to transform the 
entrenched traditional structure of his country with a modern 
one. He was powerless to enforce his reforms and the people 
were not willing to accommadate with his policies because of 
the pressure of the Ulema. 
The Revolution was a response of Islamic traditional 
society to the Shah's policies. The Revolution was the result 
of the alliance of different groups against the Shah, but the 
Islamic Republic of Iran was the result of the charisma of 
Khoemeini and the power of the Ulema to control the events. 
Acceptence of the Velayet-e Faqih principle by Islamic Iran is 
evidence of the dominating charisma of Khoemeini. Velayet-e 
Faqih was used as a tool by Khoemeini to dictate his will upon 
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the Islamic Republic. He institutionalized his role by this 
principle. 
Analysis of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic 
may give confusing signals because of irregular implementation 
of often contradictory policies by the leadership. However, by 
keeping in mind that their internal power struggles remain 
unsettled, and recaling the severe political and ideological 
differences among the various groups sharing the power, these 
contradictory polices become more understandable. 
Radical and moderate groups are predominant players in 
this struggle. However, the challenge of the Mojahheddin to 
the regime should not be ignored. By in large, the moderates 
have now established their dominance under the leadership of 
Rafsancani. This can quickly change as any dissatisfaction 
with the policies of the Rafsancani administration may result 
with in an attempt by the radicals to seize power. 
Successes and failures of Rafsancani's economic and 
social policies have had most impact on the popularity of his 
administration. The severe economic conditions of Iran has 
decreased the prosperity of Iranians, especially those of the 
so-called the Mostafezan(oppressed). Revolution has not 
improved the conditions for these huge numbers of oppressed 
people despite propaganda proclaiming otherwise. 
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In order to achieve economic improvement, Rafsancani 
opted for limited liberalization of the policies by some 
extend. Pressure from the bazaar people (merchants) could, 
however, have affected this policy choice. In any case, the 
reform program may improve the situation in the country if 
given a chance to be fully implemented. The results of the 
reform program will take time to see. 
The bilateral relations bewteen the two countries have 
faced several challenges. Analysis of these problems shows 
that many of these problems are the results of changes in the 
regional and global power structure. These problems continue 
to have a devastating impact on other countries in the region. 
Both two countries can not endure any the unexpected 
consequences from these problems. 
One of the scenarios proposed is a regional conflict 
arising from the present problem in the Caucasus. Armenia's 
apparent victory of its expansionist policies may spark 
extremely serious regional conflict. The internal power 
struggle(especially the pressure of the Dashnak party) of 
Armenia also may spark this conflict. 
A victorious Armenia could decide to solve the problem 
quickly and defivitively by attacking Azerbaijan. Armenia or 
"nationalist and patriotic irregulars that are out of the 
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government control" could launch an attack simultaneously 
against Nahcevan and Nagarno-Karabagh. Armenian's main 
objectives will be: avoiding any Turkish support with 
Azerbaijan, securing the land stripe between Nahcevan and 
Azerbaijan, and securing its corridor to Nagarno-Karabagh via 
south. 
Meantime, Armenia or "Armenian irregulars" may be 
successful in the forming a coalition with the Lach and/or 
Lezghis people who are seeking freedom. This coalition would 
have the effect of dismembering Azerbaijan. 
It is plausible that Azeri forces may not show strong 
resistance and enabling Armenian forces, regular or irregular, 
to quickly capture Nahcevan as the first step. An Armenian 
attack towards Nagorno-Karabagh will use two routes that 
already are established, to expand in Nagorno-Karabagh. Azeri 
resistence combined with the help of terrain may reduce their 
speed, however of advance. Slowed down Armenian troops with 
the help of other coalition members could still be able to 
expand the territory held. Within a short period of time, 
Armenia would achieve its goal of annexing Nagorno-Karabagh 
and Nahcevan. 
In the next step, Armenian forces may turn north, towards 
Ganje. They may pass by or encircle the city, but the major 
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goal of this attack would be establishing a link between 
Russia and Armenia. Such a link is vital for Armenia, because 
Russian support will be crucial for Armenia to survive in the 
post-war era. Another benefit for Armenia would be the end of 
its isolation surrounded by the hostile nations; Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 
In order to establish a Great Armenia on predominantly 
Armenian territories, planned massacres of Azeris may be 
useful for Armenians to achieve majority status. This is not 
a new tactic for Armenians, and during the chaos of a fast 
moving war, the international media will not have a chance to 
observe the situation. Anyhow, the Armenian propogandists 
later will provide the evidence of massacres of the Armenians 
in the liberated territorities for the consumption of the 
international media. Evidence of any Azeri massacres will be 
signaled by huge exodus to neighbouring countries, especially 
Turkey and Iran. It is quite certain that Iran would receive 
huge numbers of the Azeri refugees. 
On the other hand, in order to implement this plan, 
Armenia has to keep Turkey out of action. Armenia will use the 
international arena to deny any connection or control of the 
government over Armenian irregulars fighting for their right 
of self-determination and independence. The coalition of the 
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Armeinans with the Lach and/the Lezghis peoples will bolster 
the justification of their actions to world opinion. So, under 
the pressure of the West and international media, Turkey may 
be forced not to intervene in the situation militarily. 
Meanwhile, Armenia call for mediation of the United Nations or 
any other international organization that practically will 
create no solution. This diplomatic strategy of Armenia will 
limit the reactions of Turkey. 
However, Armenia is keenly aware of the fact that Turkey 
has important interests in the region; and pressuring the West 
or international organizations may not be enough. Armenia may 
ask for the active involvement of Russia as a counter balance 
to the challenge of Turkey for influence in the region. 
Turkey, on the other hand, can not let Armenia destroy 
its interests in the region. Besides, a strong and 
expansionist Armenia in itself is an important threat to the 
territorial integrity of Turkey. Although many people in 
Turkey are aware of the possible results of involving this 
kind of conflict, with its outcome are unpredictable and 
dangerous, Turkey still may choose to secure its eastern 
borders. Turkey will use aggreements signed in the 1920s to 
ensure the security of Nahcevan as a reason for intervention. 
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This possible Turkish military operation may have the 
aims of establishing a link with Azerbaijan via Nahcevan and 
capturing the land stripe between Nahcevan and Azerbaijan. 
This operation will cut the links between Armenia and Iran, 
but most of all it will create a corridor between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan -opening further links between Turkey and Central 
Asia. 
Should this happen, neither Russia nor Iran would accept 
a Turkish victory, shifting radically the balance of power in 
favor of Turkey, both in the Caucausus and Central Asia. The 
Russian administration, under pressure from the growing power 
of the Ultranationalist wing (even without that kind of 
pressure, Russians never accept any Turkish domination in the 
region), will side with Armenia and force Turkey to retreat. 
Although Russia does not field superior air power in the 
Caucasus, it could deploy significant number of forces to the 
region. Its long-range missiles and aircraft have enough power 
and capability to empose a significant threat to Turkey. It is 
quite sure that, because its survival is not at risk, Russia 
will have no justification to use its nuclear arsenal. The 
mere existence of such a threat plus pressure from the Turk- 
hating ultranationalists would be significant deterrence to 
thwart Turkey. 
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Iran too, could find itself in the middle of chaos. The 
exodus of huge numbers of Azeris will have negative effects. 
The problem would not be hosting these refugees but resulting 
instability to Iran that is the danger. 
The nationalism among the Azeris in Iran will be affected 
by this event. They may seek the annexation of north and south 
Azerbaijan in order to survive as a nation. If Azerbaijan was 
ever defeated and dismembered, than the Azeri population in 
Iran try to reestablish Azerbaijan once again. On the other 
hand, if Turkey was successful in annexing the Nahcevan- 
Azerbaijan corridor, strengthening Azerbaijan, then the future 
leadership of Azerbaijan could call for the establishment of 
a Great Azerbaijan. 
Iran, in order to prevent this, may invade the land strip 
between Azerbaijan and Nahcevan. Iran may also try to stop the 
exodus of Azeris into its territory. Iiran would achieve this, 
by covertly siding with Armenia. Such a covert alliance could 
help ensure the return of the territory after the chaos. 
Protection of this land strip by Iran is not such a bad 
situation for Armenia. It would relieve the pressure on them. 
However, this will bring Iran against Turkey causing a 
major rift between the two countries. Turkish armed forces may 
even engage Iranian armed forces implementing their war plans. 
-359- 
Another major conflict may be result of the situation of 
Iraq and the Kurdish problem. In this case Turkey, Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria will be major actors. Although there could be 
differences, the conflict may occur either after an attempt by 
Saddam Hussein to reestablish full control of the government 
over northern Iraq or after an attempt to overthrow him. 
Today, the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq enjoy a 
significant freedom of movement. Saddam Hussein may want to 
establish his control over them in absence of strong 
resistance from the world opinion. As a result of this action, 
the Kurds may declare the establishment of an independent 
Kurdistan in northern Iraq. In order to increase its strength 
and encourage the support of several foreign actors, the new 
Kurdistan may call other Kurds for unification with the new 
Kurdistan, "the heart and soul" of the Kurds. 
As in the second scenario, such an attempt by unified 
opposition groups may cause chaos in Iraq. The ensuing 
disorder and uncertainity will led to the dismemberment of 
Iraq. Shia groups may then establish their state in the south 
while the Kurds declare their state in the north, further 
provoking Iran and other foreign actors. To ensure its 
survival and empower it, Iraqi Kurdish leadership may call for 
the unification of the Kurds under flag of the Kurdistan. 
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However, the establishment of any Kurdish state poses 
hidden dangers to the territorial integrity and national unity 
of Turkey. Even if the establishment of such a state is going 
to occur, that state should be under the patronage of Turkey 
in order to prevent the spill-over effect of Kurdish 
nationalism. 
To ensure this, Turkey may use force against Kurdistan 
and invade northern Iraq. As justification, Turkey may use its 
historical rights over northern Iraq or the security of the 
Turkish people there. Control by Iran over northern Iraq, or 
over by a new hostile regime may be important reasons for 
Turkey to react. The oil reserves of northern Iraq may also 
provide an incentive for Turkey. 
On the other hand Iran will not accept the Turkish 
occupation even if it removes the Kurdish threat to Iran. As 
a response Iran may invade Iraq from south and north. Iran 
will try to stop Turkey establishing its control over northern 
Iraq. As a result, the Turkish forces may engage Iranian armed 
as both parties implement their plans. 
Another conflict may occur if the provocation of Iran 
becomes clear and evident to the Kurdish uprising in Turkey. 
Iran has its own Kurdish forces and have supported the PKK. If 
a Kurdish uprising should occur, Iran may use its forces to 
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support the uprising, forcing Turkey to declare a war against 
Iran. 
The Kurdish terrorist movement poses the most immediate 
and dangerous threat to Turkey. The protection and the 
integrity of the country and nation is the vital and most 
important priority of the armed forces and government. As 
noted, it is raison d'etre of the armed forces, and the cause 
for which the soldiers of this nation live and die for. As a 
guardian of the Kemalist Turkey, the armed forces will 
definitely not allow disintegration of the country and the 
nation. 
So, any radical policies of Iran that support or provoke 
the uprising of Kurds in Turkey, the armed forces will move to 
clear the base of support for the uprising where ever it has 
roots, even they are found in Iran. 
One of the scenarios considered is the direct involvement 
of Iran in the domestic problems of Turkey. Turkey may find 
itself in chaos should extreme religious groups come to power 
in democratic elections and then try to change the democratic 
and secular regime of Turkey by using the opportunities of 
their posts. There is no question that the armed forces of 
Turkey would not allow any such body or group destroy the 
secular and democratic regime of Turkey. 
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In this case, if Iran sided with the extreme groups 
actively, then the armed forces will act to remove any support 
to these groups, including any support from Iran. 
Even limited support by Iran to extreme religious groups, 
who seem unlikely of posing significant threat could be a 
problem between the two countries. The export of regime or 
support by Iran to these extreme religious groups will limit 
the areas of cooperation between the two countries. 
Any major dispute in the region will pose a threat to the 
stability of both countries. However, both countries 
desperately need stability and security in the region. There 
are many economic, social, and political burdens on the 
administrations of the two countries. In order to solve these 
problems, both countries need time and resources. The 
disstabilization of the region and overall weakening of 
security requires the devotion of many resources and skills 
the two countries can muster. This definitely reduces the 
chance for development and improvement in the well-being of 
the two countries. 
So, what the best option for Turkey and Iran is to show 
mutual understanding of their common problems and cooperate 
together to increase regional stability and security. None of 
the two countries would pose a threat to each other if they 
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achieve economic and social development of their respective 
countries in a stable and secure region that comes from 
extensive cooperation. 
They may also foster cooperation in the Southwest Asia 
by inviting other regional actors to participate. In the 
interdependent conditions of a global economy, each country 
may achieve economic development only in a stable and 
cooperative environment. 
By increasing the activities of the regional 
organizations, Turkey and Iran can increase the level of 
cooperation in the region. The ECO is a great opportunity 
for the two countries to increase their cooperation. Wider 
intraregional cooperation would be fostered by the ECO. An 
enlarged regional grouping consisting of the Central Asian 
states and their neighbours, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan may lead to the establishment of so-called 
Southwest Asian common market. 
In the view of the successes of the European Community, 
the ECO may eventually increase the economic and social 
conditions of the region. Turkey would then act as a key 
connector of three important regional economic groupings in 
future: the EC, the BSEC, and the ECO. 
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As the prosperity raises the wealth of people, they have 
less incentive to create conflicts which would destroy what 
they have just achieved. Only the mutual cooperation of Turkey 
and Iran provides a framework that allows them to enjoy the 
economic and social development of their respective countries. 
Their increased prosperity will help to create stability in 
one of the most problematic regions of the world. 
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